Abstract
Naturalism about the mind is typically associated with some kind of physicalism. This paper argues that this association is a mistake and that, given the naturalist’s commitment to the primacy of empirical evidence, naturalists should be open to different commitments. It is further argued that naturalists about the mind should be emergentists because of the epistemological attitude that is at the core of the emergentist position, properly understood.
References
Published Online: 2013-11-05
Published in Print: 2013-11
© 2013 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co.
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Masthead1
- What is Metaphysics in Murdoch’s Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals?
- Anthropocentrism versus Ecocentrism Revisited: Theoretical Confusions and Practical Conclusions
- Why a Naturalist Should Be an Emergentist about the Mind
- Properly Functioning Brains and Personal Identity: An Argument for Neural Animalism
- Aarhus Lectures: Schelling and Contemporary Philosophy
Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
emergence;
explanation;
mind;
naturalism;
reduction
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Masthead1
- What is Metaphysics in Murdoch’s Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals?
- Anthropocentrism versus Ecocentrism Revisited: Theoretical Confusions and Practical Conclusions
- Why a Naturalist Should Be an Emergentist about the Mind
- Properly Functioning Brains and Personal Identity: An Argument for Neural Animalism
- Aarhus Lectures: Schelling and Contemporary Philosophy