Abstract
This paper uses the synthetic control method to analyze the repercussions of the Arab Spring on the economic growth, corruption levels, and democracy of Tunisia and Libya. The study covered the years 2003–2018, and I utilized panel data from Tunisia, Libya, and 56 developing countries that were unaffected by the Arab revolution. I excluded countries with incomplete data, those directly impacted by the Arab Spring, and countries affected by external shocks like natural disasters or conflicts. All the data used in this analysis was obtained from the World Bank Open Data and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project. The findings indicate that the Arab Spring had adverse effects on economic growth in both Tunisia and Libya, in comparison to what would have been expected based on their synthetic control counterparts. On the other hand, the results demonstrate a significant increase in democracy and anti-corruption in both countries following the Arab Spring.
Country weights of economic growth in the synthetic Tunisia.
| Country | Weight | Country | Weight | Country | Weight | Country | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | 0 | Colombia | 0 | Madagascar | 0 | Saudi Arabia | 0.003 |
| Albania | 0 | Costa Rica | 0 | Mexico | 0 | Senegal | 0 |
| United Arab Emirates | 0 | Ecuador | 0 | Mozambique | 0 | Sierra Leone | 0 |
| Argentina | 0 | Gabon | 0 | Malawi | 0 | El Salvador | 0 |
| Armenia | 0 | Ghana | 0 | Malaysia | 0.153 | Turkey | 0 |
| Azerbaijan | 0 | Guatemala | 0 | Namibia | 0 | Tanzania | 0 |
| Bangladesh | 0 | Croatia | 0 | Nigeria | 0 | Uganda | 0 |
| Bulgaria | 0 | Hungary | 0 | Nicaragua | 0.283 | Uruguay | 0 |
| Belarus | 0 | Indonesia | 0 | Oman | 0.235 | Vietnam | 0 |
| Bolivia | 0 | India | 0.172 | Panama | 0 | South Africa | 0 |
| Brazil | 0 | Jamaica | 0 | Peru | 0 | Zimbabwe | 0 |
| Botswana | 0 | Kazakhstan | 0 | Poland | 0 | ||
| Chile | 0 | Kenya | 0 | Paraguay | 0 | ||
| China | 0.155 | Kuwait | 0 | Qatar | 0 | ||
| Cote d’Ivoire | 0 | Moldova | 0 | Romania | 0 |
Country weights of economic growth in the synthetic Libya.
| Country | Weight | Country | Weight | Country | Weight | Country | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | 0 | Colombia | 0 | Madagascar | 0 | Saudi Arabia | 0.534 |
| Albania | 0 | Costa Rica | 0 | Mexico | 0 | Senegal | 0 |
| United Arab Emirates | 0 | Ecuador | 0 | Mozambique | 0 | Sierra Leone | 0 |
| Argentina | 0 | Gabon | 0 | Malawi | 0 | El Salvador | 0 |
| Armenia | 0.035 | Ghana | 0 | Malaysia | 0 | Turkey | 0 |
| Azerbaijan | 0.199 | Guatemala | 0 | Namibia | 0 | Tanzania | 0 |
| Bangladesh | 0.019 | Croatia | 0 | Nigeria | 0 | Uganda | 0 |
| Bulgaria | 0 | Hungary | 0 | Nicaragua | 0 | Uruguay | 0 |
| Belarus | 0 | Indonesia | 0 | Oman | 0 | Vietnam | 0.014 |
| Bolivia | 0 | India | 0 | Panama | 0 | South Africa | 0 |
| Brazil | 0 | Jamaica | 0 | Peru | 0 | Zimbabwe | 0.114 |
| Botswana | 0 | Kazakhstan | 0 | Poland | 0 | ||
| Chile | 0 | Kenya | 0 | Paraguay | 0 | ||
| China | 0 | Kuwait | 0.085 | Qatar | 0 | ||
| Cote d’Ivoire | 0 | Moldova | 0 | Romania | 0 |
Democracy predictor means before the Arab Spring.
