The Slovenian Perception of the EU: From Outstanding Pupil to Solid Member

The Yugoslav Phase

The evolution of Yugoslavia after World War II and its complex relations with its eastern and western allies initiated ideas that Yugoslavia, although a socialist country, could have “a European future”. The first steps towards enhanced relations between the European Communities and Yugoslavia took place soon after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, when Yugoslavia started to negotiate a non-preferential agreement with the European Communities. This asymmetric trade agreement, relatively more advantageous for Yugoslavia than for the European Communities, was also a milestone of the “Slovenian” process towards European integration, since Slovenian companies were already at the time highly export-oriented. The economic and political cooperation between Yugoslavia and the European Communities intensified after 1975 (Zaccharia 2014, 265–6, 269). In 1978, the president of the European Parliament, Emilio Colombo, stated when he met Tito that “Yugoslavia and President Tito have a significant role as a factor of stability in Europe. […] Because of this, the Community wants to contribute to the political stability of Yugoslavia, bearing in mind its role in the world” (Obadić 2014, 342).

In spite of domestic economic and political turmoil, Yugoslavia in the 1980s intensified its economic orientation towards the European markets. For example, in 1982 exports to countries within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) accounted for 27.9 % of Yugoslavia’s total exports; by 1988, this share had almost doubled to 52.8 % (Udovič 2022a, 27–8). A similar trend of westernisation of the Yugoslav economy was presented by Artisien et al. (1992, 39–46), who provided data on Yugoslav joint ventures in Western countries. In 1987, Yugoslavia had 287 such joint ventures, 241 of them in Europe. In both foreign trade and foreign investment, the economy of Yugoslavia’s northernmost republic Slovenia played an important role. Its government incentivised its enterprises to operate in Western markets, not least by officially supporting the internationalisation of Slovenian enterprises to EU markets. However, the cooperation of pre-independent Slovenia (in Yugoslavia) had not only been established in the economic area; its political elite strove also to develop political ties. Here at least two paradiplomatic initiatives must be mentioned: the Permanent Mixed Slovenian–Bavarian Commission (Stalna mešana slovensko-bavarska komisija/Ständige Kommission Bayern – Slowenien), established in 1976, which along with economic issues also covered political cooperation; and the Alps-Adriatic Working Group that was a cross-regional body connecting Slovenia, Italy and Austria, defined by Klabjan (2013, 422) as “a precursor of an autonomous Slovene ‘national diplomacy’” (see also Udovič 2022b).

Slovenian politicians also at the federal level advocated that Yugoslavia should become a member of the European Communities as soon as possible. A symbolic step of the Slovenian leadership in this direction was undertaken by the League of Communists of Slovenia (Zveza komunistov Slovenije) in December 1989, when, at their 11th Party congress, they launched the programme “With Yugoslavia to Europe, Europe now!” (Z Jugoslavijo k Evropi, Evropa zdaj!), in which they declared that Yugoslavia should follow the development patterns of the Western countries, respect human rights and introduce a competitive political parties’ system (Figure 1). Kirn (2012) points out how Slovenia first strengthened its paradiplomatic representation in the European Communities in Paris through the platform of the parastatal Bank of Ljubljana (Ljubljanska banka), opening, in late 1989, a branch office in Brussels. In September 1990, the Executive Council (the Government of Slovenia) nominated Lojze Sočan as its first representative towards the European Communities’ institutions (more in Udovič 2017).

Figure 1:

The Slovenian Communist Party Electoral Programme, December 1989 – Europe now! Source: Bavčer 1989.

After the amendments to the Republic’s (i.e. Slovenian) Constitution adopted in September 1989, which among other things abolished the adjective of “Socialist” before the name of the Republic of Slovenia and enhanced the commitment of Slovenia to the protection of human rights and liberties, other steps of democratisation of the Slovenian political life followed. In January 1990, the Slovene delegation left the 14th extraordinary party congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Zveza komunistov Jugoslavije), which led to its collapse; in February 1990 it changed its name to League of Communists of Slovenia – Party of Democratic Reform (Zveza komunistov Slovenije – Stranka demokratične prenove, ZKS-SDP). In April 1990 Slovenia had the first post-WWII multi-party elections, which the coalition of several newly established centre-right parties – Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (Demokratična opozicija Slovenije, DEMOS) – won. Slovenia’s pace towards Euro-Atlantic integration accelerated with the positively answered independence referendum of 23 December 1990, and with its independence from Yugoslavia, declared six months later, on 25 June 1991 (Rupel 1992).

