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Bubble on real estate: the role of altruism and fiscal policy

  • Lise Clain-Chamosset-Yvrard and Thomas Seegmuller EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: April 9, 2019

Abstract

In this paper, we are interested in the interplay between real estate bubble, aggregate capital accumulation and taxation in an overlapping generations economy with altruistic households. We consider a three-period overlapping generations model with three key elements: altruism, portfolio choice, and financial market imperfections. Households realise different investment decisions in terms of asset at different periods of life, face a binding borrowing constraint and leave bequests to their children. We show that altruism plays a key role on the existence of a productive real estate bubble, i.e. a bubble in real estate raising physical capital stock and aggregate output. The key mechanism relies on the fact that a real estate bubble raises income of retired households. Because of higher bequests, there children are able to invest more in productive capital. Introducing fiscal policy, we show that raising real estate taxation dampens capital accumulation.

JEL Classification: E22; E44; G11

Acknowledgement

We are very pleased to participate to this special issue in honor of Kazuo Nishimura. As a leading researcher in the analysis of non-linear dynamics and sunspot equilibria, Kazuo influences our scientific works. We are indebted to him for having the opportunity to co-author some papers. We are grateful for useful suggestions from Aurélien Eyquem, Frederic Jouneau-Sion, Xavier Raurich and Bertrand Wigniolle. We also thank participants to the Workshop “Macroeconomics, finance and history of economics” held on June 2017 at Ecully, to the conference SAET 2017 and to the workshop “Real and financial interdependencies: New approaches with dynamic general equilibrium models” held in Paris School of Economics on July 2017. Any remaining errors are ours. This work has benefited from the financial support of the French National Research Agency (ANR-15-CE33-0001-01).

A Appendix

A.1 Households’ behaviour

We maximize the Lagrangian function:

lnc1,t+βlnc2,t+1+β2lnc3,t+2+δln(ϕwt+2+xt+2)+λ1,t(wt+dtyc1,tptht+1)+λ2,t+1(ϕwt+1+xt+1c2,t+1Rt+1ddtykt+2dt+1m)+λ3,t+2(pt+2ht+1+Rt+2ddt+1m+Rt+2kt+2c3,t+2xt+2)+λ4,t+1(θ1pt+1ht+1+θ2ϕwt+1Rt+1ddty)

with respect to (c1,t,c2,t+1,c3,t+2,kt+2,dty,dt+1m,ht+1,xt+2,λ1,t,λ2,t+1,λ3,t+2,λ4,t+1).

First-order conditions are given by:

(56)c1,t:1c1,t=λ1,t
(57)c2,t+1:βc2,t+1=λ2,t+1
(58)c3,t+2:β2c3,t+2=λ3,t+2
(59)ht+1:ptλ1,tpt+2λ3,t+2θ1pt+1λ4,t+1=0
(60)xt+2:λ3,t+2δϕwt+2+xt+2=0
(61)dty:λ1,t=Rt+1d(λ2,t+1+λ4,t+1)
(62)dt+1m:λ2,t+1=Rt+2dλ3,t+2
(63)kt+2:λ2,t+1=Rt+2λ3,t+2
(64)λ4,t+1(θ1pt+1ht+1+θ2ϕwt+1Rt+1ddt)=0

From Eqs. (62)–(63), we get : Rt+2=Rt+2d. Physical capital and deposit are perfect substitutes. From Eqs. (61) and (63), one has:

(65)λ4,t+1=λ1,tRt+1dRt+2λ3,t+2

We restrict our attention to the case of a binding borrowing constraint to be able to discuss our results according to the importance of the different types of collateral. Using (64) and the Kuhn and Tucker conditions, this is ensured by λ4,t+1>0. Substituting Eqs. (56)–(58) and (65) into Eqs. (59)–(63), one has :

(66)β2c3,t+2(pt+2θ1pt+1Rt+2)=1c1,t(ptθ1pt+1Rt+1)
(67)β2c3,t+2=δϕwt+2+xt+2
(68)1c2,t+1=Rt+2dβc3,t+2
(69)θ1pt+1ht+1+θ2ϕwt+1=Rt+1ddt

A.2 Proof of Proposition 1.

