Artikel
Lizenziert
Nicht lizenziert
Erfordert eine Authentifizierung
Brave New World: A Proposal for Institutional Investors
-
Sharon Hannes
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
3. Februar 2015
Abstract
The purpose of this Article is to consider a novel framework for institutional shareholders’ activism in the United States. This new activism framework would be aimed at improving, at minimal costs, the performance of the portfolio companies in which institutional shareholders invest. The Article begins by laying out this new activism framework and then compares the proposed framework with the prevalent mode of activism through hedge funds. The Article concludes with a discussion of certain implementation challenges, and calls for future research into the proposed activism framework.
Published Online: 2015-2-3
Published in Print: 2015-1-1
© 2015 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
Sie haben derzeit keinen Zugang zu diesem Inhalt.
Sie haben derzeit keinen Zugang zu diesem Inhalt.
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks, and the Financial Crisis
- A State of Inaction: Regulatory Preferences, Rent, and Income Inequality
- Officers’ and Directors’ Liability Under German Law — A Potemkin Village
- Dividend Policy with Controlling Shareholders
- The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nonfinancial Firms: The Case of Brazilian Corporations and the “Double Circularity” Problem in Transnational Securities Litigation
- Corporate Fiduciary Duties and Prudential Regulation of Financial Institutions
- Quack Corporate Governance, Round III? Bank Board Regulation Under the New European Capital Requirement Directive
- Brave New World: A Proposal for Institutional Investors
- The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves “Pivotal Mechanism” as an Alternative to Voting for Organizational Control
- Self-Selection and Heterogeneity in Firms’ Choice of Corporate Law
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks, and the Financial Crisis
- A State of Inaction: Regulatory Preferences, Rent, and Income Inequality
- Officers’ and Directors’ Liability Under German Law — A Potemkin Village
- Dividend Policy with Controlling Shareholders
- The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nonfinancial Firms: The Case of Brazilian Corporations and the “Double Circularity” Problem in Transnational Securities Litigation
- Corporate Fiduciary Duties and Prudential Regulation of Financial Institutions
- Quack Corporate Governance, Round III? Bank Board Regulation Under the New European Capital Requirement Directive
- Brave New World: A Proposal for Institutional Investors
- The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves “Pivotal Mechanism” as an Alternative to Voting for Organizational Control
- Self-Selection and Heterogeneity in Firms’ Choice of Corporate Law