From Slovenian Independence to European Union Membership 1991–2004

Slovenia committed itself to Euro-Atlantic integration even prior to its declaration of independence on 25 June 1991. In the document “The Basics of Slovenia’s Foreign Policy Strategy” (Skupščina Republike Slovenije 1991, 11), published on 26 March 1991, it says: “Our [Slovenian] strategic goal is the membership in the European Communities, which today have 12 member states. Slovenia is not yet prepared to become a member: neither politically, nor economically, nor technically. […] The debate on how to comply with these areas has to start.”

In the same document paragraph C is devoted to membership in the European Communities:

Slovenia’s foreign policy will be primarily oriented towards the accession to European economic and political integration with the goal that Slovenia becomes a full member of the European Communities. This goal will be achieved by the adaptation of Slovenia’s economic and political system to the standards adopted by the European Communities. […] This goal cannot be achieved in a short run. (Skupščina Republike Slovenije 1991, 12)

In January 1992, the newly independent country was internationally recognised by member states of the European Communities. Soon Slovenia engaged in the pre-accession process, with the ambition to conclude the agreement with the EC/EU as soon as possible. A first step for achieving this was the conversion of the paradiplomatic representation established in 1990 to Slovenian official representation in Brussels, which occurred on 13 April 1992. A year after, in April 1993, Slovenia and the European Economic Community signed an Agreement on Cooperation (Accord de coopération entre la Communauté Economique Européenne et la République de Slovénie), which entered into force in September 1993 (Uradni list Republike Slovenije 1993). This formalised the Slovenian path towards European Union membership. However, the path would prove long, and not always straightforward nor without obstacles.

The first obstacle came immediately and effectively halted the Slovenian EU accession process until 1996. Italy, soon after the signature of the Agreement on Cooperation between Slovenia and the European Economic Community, and then for three years, claimed several times that Slovenia should as soon as possible repair “past injustices” caused by Yugoslavia to the Italian citizens living in the littoral areas of the country before 1954. The main issue about these “injustices” were the properties of the so-called optants, the people of Italian citizenship and customary language that, according to the 1947 (Paris) peace treaty between Yugoslavia and Italy, could leave the territories that treaty ceded to Yugoslavia. The vast majority of those who were entitled to leave Yugoslavia did do so, leaving their immovable property behind in most cases. The question of remuneration for the abandoned property had been resolved by Yugoslavia and Italy with the Osimo Agreements in 1975 (and later in 1983), but in 1993 Italy insisted on officially stating that until these “injustices” were settled it would veto Slovenia accessing the EU (cf. Kosin 2000).

Negotiations between Slovenia and Italy started immediately, but internal political problems in Italy (political opportunism, Tangentopoli affair, government instability etc.) and in Slovenia (fractions in the coalition, different views on how to solve the problem etc.) prolonged the process for three years. In 1996, in a meeting in Madrid, the so-called “Spanish compromise” was reached, which said that Slovenia would “adjust the national legislation regarding the real estate rights to the European standards” (Drčar Murko 1995, 115), meaning that no reciprocity clause would be in force anymore. Upon the change of Article 68 of the Slovenian Constitution Italy removed the blockage.

In June 1996, Slovenia formally requested the opening of EU membership negotiations. A year later, on 16 July 1997, the European Commission presented opinions on candidate countries. Since the opinion for Slovenia was positive, the country was, in December 1997, included in the first round of countries for the start of negotiations, which officially began on 31 March 1998 (GOV.SI Portal 2023).

To cope with the challenge of adapting its own legislation to the Acquis Communautaire Slovenia prepared several structural measures. One of them was the establishment, at the ministerial level, of a special Government Office for European Affairs, whose task it was to take all necessary measures to adopt Slovenian legislation to EU legislation and to solve any issues of discrepancy between the two. Importantly, there was close to no opposition to Slovenian (quick) EU membership—neither among the political parties, with the exception of the far-right wing Slovenian National Party (Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka, SNS), nor among the public. In 1994, 74.7 % of people supported Slovenia’s EU membership (Toš 2021).