One can easily show that R_<1 if and only if δ>δ^. The borrowing constraint is binding if c3>β2R_2c1. This inequality is equivalent to:

(70)A1>R_(sR_+A3)

Since R_<1 under δ>δ^, inequality (70) is satisfied if

(71)A1>sR_+A3

We can write A1 and sR_+A3 as continuous functions of ϕ and θ2:

(72)A1=1+ϕ[1+(1+θ2)s]β2+δLHS(ϕ,θ2)
(73)sR_+A3=sβ+β2+δ+ϕ[(1+θ2s)(β+β2+δ)+βs]δ+ϕ[(1+s)δβ2θ2s]+ϕθ2sRHS(ϕ,θ2)

Note that

(74)LHS(ϕ,0)=1+ϕ[1+s]β2+δ
(75)RHS(ϕ,0)=sβ+β2+δ+ϕ[β(1+s)+β2+δ]δ+ϕ(1+s)δ

For θ2 = 0, Inequality (70) is satisfied if LHS(ϕ,0)>RHS(ϕ,0). Note that LHS(ϕ,0) is an increasing function of ϕ and RHS(ϕ,0) a decreasing function of ϕ. We have LHS(+,0)>RHS(+,0) and LHS(1,0)<RHS(1,0) if δ is sufficiently high. Therefore, it exists a threshold ϕ_0>1 such that for ϕ>ϕ_0, LHS(ϕ,0)>RHS(ϕ,0). Note that LHS(ϕ,θ2) and RHS(ϕ,θ2) are both increasing functions of θ2. Moreover, for δ high enough, LHS(+,1)<RHS(+,1). By continuity, there exist thresholds θ¯2(0,1) and ϕ_>1 such that for θ2<θ2¯ and ϕ>ϕ_, LHS(ϕ,θ2)>RHS(ϕ,θ2). Therefore, if δ is sufficiently high such that δ>δ^, ϕ>ϕ_ and θ2<θ¯2, Proposition 1 follows.

A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.

A bubbly steady state R¯ is a solution of G(R)=H(R), where G(R) and H(R) satisfy (28)–(29).

We start by determining the admissible range of values for R. We have already seen that θ1<R<1. We remind that we restrict our attention to the existence of a productive bubble (i.e. R¯<R_). As p=RG(R)a, B1+RB3 must be negative to get a positive bubble.

As B1=θ1+(1+θ1)β/(β2+δ)>0, B1+RB3<0 implies R>B1/B3 with B3=(β2θ1δ)/(β2+δ)<0. Note that under Assumption 2 (δ>δ¯), B3 < 0 and B1/B3>θ1. Then, the possible admissible range of values for productive bubbles is R(B1/B3,R_), with R_<1.

To prove the existence of a stationary solution R¯(B1/B3,R_), we use the continuity of G(R) and H(R). Note that G(R) has a vertical asymptote at R=B1/B3 and is a decreasing and continuous function of R when R increases to R_. H(R) has two vertical asymptotes at R=θ1<B1/B3 and R=(1+A2)/θ1>1. From Eqs. (28) and (29), we determine the boundary values of G(R) and H(R):

limRB1/B3G(R)=+limRR_G(R)=0limRB1/B3H(R)=(B1/B3+θ1)A1+(1+θ1B1/B3)(sB1/B3+A3)(B1/B3θ1)(A2+1+θ1B1/B3)limRR_H(R)=(R_θ1)A1+(1θ1R_)(sR_+A3)(R_θ1)(A2+1θ1R_)

We have limRB1/B3H(R)<limRB1/B3G(R). The existence of a steady state R¯(B1/B3,R_), solving G(R)=H(R), is ensured by 0<H(R_), namely:

(76)A1<1θ1R_R_θ1(sR_+A3)

Note that (1θ1R_)/(R_θ1)>1 if and only if R_<1. Using the proof of Proposition 1, Inequality (76) is in accordance with Inequality (71) and satisfied by continuity argument if ϕ close but larger than ϕ_ and θ2(0,θ¯2), because it ensures that A1 is larger but close to sR_+A3.

We ensure now that the set (B1/B3,R_) is non-empty. The set (B1/B3,R_) is non-empty if and only if B1/B3<R_ with:

(77)B1B3=δθ1+β+θ1β(1+β)δβ2θ1LHS(δ,θ1)
(78)R_=(1+ϕ+ϕθ2s)(δ+β+β2)+βϕsδ(1+ϕ+ϕs)θ2β2ϕsRHS(δ)

Note that LHS(δ,θ1) and RHS(δ) are decreasing functions of δ and we have that:

limδ+LHS(δ,θ1)=θ1limδ+RHS(δ)=1+ϕ+ϕθ2s1+ϕ+ϕs<1

We deduce that limδ+LHS(δ,θ1)<limδ+RHS(δ) if and only if:

θ1<1+ϕ+ϕθ2s1+ϕ+ϕsθ¯1

If θ1<θ¯1, there exists a threshold δ~>0 such that for δ>δ~, LHS(δ,θ1)<RHS(δ). Therefore, if θ1<θ¯1 and δ>δ~, the set (B1/B3,R_) is nonempty.

