Abstract
In a homogenous product market, customers’ different demand elasticities may lead to different prices. This study examined price discrimination’s effect on equilibrium points in Cournot duopoly games by assuming that each firm charges K prices and adjusts its strategies based on bounded rationality. In consideration of price discrimination, two discrete dynamic game systems with 2K variables were introduced for players with homogenous or heterogenous expectations. The stability of the Nash equilibrium point was found to be independent of price discrimination. Given price discrimination, the stability of boundary stationary points for the system with homogenous players is different from that for the system with heterogenous players. Numerical simulations verified the critical point for the system with homogenous players from being stable to its bifurcation.
Funding source: National Natural Science Foundation of China
Award Identifier / Grant number: 11661030
Funding source: Guangxi Natural Science Foundation
Award Identifier / Grant number: 2016GXNSFAA380059
Award Identifier / Grant number: 2018GXNSFAA281021
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Author contribution: All the authors have accepted responsibility for the entire content of this submitted manuscript and approved submission.
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Research funding: This project is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (11661030) and Guangxi Natural Science Foundation (2016GXNSFAA380059, 2018GXNSFAA281021).
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Conflict of interest statement: The authors declare no conflicts of interest regarding this article.
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Supplementary Material
The online version of this article offers supplementary material (https://doi.org/10.1515/snde-2019-0137).
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Crypto-assets portfolio selection and optimization: a COGARCH-Rvine approach
- Testing for stationarity with covariates: more powerful tests with non-normal errors
- The non-linear effects of the Fed asset purchases
- Multiple structural breaks in cointegrating regressions: a model selection approach
- Time-varying threshold cointegration with an application to the Fisher hypothesis
- A new bivariate Archimedean copula with application to the evaluation of VaR
- The effect of price discrimination on dynamic duopoly games with bounded rationality
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Crypto-assets portfolio selection and optimization: a COGARCH-Rvine approach
- Testing for stationarity with covariates: more powerful tests with non-normal errors
- The non-linear effects of the Fed asset purchases
- Multiple structural breaks in cointegrating regressions: a model selection approach
- Time-varying threshold cointegration with an application to the Fisher hypothesis
- A new bivariate Archimedean copula with application to the evaluation of VaR
- The effect of price discrimination on dynamic duopoly games with bounded rationality