| Predictors | Tunisia | Synthetic Tunisia | Libya | Synthetic Libya |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Real GDP per capita | 9.11 | 9.84 | 9.93 | 10.07 |
| Life expectancy | 4.31 | 4.29 | 4.28 | 4.29 |
| Government expenditure % of GDP | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.14 | 0.18 |
| Female to labor | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.33 | 0.26 |
| Rule of law | 0.04 | −0.13 | −0.94 | −0.21 |
| Urban | 0.66 | 0.65 | 0.77 | 0.69 |
| Region | 1.00 | 0.61 | 1.00 | 0.65 |
| Open | 0.96 | 0.95 | 0.99 | 0.86 |
| Population growth | 0.93 | 1.98 | 1.42 | 2.21 |
| Democracy (2007) | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.04 | 0.05 |
| Democracy (2005) | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| Democracy (2003) | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
Country weights of democracy in the synthetic Tunisia.
| Country | Weight | Country | Weight | Country | Weight | Country | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | 0 | Colombia | 0 | Madagascar | 0 | Saudi Arabia | 0.526 |
| Albania | 0 | Costa Rica | 0 | Mexico | 0 | Senegal | 0 |
| United Arab Emirates | 0 | Ecuador | 0 | Mozambique | 0 | Sierra Leone | 0 |
| Argentina | 0 | Gabon | 0 | Malawi | 0 | El Salvador | 0 |
| Armenia | 0.088 | Ghana | 0 | Malaysia | 0 | Turkey | 0 |
| Azerbaijan | 0 | Guatemala | 0 | Namibia | 0 | Tanzania | 0 |
| Bangladesh | 0.020 | Croatia | 0 | Nigeria | 0 | Uganda | 0 |
| Bulgaria | 0.003 | Hungary | 0 | Nicaragua | 0.044 | Uruguay | 0 |
| Belarus | 0 | Indonesia | 0 | Oman | 0.087 | Vietnam | 0.180 |
| Bolivia | 0 | India | 0 | Panama | 0 | South Africa | 0 |
| Brazil | 0 | Jamaica | 0 | Peru | 0 | Zimbabwe | 0 |
| Botswana | 0 | Kazakhstan | 0 | Poland | 0 | ||
| Chile | 0 | Kenya | 0 | Paraguay | 0 | ||
| China | 0 | Kuwait | 0 | Qatar | 0 | ||
| Cote d’Ivoire | 0 | Moldova | 0.050 | Romania | 0 |
Country weights of democracy in the synthetic Libya.
| Country | Weight | Country | Weight | Country | Weight | Country | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | 0 | Colombia | 0 | Madagascar | 0 | Saudi Arabia | 0.649 |
| Albania | 0 | Costa Rica | 0 | Mexico | 0 | Senegal | 0 |
| United Arab Emirates | 0 | Ecuador | 0 | Mozambique | 0 | Sierra Leone | 0 |
| Argentina | 0 | Gabon | 0 | Malawi | 0 | El Salvador | 0 |
| Armenia | 0 | Ghana | 0 | Malaysia | 0 | Turkey | 0 |
| Azerbaijan | 0.198 | Guatemala | 0 | Namibia | 0 | Tanzania | 0 |
| Bangladesh | 0 | Croatia | 0 | Nigeria | 0 | Uganda | 0 |
| Bulgaria | 0 | Hungary | 0 | Nicaragua | 0 | Uruguay | 0 |
| Belarus | 0 | Indonesia | 0 | Oman | 0 | Vietnam | 0.032 |
| Bolivia | 0 | India | 0 | Panama | 0 | South Africa | 0 |
| Brazil | 0 | Jamaica | 0 | Peru | 0 | Zimbabwe | 0 |
| Botswana | 0 | Kazakhstan | 0 | Poland | 0 | ||
| Chile | 0 | Kenya | 0 | Paraguay | 0 | ||
| China | 0.121 | Kuwait | 0 | Qatar | 0 | ||
| Cote d’Ivoire | 0 | Moldova | 0 | Romania | 0 |
Corruption predictor means before the Arab Spring.