To conclude, if ϕ is close but larger than ϕ_, θ2<θ¯2, θ1<θ1¯ and δ sufficiently high such that δ>max{δ~,δ¯,δ^}, there exists a steady state R¯(B1/B3,R_) which coexists with the bubbleless one R_.

To prove uniqueness, we observe that the equation H(R)=G(R) is equivalent to a polynomial of degree 3, i.e. has at most three solutions. Since limR(1+A2)/θ1H(R)= and limR(1+A2)/θ1G(R) is finite, we have limR(1+A2)/θ1H(R)<limR(1+A2)/θ1G(R). We have established that limRR_H(R)>limRR_G(R). This means that an odd number of solutions to the equation H(R)=G(R) belong to (R_,(1+A2)/θ1). Since we also have limRB1/B3G(R)>limRB1/B3H(R), there are an odd number of solutions to H(R)=G(R) that belong (B1/B3,R_). Since there are at most three solutions, the solution R¯ in this last interval is unique.

A.4 Households’ behaviour in the model with taxation

We maximize the Lagrangian function:

lnc1,t+βlnc2,t+1+β2lnc3,t+2+δln[ϕwt+2+xt+2]+λ1,t(wt+dtyc1,tptht+1)+λ2,t+1[ϕwt+1+xt+1c2,t+1Rt+1ddtykt+2dt+1m]+λ3,t+2[(1τh)pt+2ht+1+Rt+2ddt+1m+Rt+2kt+2c3,t+2xt+2]+λ4,t+1(θ1pt+1ht+1+θ2ϕwt+1Rt+1ddty)

with respect to (c1,t,c2,t+1,c3,t+2,kt+2,dty,dt+1m,ht+1,xt+2,λ1,t,λ2,t+1,λ3,t+2,λ4,t+1). First-order conditions are given by:

(79)1c1,t=λ1,t,βc2,t+1=λ2,t+1,β2c3,t+2=λ3,t+2
(80)ptλ1,t=(1τh)pt+2λ3,t+2+θ1pt+1λ4,t+1
(81)λ3,t+2=δϕwt+2+xt+2
(82)λ1,t=Rt+1d(λ2,t+1+λ4,t+1)
(83)λ2,t+1=Rt+2dλ3,t+2,λ2,t+1=Rt+2λ3,t+2

From Eq. (83), we get Rt+2=Rt+2d. From Eqs. (82) and (83), one has:

(84)λ4,t+1=λ1,tRt+1dRt+2dλ3,t+2

We restrict our attention on the case where λ4,t+1>0, i.e. λ1,t>Rt+1dRt+2dλ3,t+2. Substituting Eq. (79) into Eqs. (80), (81) and (83), we deduce:

(85)β2c3,t+2[(1τh)pt+2θ1pt+1Rt+2]=1c1,t[ptθ1pt+1Rt+1]
(86)1c2,t+1=Rt+2βc3,t+2
(87)Rt+2d=Rt+2
(88)β2c3,t+2=δϕwt+2+xt+2
(89)θ1pt+1ht+1+θ2ϕwt+1=Rt+1dty
(90)β2Rt+1Rt+2c1,t<c3,t+2
(91)xt+2>0

A.5 Proof of Proposition 5.

The existence of the steady state is obtained because GT(R)>HT(R) when R tends to B~1/B~3 and GT(R)<HT(R) when R tends to R_T. Uniqueness allows to deduce that at the steady state, we have GT(R)<HT(R).

Using Eq. (53), we have:

(92)dR¯Td(1τh)=GT(R¯T)(1τh)HT(R¯T)(1τh)HT(R¯T)GT(R¯T)

We start by computing GT(R¯T)/(1τh). Note that B2 and B4 do not depend on τh, while we have:

(B~1+RB~3)(1τh)=βδRβ2+δ<0

because R>θ1 and δ>β/θ1. We deduce that:

(93)GT(R¯T)(1τh)=GT(R¯T)B~1+R¯TB~3βδR¯Tβ2+δ<0

because B~1+R¯TB~3<0.

Using Eq. (55), HT(R) can be rewritten as follows:

(94)HT(R)=β2+δRθ1(1τhθ1R)(sR+A3)(Rθ1)A1(1τh)(1+β2+δ)+θ1[1(β2+δ)R]

Obviously, HT(R¯T)/(1τh) has the sign of its numerator, i.e.

(sR¯T+A3)θ1(1+R¯T)+(1+β2+δ)A1(R¯Tθ1)>0

Using Eq. (92), we deduce that dR¯T/d(1τh)<0. This means that R¯T increases with τh, whereas āT decreases with τh.

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Published Online: 2019-04-09

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