Scientific Testability Following the Assumption of Insufficient Knowledge and Resources
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Miguel López-Astorga
Abstract
Carnap described ways to test scientific hypotheses. However, Carnap acknowledged that confirmation can never be definite. This left open the issue about the criteria to accept hypotheses. On the other hand, Wang has developed a computer program working without sufficient knowledge or resources, which makes the action of the program akin to the manner the human mind thinks. Wang’s program includes quantitative indicators that can be assigned to the frequency and the confidence of sentences. The present paper tries to link both approaches. The goal is to show how quantitative indicators such as those in Wang’s program can also be attributed to scientific hypotheses. Those indicators can help make decisions about the acceptance of the hypotheses. All of this allows proposing general characteristics for a possible algorithm to decide whether a particular hypothesis is admissible.
Funding source: PIA Ciencias Cognitivas, Centro de Investigacion en Ciencias Cognitivas, Instituto de Estudios Humanisticos, Universidad de Talca
Funding source: Proyecto Dialectica virtuosa de la educacion: De la fundamentacion filosofica y antropologica a implementaciones concretas, UNMdP
Award Identifier / Grant number: 15/I122 SAL127/19
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© 2024 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Editorial
- A Brief Note from the Editors
- Articles
- Philosophy as Passion for Knowledge: What Kind of History of Philosophy for the 21st Century?
- Scientific Testability Following the Assumption of Insufficient Knowledge and Resources
- Do Logical Aliens Think? Frege’s Agent-Relative View of Logic’s Constitutive Role for Thinking
- Book Reviews
- Niklas Forsberg: Lectures on a Philosophy Less Ordinary: Language and Morality in J. L. Austin’s Philosophy
- Ditte Marie Munch-Jurisic: Perpetrator Disgust. The Moral Limits of Gut Feelings
- Axel Hutter: Narrative Ontology
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Editorial
- A Brief Note from the Editors
- Articles
- Philosophy as Passion for Knowledge: What Kind of History of Philosophy for the 21st Century?
- Scientific Testability Following the Assumption of Insufficient Knowledge and Resources
- Do Logical Aliens Think? Frege’s Agent-Relative View of Logic’s Constitutive Role for Thinking
- Book Reviews
- Niklas Forsberg: Lectures on a Philosophy Less Ordinary: Language and Morality in J. L. Austin’s Philosophy
- Ditte Marie Munch-Jurisic: Perpetrator Disgust. The Moral Limits of Gut Feelings
- Axel Hutter: Narrative Ontology