At the end of the 1990s it seemed that Slovenia would not be facing new obstacles on its path towards the European Union, but this proved to be wrong. A “new political wind” in Austria, with the formation of the coalition between the conservative Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) and the right-wing Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), started a process of new conditionalities for the Slovenian accession to the EU. Once more, some ghosts of the past were revived, such as the Yugoslav legislation, adopted in 1944, of expropriating German-speaking citizens, many of whom had collaborated with the occupation forces during the Second World War (known as the AVNOJ resolutions), which Austria wanted to see officially revoked. Also, Austria demanded that Slovenia shut down its nuclear plant at Krško, on the Slovenian–Croatian border, as soon as possible, since Austria opposed nuclear energy. The third issue was the status of Slovenia’s small German-speaking ethnic community, which is (to this day) not recognised among Slovenia’s ethnic minorities. All three issues were opened as a condition to be resolved before Slovenia could enter the EU. Slovenian diplomacy, having learnt its lesson from the Italian pressure, increased its activities ahead of time to prevent the possibility of Austrian blocking. In September 2000, Austrian president Thomas Klestil officially announced to Slovenian president Milan Kučan that Austria would not apply any open bilateral questions as a conditionality for Slovenian EU membership (STA 2000).

Nevertheless, despite some pitfalls, Slovenia remained firmly committed to EU membership and was structurally well prepared. Still, the European Commission in 2000 realised that in some areas the progress was too slow, especially concerning economic issues related to liberalisation and privatisation. Slovenia enhanced its pace, adopted the Acquis Communautaire in 2002, and signed the membership agreement in 2003. In the same year, a referendum on its EU membership was held, with the expected result—a very large share of the voters approved membership (89.61 %) (DVK 2003). Another year later, on 1 May 2004, Slovenia, along with nine other countries, became a member of the EU (Rupel 2011).

Public Attitudes to EU Membership

In the following, we assess Eurobarometer surveys in Slovenia, especially those carried out around specific events, to show that, even though support to EU membership never fell to a critical low, the figures do still reflect public reactions to given EU-related policies and events. After the successful 2003 referendum on EU membership, it is not surprising that in the Eurobarometer survey of 2004 82 % of those polled declared that they were proud of being part of the EU family (Eurobarometer 2004). In the first years of membership, the Slovenian government followed Brussels’ recommendations very strictly. It succeeded in entering the Eurozone by 2007, as the first of the new member states. The economic policies were focused on meeting the convergence criteria, as was the adjustment of the legal instruments. The country submitted the convergence programme a couple of weeks after formally joining the EU, where the early adoption of the Euro was planned. The Council of the European Union assessed the programme on 5 July 2004,^[4] pointing out certain incompatibilities of the Slovenian legislation with the European Commission Treaty and European System of Central Banks/European Central Bank Statues. Slovenia succeeded in removing these incompatibilities within two years (European Commission 2006, 45).

The Bank of Slovenia had a special changeover team with a high level of governmental support, which took care of the formal and legal preparations as well as communication with the broader public. A special publication was prepared for citizens to consult with the bank, as was a website which was operational from February 2006 to June 2007, where questions with regard to the transition to the Euro could be posted.^[5] In May 2006, the European Commission reported that Slovenia’s financial system had been substantially integrated into the broader EU financial system, achieving a high degree of sustainable convergence according to its criteria (European Commission 2006, 50).

The Slovenian public was also in favour of moving to the Euro: only 4 % of those included in a special Eurobarometer public survey expressed concern about the currency change; 79 % felt that there was no problem with this (ADP 2007). The process was also eased by the fact that Slovenes were already familiar with the Euro, not only due to their proximity to Austria and Italy, but also because many in fact kept their savings account in the currency, while businesses often quoted prices for higher value products in Euro (Deloitte 2007). The membership in the Eurozone thus was assessed as an important contribution to Slovenia’s economic stability (Eurobarometer 2008). Today, Slovenia’s Eurozone membership is viewed as completely normal by businesses as well as the general public, with no explicit opposition or regrets detectable.

