Competitive Third-Party Regulation: How Private Certification Can Overcome Constraints That Frustrate Government Regulation
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Timothy D. Lytton
Abstract
Private certification as a means of risk regulation and quality assurance can offer advantages over government regulation, including superior technical expertise, better inspection and monitoring of regulated entities, increased responsiveness to consumers, and greater efficiency. This Article examines two examples of reliable private certification in regulatory arenas - fire safety and kosher food - where political opposition and resource constraints have frustrated government regulatory efforts. The Article identifies key features of reliable private certification and analyzes its comparative institutional advantages over government regulation. Critics of private certification question its legitimacy, asserting that private regulation is less participatory, transparent, and accountable than government regulation. The Article responds to these claims, arguing that the two examples of private certification presented here compare favorably with government regulation based on these criteria of legitimacy
© 2014 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Introduction
- The Uneasy Case of Multiple Injurers’ Liability
- Assumption of Risk, After All
- Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice and Road Accidents
- Tort-Agency Partnerships in an Age of Preemption
- The Tort Entitlement to Physical Security as the Distributive Basis for Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulations
- Reg Neg Redux: The Career of a Procedural Reform
- Internality Regulation Through Public Choice
- Modeling Partial Agency Autonomy in Public-Health Policymaking
- Reexamining the Pathways to Reduction in Tobacco-Related Disease
- Competitive Third-Party Regulation: How Private Certification Can Overcome Constraints That Frustrate Government Regulation
- Outcome-Based Regulatory Strategies for Promoting Greater Patient Safety
- Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design
- A Sampling-Based System of Civil Liability
- Operation Arbitration: Privatizing Medical Malpractice Claims
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Introduction
- The Uneasy Case of Multiple Injurers’ Liability
- Assumption of Risk, After All
- Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice and Road Accidents
- Tort-Agency Partnerships in an Age of Preemption
- The Tort Entitlement to Physical Security as the Distributive Basis for Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulations
- Reg Neg Redux: The Career of a Procedural Reform
- Internality Regulation Through Public Choice
- Modeling Partial Agency Autonomy in Public-Health Policymaking
- Reexamining the Pathways to Reduction in Tobacco-Related Disease
- Competitive Third-Party Regulation: How Private Certification Can Overcome Constraints That Frustrate Government Regulation
- Outcome-Based Regulatory Strategies for Promoting Greater Patient Safety
- Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design
- A Sampling-Based System of Civil Liability
- Operation Arbitration: Privatizing Medical Malpractice Claims
