Varieties of intentional objects
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Arkadiusz Chrudzimski
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (b. 1967) is an associate professor at the University of Szczecin 〈arkadiusz.chrudzimski@univ.szczecin.pl〉. His research interests include ontology, epistemology, and theory of intentionality. His publications includeDie Erkenntnistheorie von Roman Ingarden (1999);Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano (2001);Intentionalität, Zeitbewusstsein und Intersubjektivität. Studien zur Phänomenologie von Brentano bis Ingarden (2005); andGegenstandstheorie und Theorie der Intentionalität bei Alexius Meinong (2007).
Abstract
This paper proposes a classification of entities that are introduced in various theories of intentionality under the label “intentional objects.” Franz Brentano's immanent objects, Alexius Meinong's entities “beyond being and non-being” and Roman Ingarden's purely intentional objects can serve as examples of such entities. They all have in common that they have been introduced in order to extensionalize so-called “intentional contexts.” Not all such objects, however, deserve the name of intentional objects. In particular, neither Frege's senses nor mental contents of the early Husserl are to be classified as intentional objects in my sense. Roughly speaking, to be called “an intentional object,” a postulated entity must be supposed to function as a target of the subject's intention: intentional objects are supposed to stand “before the subject's mind” so that they “replace” the common sense objects of reference. The intentional objects that were introduced in the history of philosophy make up groups that, ontologically, are very heterogeneous. It is, however, possible to formulate certain systematic criteria for classifying them.
About the author
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (b. 1967) is an associate professor at the University of Szczecin 〈arkadiusz.chrudzimski@univ.szczecin.pl〉. His research interests include ontology, epistemology, and theory of intentionality. His publications include Die Erkenntnistheorie von Roman Ingarden (1999); Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano (2001); Intentionalität, Zeitbewusstsein und Intersubjektivität. Studien zur Phänomenologie von Brentano bis Ingarden (2005); and Gegenstandstheorie und Theorie der Intentionalität bei Alexius Meinong (2007).
©[2013] by Walter de Gruyter Berlin Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Introduction
- Approaching the abstract: Building blocks for an epistemology of abstract objects
- The ideal as real and as purely intentional: Ingarden-based reflections
- Making sense together: A dynamical account of linguistic meaning-making
- An example of the “synthetic a priori”: On how it helps us to widen our philosophical horizons
- The generality of signs: The actual relevance of anti-psychologism
- Sensory imagination and narrative perspective: Explaining perceptual focalization
- The basic distinctions in Der Streit
- The Wolf: Ingarden to the narratological rescue. A few remarks on a messy situation within the theory of fiction
- Roman Ingarden's theory of reader experience: A critical assessment
- Varieties of intentional objects
- More than an attitude: Roman Ingarden's aesthetics
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Introduction
- Approaching the abstract: Building blocks for an epistemology of abstract objects
- The ideal as real and as purely intentional: Ingarden-based reflections
- Making sense together: A dynamical account of linguistic meaning-making
- An example of the “synthetic a priori”: On how it helps us to widen our philosophical horizons
- The generality of signs: The actual relevance of anti-psychologism
- Sensory imagination and narrative perspective: Explaining perceptual focalization
- The basic distinctions in Der Streit
- The Wolf: Ingarden to the narratological rescue. A few remarks on a messy situation within the theory of fiction
- Roman Ingarden's theory of reader experience: A critical assessment
- Varieties of intentional objects
- More than an attitude: Roman Ingarden's aesthetics
