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Age, Equality, and Vulnerability

  • Alexander A. Boni-Saenz
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 26. Februar 2020
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Abstract

This Article uses age as an entry point for examining how temporal and methodological issues in egalitarianism make substantive equality an unattractive goal for vulnerability theory. Instead, vulnerability theory should adopt a continuous doctrine of sufficiency, which is a better fit with vulnerability theory’s underlying aims and rhetoric. Instead of evaluating what individuals have in relation to others, sufficiency refocuses the inquiry on whether we have enough throughout the lifecourse. In the context of vulnerability theory, enough should be defined as the capability to be resilient as guaranteed by the responsive state.


* Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. For helpful suggestions and comments, I would like to thank Debbie Dinner, Tova Gamliel, Daphna Hacker, Martha Fineman, Alon Jasper, Suzanne Kim, Nina Kohn, Ariela Lowenstein, Lilach Lurie, Titti Mattsson, Sagit Mor, Fusako Seki, Hila Shamir, Merril Silverstein, Laura Tamblyn Watts, the editors at Theoretical Inquiries in Law, and participants at the Workshop on Legal Transitions and the Vulnerable Subject at Emory Law School and the Elder Law and its Discontents Conference at Tel Aviv University, where I presented earlier versions of this Article.

Cite as: Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Age, Equality, and Vulnerability, 21 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 161 (2020).


Published Online: 2020-02-26
Published in Print: 2020-02-26

© 2020 by Theoretical Inquiries in Law

Heruntergeladen am 26.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/til-2020-0008/pdf?lang=de
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