Internality Regulation Through Public Choice
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Saul Levmore
Abstract
Much health and safety regulation can be understood as the product of political coalitions between two groups. The first, consisting of persons with self-control issues, enlists the government as an intermediary. The second either expects to benefit from the success of the first, or anticipates gains from a tax imposed on the first group’s behavior. A political entrepreneur might plausibly turn these groups’ preferences into law. This public choice perspective on regulation provides a positive explanation of why it is more likely that a legal system will engage in some health and safety programs than in others. The important break from the conventional view of regulation, as something that either controls externalities or is imposed paternalistically, is in advancing the idea that the government is an intermediary deployed by those who want help. Internalities, associated with collective action problems or with time inconsistent preferences, deserve equal billing. The discussion considers smoking regulation and other health and safety regulation, and then contrasts these with anti-obesity efforts where private contracting is a more feasible means of controlling internalities, and where political coalitions are less likely
© 2014 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Introduction
- The Uneasy Case of Multiple Injurers’ Liability
- Assumption of Risk, After All
- Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice and Road Accidents
- Tort-Agency Partnerships in an Age of Preemption
- The Tort Entitlement to Physical Security as the Distributive Basis for Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulations
- Reg Neg Redux: The Career of a Procedural Reform
- Internality Regulation Through Public Choice
- Modeling Partial Agency Autonomy in Public-Health Policymaking
- Reexamining the Pathways to Reduction in Tobacco-Related Disease
- Competitive Third-Party Regulation: How Private Certification Can Overcome Constraints That Frustrate Government Regulation
- Outcome-Based Regulatory Strategies for Promoting Greater Patient Safety
- Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design
- A Sampling-Based System of Civil Liability
- Operation Arbitration: Privatizing Medical Malpractice Claims
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Introduction
- The Uneasy Case of Multiple Injurers’ Liability
- Assumption of Risk, After All
- Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice and Road Accidents
- Tort-Agency Partnerships in an Age of Preemption
- The Tort Entitlement to Physical Security as the Distributive Basis for Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulations
- Reg Neg Redux: The Career of a Procedural Reform
- Internality Regulation Through Public Choice
- Modeling Partial Agency Autonomy in Public-Health Policymaking
- Reexamining the Pathways to Reduction in Tobacco-Related Disease
- Competitive Third-Party Regulation: How Private Certification Can Overcome Constraints That Frustrate Government Regulation
- Outcome-Based Regulatory Strategies for Promoting Greater Patient Safety
- Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design
- A Sampling-Based System of Civil Liability
- Operation Arbitration: Privatizing Medical Malpractice Claims