The second important step towards deeper EU integration was joining the Schengen zone on 21 December 2007, leading to the abolishment of the border controls with Austria, Italy and Hungary, while the control at the Croatian border, as the now external Schengen border, had to be significantly strengthened. This additionally increased the feeling of participation in the EU, expressed also in a public belief that Slovenian opinion matters (73 %) and that the EU was something positive (60 % in comparison to the EU average of 48 %) (Eurobarometer 2008). The fact that the first Slovenian presidency to the EU Council happened soon after, in Spring 2008, further strengthened the perception that even a small country can make a difference in the EU family.

In subsequent years, however, this enthusiasm dwindled due to both external factors and domestic politics. The first major blow came with the economic and financial crisis after 2008, which reached Slovenia with a slight delay: the most serious decline of its GDP happened in 2009 (−7.5 %) and a negative growth repeated itself again in 2012 (−2.6 %) and in 2013 (−1.0 %).^[6] While between 2004 and 2008, exports had increased from 12.7 billion to 20 billion Euros, it dropped to 16.2 billion in 2009, after which it took Slovenia two years to bring its exports back to the 2008 level. The depth of the crisis, however, was very much the result of the aforementioned gradual approach to undertaking the structural economic reforms during the transition period from socialism to market capitalism. Even though both the OECD and the EU warned the Slovenian governments of the lack of more comprehensive reforms, which included a pension reform, a banking sector reform, the still relatively high state ownership in the economy as well as a tax reform, more radical reform attempts never made it through parliament. Since all of these reforms were highly unpopular, they kept being postponed, until the crisis forced government(s) to start their delayed implementation.

A harsh and very restrictive stabilisation programme had to be put in place to avoid joining the so-called PIGS group, a derogatory term for the southern EU countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) who seemed to be facing state bankruptcy during the crisis. The severe crisis of the Slovenian banking sector was caused by excessive risk-taking of the commercial banks and the weak corporate governance of the state-owned banks, which led to a high budget deficit (OECD 2013). However, the Slovenian government and media attributed the need for strict financial consolidation to the requests coming from Brussels. Cutting the budgetary expenditures in different fields, freezing the salaries in the public sector and various other restrictive measures introduced in reply to the crisis were very unpopular, which partly explains Slovenia’s political instability between 2012 and 2014, when three successive governments did not complete their term in office (Bučar 2019).

How severely the crisis hit Slovenia can be demonstrated by several indicators. In 2009, the country recorded the second deepest decline in GDP in the OECD (behind Estonia) and was expected to grow modestly in 2010–2012. Even in 2016, the level of GDP and GDP per capita was only at the level achieved in 2007 (OECD 2011). In that year, employment numbers were the same as in 2001, with employment at a level achieved in 2005 (Sicherl 2017). In terms of inward foreign direct investment flows, Slovenia was hit with some delays, and more than other new member states. The majority of the largest Slovenian multinational enterprises, such as Merkur, Trimo, Gorenje and Prevent, still performed positively in 2008 and 2009, but experienced lower sales. Foreign affiliates reduced and postponed planned investments (Jaklič and Rojec 2014). Slovenia started to lose its appeal as a location for foreign investors, and a number of domestic firms moved their activities abroad. Since 2008, the share of foreign investors estimating Slovenia to be unattractive as an investment location had been rising. In 2012, over 73 % of foreign affiliates found the conditions in Slovenia to be deteriorating, and almost 84 % repeated this assertion in 2013 (Rojec and Jaklič 2013).

The unpopular policies affected the public opinion on the EU (Oprčkal 2014). The Eurobarometer survey of 2014 brought forth a significantly changed attitude towards EU membership (Eurobarometer 2014). Some 63 % of the respondents still felt proud of being EU citizens (down from 82 % in 2004), but the image of the EU had dropped from 62 % of totally positive and only 5 % of totally negative in 2004 to 38 % of totally positive and as much as 17 % of totally negative. On the other hand, in another survey Slovenians were asked who was in a better position to end the economic and financial crisis by introducing effective policies, and those polled put the EU at 35 % and the national government at 17 %. Clearly, Slovenes still trusted the EU more than their own government (Eurobarometer Spring 2014).

