Abstract
How to make interpersonal comparisons is one of the most important questions to address in the discussion of distributive justice. This paper discusses two of the most relevant dividing lines in the literature of interpersonal comparison: between a monistic and pluralistic approach to interpersonal comparison, and between a subjectivist and objectivist standard of interpersonal comparison. The paper provides a normative argument for pluralism and objectivism with regard to interpersonal comparison, and it suggests that the Capability Approach as developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum fits these criteria.
Published Online: 2012-12-18
Published in Print: 2012-12
© 2012 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co.
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Masthead
- Hegel On Knowledge of What We Are Doing
- Rigidity, Reference, and Contingent Identity
- Pantheismus und Pantheismuskritik in Schellings Freiheitsschrift
- A Kantian Conception of Trust
- Coining collective identities: the multitude in De cive and Tractatus politicus
- Pluralism and Objectivism: Cornerstones for Interpersonal Comparisons
- On Thomas Pogge’s Theory of Global Justice. Why We Are Not Collectively Responsible for the Global Distribution of Benefits and Burdens between Individuals
Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
Pluralism;
Objectivism;
Interpersonal comparisons;
Capabilities;
Perfectionism
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Masthead
- Hegel On Knowledge of What We Are Doing
- Rigidity, Reference, and Contingent Identity
- Pantheismus und Pantheismuskritik in Schellings Freiheitsschrift
- A Kantian Conception of Trust
- Coining collective identities: the multitude in De cive and Tractatus politicus
- Pluralism and Objectivism: Cornerstones for Interpersonal Comparisons
- On Thomas Pogge’s Theory of Global Justice. Why We Are Not Collectively Responsible for the Global Distribution of Benefits and Burdens between Individuals