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Relations: The true substrate for evolution

  • Jesper Hoffmeyer
Published/Copyright: March 19, 2010
Semiotica
From the journal Volume 2010 Issue 178

Abstract

The strange “forgetfulness of the notion of the sign” that John Deely puts as an emblem for the third of the Four ages of understanding (Deely, Four ages of understanding: The first postmodern survey of philosophy from ancient times to the turn of the twenty-first century, University of Toronto Press, 2001: xxx) may also be seen as an emblem for the so-called modern science that grew to unprecedented victories in that same historical period. This was the period where the Newtonian idealization of nature was, somewhat paradoxically, taken as a prime model for good materialistic science. One important consequence of this idealization was that the spectrum of acceptable causalities operative in nature was reduced to just one, the efficient causality of Aristotle. As a consequence the concept of relation disappeared from nature as autonomously existent. Departing from the bioanthropological critique of modern biology launched by Gregory Bateson, the paper reinstates “relative being” — and thus the notion of the sign — as a “unique, suprasubjective mode of being” (Deely, Four ages of understanding: The first postmodern survey of philosophy from ancient times to the turn of the twenty-first century, University of Toronto Press, 2001: xxxi). The scientific vision of a nature governed by natural laws is thus replaced by a vision of nature as an incessant semiotic emergence brought out by the ever increasing capacity of life for inventing new and more efficient kinds of “interpretance” or, in Peircean terms, a tendency to take habits.

Published Online: 2010-03-19
Published in Print: 2010-February

© 2010 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/New York

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