The ideal as real and as purely intentional: Ingarden-based reflections
-
Ingvar Johansson
Ingvar Johansson (b. 1943) is Professor Emeritus at Umeå University 〈ingvar.johansson@philos.umu.se〉. His research interests include ontology and philosophy of science. His publications includeA critique of Karl Popper's methodology (1975);Ontological investigations: An inquiry into the categories of nature, man, and society (2004 [1989]); andMedicine & philosophy: A twenty-first century introduction (with N. Lynøe, 2008).
Abstract
The paper takes its departure from Ingarden's distinctions between four different main modes of being: absolute, extratemporal, real, and purely intentional. It introduces a distinction between two kinds of ideal entities: impurely ideal and purely ideal. Of the former kind are universals, and of the latter numbers; Ingarden regards both as existing in the extratemporal mode. It is then discussed whether Ingarden, and many others, has fallen prey to a mode illusion; and that, in fact, the impurely ideal entities exist in the real mode and the purely ideal in the purely intentional mode of being. The answers are weakly affirmative. On these presuppositions a concept of “mixed intentional object” is introduced. It seems to be of importance for how to understand numerical scales and the development of science.
About the author
Ingvar Johansson (b. 1943) is Professor Emeritus at Umeå University 〈ingvar.johansson@philos.umu.se〉. His research interests include ontology and philosophy of science. His publications include A critique of Karl Popper's methodology (1975); Ontological investigations: An inquiry into the categories of nature, man, and society (2004 [1989]); and Medicine & philosophy: A twenty-first century introduction (with N. Lynøe, 2008).
©[2013] by Walter de Gruyter Berlin Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Introduction
- Approaching the abstract: Building blocks for an epistemology of abstract objects
- The ideal as real and as purely intentional: Ingarden-based reflections
- Making sense together: A dynamical account of linguistic meaning-making
- An example of the “synthetic a priori”: On how it helps us to widen our philosophical horizons
- The generality of signs: The actual relevance of anti-psychologism
- Sensory imagination and narrative perspective: Explaining perceptual focalization
- The basic distinctions in Der Streit
- The Wolf: Ingarden to the narratological rescue. A few remarks on a messy situation within the theory of fiction
- Roman Ingarden's theory of reader experience: A critical assessment
- Varieties of intentional objects
- More than an attitude: Roman Ingarden's aesthetics
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Introduction
- Approaching the abstract: Building blocks for an epistemology of abstract objects
- The ideal as real and as purely intentional: Ingarden-based reflections
- Making sense together: A dynamical account of linguistic meaning-making
- An example of the “synthetic a priori”: On how it helps us to widen our philosophical horizons
- The generality of signs: The actual relevance of anti-psychologism
- Sensory imagination and narrative perspective: Explaining perceptual focalization
- The basic distinctions in Der Streit
- The Wolf: Ingarden to the narratological rescue. A few remarks on a messy situation within the theory of fiction
- Roman Ingarden's theory of reader experience: A critical assessment
- Varieties of intentional objects
- More than an attitude: Roman Ingarden's aesthetics
