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On zoosemiotics and bridging the value gap

  • Jonathan Beever

    Jonathan Beever (b. 1980) is a Post-Doctoral Scholar at Penn State's Rock Ethics Institute 〈jzb18@psu.edu〉. His research interests include moral theory, applied ethics, and biosemiotics. His publications include “Symbolic violence as subtle virulence: The philosophy of terrorism” (2011); “Violence, terrorism, and the symbolic response” (2012); and “Meaning Matters: The Biosemiotic Basis of Bioethics” (2012).

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Published/Copyright: February 15, 2014

Abstract

The immanent and empirical foundation of zoosemiotics grounds a theory of moral value. According to this theory, semiosis is a morally relevant and natural property of all animals, human and nonhuman. A consequence of this semiotic theory is that all individual animals are accorded inherent moral value based on their natural ability to signify. This paper argues that such a theory of moral value offers a justificatory strategy for our contemporary moral intuitions concerning our semiotic and moral relationships with nonhuman animals while also productively pushing our normative ethical boundaries.

About the author

Jonathan Beever

Jonathan Beever (b. 1980) is a Post-Doctoral Scholar at Penn State's Rock Ethics Institute 〈jzb18@psu.edu〉. His research interests include moral theory, applied ethics, and biosemiotics. His publications include “Symbolic violence as subtle virulence: The philosophy of terrorism” (2011); “Violence, terrorism, and the symbolic response” (2012); and “Meaning Matters: The Biosemiotic Basis of Bioethics” (2012).

Published Online: 2014-2-15
Published in Print: 2014-2-1

©2014 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston

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