Meaning between sense and reference: Impacts of semiotics on philosophy of science
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Evandro Agazzi,
Abstract
Modern philosophy of science was characterized as an analysis of the language of science based on mathematical logic. The formalistic perspective regarding mathematics and logic (which were conceived as linguistic constructions “devoid of meaning”) had to be corrected when applied to empirical theories. These were presented as formal system to which their intended meaning is granted through an “interpretation” (reflecting the fact that the initial “syntactic” view had been integrated in mathematical logic by the elaboration of “semantics”). But what is the meaning of a linguistic expression? The semantics of mathematical logic (model theory) identifies meaning with the referents of the expression. However, Frege had recovered an ancient distinction specifying that sense and reference are two different constituents of meaning, and the identification of meaning with sense has become widespread in the philosophy of language. Both positions are one-sided and entail difficulties that have affected the analytical philosophy of science. The aim of this paper is to recover the importance of a “three level semantics” (sign-sense-reference) and discuss other related notions (such as intension-extension), by pointing out the operational and not just linguistic or mental nature of reference. This has also consequences regarding the ontological purport of the different sciences.
© 2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Prelims
- Semiotics and logic: Pragmatization of the common ground
- Meaning between sense and reference: Impacts of semiotics on philosophy of science
- Where does logic meet semiotics?
- The correspondence theory of truth
- The intent to lie
- Reasoning in belief contexts
- Pragmatic constraints of meaning: An inferentialist approach
- On common knowledge in conversation
- Proofs and mistakes: Their syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics
- Object realism versus mathematical structuralism
- Indeterministic tense operators and the concept of time as a substance
- Counterfactual semantics and quantum physics
- The ultimate strengthening of the Turing Test?
- Is computation based on interpretation?
- The troubles with ontological primacy
- Some remarks on the word “be” and other existential expressions
- The evolution of scientific languages in Ajdukiewicz and Kuhn
- The core of grammar
- The grammar of philosophical discourse
- Semantic bounds for everyday language
- Demonstrative descriptions and conventional implicatures
- Does the Twin-Earth argument rest on a fallacy of equivocation?
Articles in the same Issue
- Prelims
- Semiotics and logic: Pragmatization of the common ground
- Meaning between sense and reference: Impacts of semiotics on philosophy of science
- Where does logic meet semiotics?
- The correspondence theory of truth
- The intent to lie
- Reasoning in belief contexts
- Pragmatic constraints of meaning: An inferentialist approach
- On common knowledge in conversation
- Proofs and mistakes: Their syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics
- Object realism versus mathematical structuralism
- Indeterministic tense operators and the concept of time as a substance
- Counterfactual semantics and quantum physics
- The ultimate strengthening of the Turing Test?
- Is computation based on interpretation?
- The troubles with ontological primacy
- Some remarks on the word “be” and other existential expressions
- The evolution of scientific languages in Ajdukiewicz and Kuhn
- The core of grammar
- The grammar of philosophical discourse
- Semantic bounds for everyday language
- Demonstrative descriptions and conventional implicatures
- Does the Twin-Earth argument rest on a fallacy of equivocation?