The next blow to the public attitude towards the EU was the so-called migration crisis of 2015, when a high number of migrants crossed Slovenia on their way towards Western EU countries. When Hungary closed its border in late 2015, this left Slovenia as the main entry point into the Schengen area (Lovec 2018). The massive movement of people across the country increased anti-migrant feelings in the population: 73 % of the replies to the Eurobarometer survey in 2016 were negative to the question of the potential contribution of migrants to society, and as many as 40 % believed that the country should not help the refugees. Negative feelings associated with immigration from countries outside the European Union were voiced by 68 % of Slovenians replying to the survey. The same percentage expressed the need for additional measures to fight illegal migration at EU as well as national level (Eurobarometer 2016). The experience with the refugee crisis led several EU member states to change their border procedures, which for Slovenians meant travel restrictions at their northern border when Austria reintroduced border checking. This complicated life especially for the Slovenian daily migrants working in neighbouring areas of Austria (Gotev 2017). All this additionally lowered the belief that the EU has efficient common mechanisms in place which can prevent one member state acting against another, or that the EU can effectively deal with a crisis of such proportions. This is illustrated by the results of the Eurobarometer 2017, when an unprecedented 45 % of Slovenian citizens declared the membership a good thing for the country, with another 41 % seeing the membership as neither good nor bad (European Parliament 2017).

At the end of 2017, another important event where Slovenians had high expectations from the EU was the border settlement with Croatia. Under the patronage of the EU and the activities of their two governments, Slovenia and Croatia in 2009 agreed that their border dispute, which had been ongoing since the two countries declared their independence in 1991, should be resolved by the ad-hoc Arbitration court.^[7] The arbitration ruling, issued by the court on 29 June 2017, was to be implemented by the end of the same year. While Slovenia accepted the ruling, Croatia refused to recognise the authority of the court. At the beginning of December 2017, Slovenian news outlets announced that the then First Vice-President of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans, would actively engage on behalf of the Commission as an intermediary between the two countries. According to the reports by Slovenian media, the Commission supported the arbitration process and the court ruling and expected both countries to do the same. This created the public impression that Slovenia could count on the additional help of the European Commission in negotiating the implementation of the border decision (Bučar 2019). In other words, Slovenia expected that the EU institutions would back Slovenia and would “force” Croatia to accept the arbitration award. Instead, the European Commission made a vague statement about the relevance of the rule of law in the EU, while other EU institutions did not react. This was a significant blow for Slovenia, and as of the time of writing this article the ruling of the arbitration court still remains to be implemented from the Croatian side.

The Eurobarometer survey of 2021, however, showed a renewed improvement of the image of the EU in the eyes of Slovenian citizens. While the majority always recognised the EU as the only option for a small country like Slovenia, now 82 % of those interviewed stated that they were proud to be European, while 54 % had a positive image of EU, with an additional 40 % being neutral. Trust in the EU institutions had also increased to 55 %, slightly above the EU average of 49 % (Eurobarometer 2021). If the Slovenian public remains divided over several domestic issues, their majority perception of EU membership as something positive has never been seriously questioned. Slovenia’s only anti-EU party, the above-mentioned Slovenian National Party, has very limited support among the population and did not secure any seats in Parliament in the 2022 elections (DVK 2022).

Probably as a consequence of the negative experience in dealing with Covid-19 at the national level, as many as 47 % of the respondents to the Special Eurobarometer of 2020 totally agree and 40 % tend to agree with the statement that the EU should have more competencies to deal with crises such as the coronavirus outbreak. At the same time, 71 % totally agree and an additional 26 % tend to agree that EU citizens should be taken into account more when it comes to decisions relating to the future of Europe. Elsewhere, some 63 % expressed a willingness to take part in the Conference of the Future of the EU, a citizen-led series of debates and discussions that ran from April 2021 to May 2022 (Special Eurobarometer 500 2020, 37).^[8]

