Demonstrative descriptions and conventional implicatures
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Justyna Grudzińska,
Abstract
In our paper, we develop a proposal in which the predicational material in a demonstrative description is conventionally implicated and not part of the semantics proper. It is argued that existing approaches to demonstrative descriptions are inadequate because they do not correctly account for the full range of facts covering the properties of demonstrative descriptions. According to Richard's (1993) view, the descriptive element of a demonstrative description contributes to the truth-conditional content of the relevant utterance: “That F is G” entails (implies logically) “That (it) is F.” On Braun (1994) and Borg's (2000) view, the descriptive element contributes to the Kaplanian character of the relevant utterance: “That F is G” presupposes (in the Strawsonian sense) “That (it) is F.” We also argue that demonstrative descriptions should not be identified with Gödelian descriptions: “[The x: x = a and x is F]” (Lepore and Ludwig 2000). We think that a very promising alternative would be to regard the predicational content not as material that is part of the semantics of sentences but rather as material that is conventionally implicated: “That F is G” implicates conventionally “That (it) is F.”
© 2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Prelims
- Semiotics and logic: Pragmatization of the common ground
- Meaning between sense and reference: Impacts of semiotics on philosophy of science
- Where does logic meet semiotics?
- The correspondence theory of truth
- The intent to lie
- Reasoning in belief contexts
- Pragmatic constraints of meaning: An inferentialist approach
- On common knowledge in conversation
- Proofs and mistakes: Their syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics
- Object realism versus mathematical structuralism
- Indeterministic tense operators and the concept of time as a substance
- Counterfactual semantics and quantum physics
- The ultimate strengthening of the Turing Test?
- Is computation based on interpretation?
- The troubles with ontological primacy
- Some remarks on the word “be” and other existential expressions
- The evolution of scientific languages in Ajdukiewicz and Kuhn
- The core of grammar
- The grammar of philosophical discourse
- Semantic bounds for everyday language
- Demonstrative descriptions and conventional implicatures
- Does the Twin-Earth argument rest on a fallacy of equivocation?
Articles in the same Issue
- Prelims
- Semiotics and logic: Pragmatization of the common ground
- Meaning between sense and reference: Impacts of semiotics on philosophy of science
- Where does logic meet semiotics?
- The correspondence theory of truth
- The intent to lie
- Reasoning in belief contexts
- Pragmatic constraints of meaning: An inferentialist approach
- On common knowledge in conversation
- Proofs and mistakes: Their syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics
- Object realism versus mathematical structuralism
- Indeterministic tense operators and the concept of time as a substance
- Counterfactual semantics and quantum physics
- The ultimate strengthening of the Turing Test?
- Is computation based on interpretation?
- The troubles with ontological primacy
- Some remarks on the word “be” and other existential expressions
- The evolution of scientific languages in Ajdukiewicz and Kuhn
- The core of grammar
- The grammar of philosophical discourse
- Semantic bounds for everyday language
- Demonstrative descriptions and conventional implicatures
- Does the Twin-Earth argument rest on a fallacy of equivocation?
