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Third-Party litigation funding: Panacea or more problems?

  • Charles Silver und David A. Hyman
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 21. Juli 2025
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Abstract

Third-party litigation funding (“TPLF”) is controversial. To its detractors, TPLF creates serious ethical and national security risks, and results in defendants paying out large “blackmail settlements” based on marginal (if not wholly frivolous) claims. To its supporters, TPLF helps ensure access to justice by putting plaintiffs and their lawyers on a more equal footing with well-resourced defendants, and the willingness of sophisticated third parties to invest their own money is an unambiguous signal that a plaintiff’s case has merit.

Our Article makes three contributions: we begin by identifying the similarities in political economy of the campaign against TPLF to the campaigns waged in favor of tort reform. Second, we evaluate the substantive merits of certain arguments against TPLF, treating the rules of professional responsibility as instrumental, rather than ends in themselves. Finally, we explore the importance of agency costs in the market for TPLF. We conclude with some recommendations on how to regulate TPLF.


* Roy W. and Eugenia C. McDonald Endowed Chair in Civil Procedure, School of Law, University of Texas at Austin. Professor Silver participated as an expert witness for Chevron in a bilateral arbitration against Ecuador in which the company seeks to recover some of the litigation costs it incurred as a result of the fraudulent litigation described in Part III, infra.

** Scott K. Ginsburg Professor of Health Law & Policy, Georgetown University Law Center. Professor Hyman only wishes he had been hired as an expert witness for Chevron.


Published Online: 2025-07-21
Published in Print: 2024-07-26

© 2025 by Theoretical Inquiries in Law

Heruntergeladen am 10.9.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/til-2024-0014/pdf
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