An intensified cooperation between the EU member states is seen as an answer to the main global challenges by 91 % of respondents, significantly above the EU average of 80 %. The seven main values identified by the Eurobarometer—peace; freedom of opinion; social equality and solidarity; tolerance and openness to others; respect for nature and the environment; respect for history and its lessons; progress and innovation—are best embedded in the EU, as assessed by Slovenians who have responded high above the EU average for each individual value, suggesting a high opinion of European respect for these values. A relatively high level of confidence in the EU is also expressed in the set of answers as to which level different policy areas should be addressed: totally or mainly at the EU level; at the EU and national level; or totally or mainly at the national level. The preference of all member states, including Slovenia, is that policy areas need to be addressed at both the EU and the national level. The high level of trust in the EU by Slovenians is reflected also in the fact that for all policy areas the percentage of Slovenians who feel policy areas should be addressed totally or mainly by the EU is above the average in comparison to other member states. As many as 42 % of the respondents felt that issues of security and defence should be addressed mainly at the EU level; 38 % felt this way when it came to policies in the area of migration and refugees; and 36 % would have the EU address foreign policy (Special Eurobarometer 500 2020).

As said, this rather positive public perception of the EU can be explained on the one hand by the EU’s approach to the Covid-19 crisis, where, despite some initial questioning of EU solidarity, later actions of the European Commission, like the joint purchase of vaccines, proved that for a small country belonging to a bigger family can be fruitful. The second policy that positively impacted people’s attitude towards membership, however, was much improved communication by both the government and the Office of the European Commission in Slovenia concerning the contributions of the EU’s Cohesion and Structural Funds since 2014. The government wanted to demonstrate its own efficiency in the implementation process of these funds, stressing the number of important projects to which the various EU funds had contributed. The public communication efforts did succeed in raising citizens’ awareness of the wide variety of EU projects, from bicycle routes to roads and town renovations, and from various social activities to projects focussing on the young or the elderly. With its active communication strategy, the European Commission’s Office contributed to a better understanding of the benefits of membership (Evropska komisija 2021).

Slovenia first implemented the Cohesion policy in the 2004–2006 period. It was treated as a single cohesion region (NUTS-II levels) eligible for Objective 1—convergence assistance targeting those below 75 % of the EU’s GDP average. The EU funds available accounted for 240 million Euros. Some projects had already been funded before Slovenia’s accession in 2004 from the pre-accession instrument (IPA) and became part of the Cohesion policy with the accession (COHESIFY 2018). Every subsequent financial perspective brought more money from the EU, but early on the implemented projects were seldom properly attributed to the EU’s co-financing. Rather, local and national governments claimed them as their own if they were successful and forgot to mention that in fact almost 85 % of the resources had come from the EU budget (Bučar 2019).

Since the 2014–2020 funding period, Slovenia has been organised in two cohesion regions, East and West Slovenia, with its eastern part being more below the EU average. Altogether, the country between 2014 and 2020 had access to 3.312 million Euros from the Cohesion and Structural Funds, with the possibility to draw on these funds until the end of 2023. According to official data, by April 2022 funds in the value of 113 % of the total sum were awarded through the calls, operations of 104 % of the available funds were approved, payments of 2.31 million Euros were made (75 % of what had been expected), and 2.45 billion Euros were claimed from the EU budget. The full implementation of the planned projects within the Operational Programme 2014–2020 seems to be underway. As it stands, Slovenia in January 2023 finally managed to conclude the Operational programme for the period 2021–2027, which means that the country is already late in the implementation. According to the available data, the base line for the allocation of the funding is the fact that Slovenia’s western cohesion region in 2019 was at 106 % of the EU average, while the eastern region was at 73 %. Altogether, Slovenia can count on 3.214 billion Euros, with more than two thirds of this going to its eastern part (Evropska sredstva 2022). The question thus arises of whether there will be a sufficient number of well-prepared projects for the absorption of these funds.

In 2021, Slovenia prepared a Recovery and Resilience Plan for 1.8 billion Euros of grants and 705 million Euros of favourable loans, which was approved by the Commission in July 2021 (European Commission 2022). It is expected that the projects implemented within this plan will not only contribute to the green transition and digital transformation, but also to raising the image of the EU. Thus, in spite of several ups and downs caused either by external events or domestic policies, a vast majority of Slovenians continue to believe that EU membership has been a good thing. The benefits thus seem to outweigh the occasional dissatisfaction. They also outweigh the problems encountered in specific areas, where EU policies were insufficiently explained to citizens, for example the need for structural reforms, environmental legislation, or asylum policy.