Reg Neg Redux: The Career of a Procedural Reform
-
Peter H. Schuck
Abstract
This Article traces the trajectory of negotiated rulemaking within American administrative law. The popularity of negotiated rulemaking - among scholars, politicians, and regulators - has waxed and waned since its start in the 1980s. This Article describes and assesses these shifts, charting the birth of negotiated rulemaking, its incorporation into the APA, and its infrequent use in recent years. In mapping the rise and fall of negotiated rulemaking, we focus on two particular critiques - that it violates normative commitments to expertise and rationality in bureaucratic decision making, and that it fails to deliver on its promises of faster rulemaking and less litigation. This Article contends that the first critique is overblown and that the second is true in some instances but not in others. We argue that negotiated rulemaking is most valuable when the appropriate negotiating parties can be easily identified, when they are likely to make concessions and build rapport with each other, and when traditional methods of rulemaking have become ossified
© 2014 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Introduction
- The Uneasy Case of Multiple Injurers’ Liability
- Assumption of Risk, After All
- Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice and Road Accidents
- Tort-Agency Partnerships in an Age of Preemption
- The Tort Entitlement to Physical Security as the Distributive Basis for Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulations
- Reg Neg Redux: The Career of a Procedural Reform
- Internality Regulation Through Public Choice
- Modeling Partial Agency Autonomy in Public-Health Policymaking
- Reexamining the Pathways to Reduction in Tobacco-Related Disease
- Competitive Third-Party Regulation: How Private Certification Can Overcome Constraints That Frustrate Government Regulation
- Outcome-Based Regulatory Strategies for Promoting Greater Patient Safety
- Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design
- A Sampling-Based System of Civil Liability
- Operation Arbitration: Privatizing Medical Malpractice Claims
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Introduction
- The Uneasy Case of Multiple Injurers’ Liability
- Assumption of Risk, After All
- Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice and Road Accidents
- Tort-Agency Partnerships in an Age of Preemption
- The Tort Entitlement to Physical Security as the Distributive Basis for Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulations
- Reg Neg Redux: The Career of a Procedural Reform
- Internality Regulation Through Public Choice
- Modeling Partial Agency Autonomy in Public-Health Policymaking
- Reexamining the Pathways to Reduction in Tobacco-Related Disease
- Competitive Third-Party Regulation: How Private Certification Can Overcome Constraints That Frustrate Government Regulation
- Outcome-Based Regulatory Strategies for Promoting Greater Patient Safety
- Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design
- A Sampling-Based System of Civil Liability
- Operation Arbitration: Privatizing Medical Malpractice Claims