| Predictors | Tunisia | Synthetic Tunisia | Libya | Synthetic Libya |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Real GDP per capita | 9.11 | 9.26 | 9.93 | 9.44 |
| Life expectancy | 4.31 | 4.22 | 4.28 | 4.25 |
| Government expenditure % of GDP | 0.17 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.13 |
| Female to labor | 0.26 | 0.43 | 0.33 | 0.41 |
| Rule of law | 0.04 | −0.50 | −0.95 | −0.66 |
| Urban | 0.66 | 0.65 | 0.77 | 0.58 |
| Region | 1.00 | 0.08 | 1.00 | 0.20 |
| Open | 0.96 | 0.82 | 0.99 | 0.94 |
| Population growth | 0.93 | 0.99 | 1.42 | 1.47 |
| Corruption (2007) | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.85 |
| Corruption (2005) | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.85 |
| Corruption (2003) | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.85 |
Country weights of corruption in the synthetic Tunisia.
| Country | Weight | Country | Weight | Country | Weight | Country | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | 0 | Colombia | 0 | Madagascar | 0.028 | Saudi Arabia | 0.082 |
| Albania | 0 | Costa Rica | 0 | Mexico | 0 | Senegal | 0 |
| United Arab Emirates | 0 | Ecuador | 0 | Mozambique | 0 | Sierra Leone | 0 |
| Argentina | 0 | Gabon | 0.242 | Malawi | 0 | El Salvador | 0 |
| Armenia | 0.380 | Ghana | 0 | Malaysia | 0 | Turkey | 0 |
| Azerbaijan | 0.171 | Guatemala | 0 | Namibia | 0 | Tanzania | 0 |
| Bangladesh | 0.005 | Croatia | 0 | Nigeria | 0 | Uganda | 0 |
| Bulgaria | 0 | Hungary | 0 | Nicaragua | 0 | Uruguay | 0 |
| Belarus | 0 | Indonesia | 0 | Oman | 0 | Vietnam | 0 |
| Bolivia | 0.012 | India | 0 | Panama | 0 | South Africa | 0 |
| Brazil | 0 | Jamaica | 0 | Peru | 0 | Zimbabwe | 0 |
| Botswana | 0 | Kazakhstan | 0 | Poland | 0 | 0 | |
| Chile | 0 | Kenya | 0 | Paraguay | 0 | ||
| China | 0 | Kuwait | 0 | Qatar | 0 | ||
| Cote d’Ivoire | 0 | Moldova | 0.080 | Romania | 0 |
Country weights of corruption in the synthetic Libya.
| Country | Weight | Country | Weight | Country | Weight | Country | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | 0 | Colombia | 0 | Madagascar | 0 | Saudi Arabia | 0.197 |
| Albania | 0.065 | Costa Rica | 0 | Mexico | 0 | Senegal | 0 |
| United Arab Emirates | 0 | Ecuador | 0 | Mozambique | 0 | Sierra Leone | 0 |
| Argentina | 0 | Gabon | 0 | Malawi | 0 | El Salvador | 0 |
| Armenia | 0 | Ghana | 0 | Malaysia | 0 | Turkey | 0 |
| Azerbaijan | 0.737 | Guatemala | 0 | Namibia | 0 | Tanzania | 0 |
| Bangladesh | 0 | Croatia | 0 | Nigeria | 0 | Uganda | 0 |
| Bulgaria | 0 | Hungary | 0 | Nicaragua | 0 | Uruguay | 0 |
| Belarus | 0 | Indonesia | 0 | Oman | 0 | Vietnam | 0 |
| Bolivia | 0 | India | 0 | Panama | 0 | South Africa | 0 |
| Brazil | 0 | Jamaica | 0 | Peru | 0 | Zimbabwe | 0 |
| Botswana | 0 | Kazakhstan | 0 | Poland | 0 | ||
| Chile | 0 | Kenya | 0 | Paraguay | 0 | ||
| China | 0 | Kuwait | 0 | Qatar | 0 | ||
| Cote d’Ivoire | 0 | Moldova | 0 | Romania | 0 |
GDP predictor means before the Arab Spring with additional control variables.
| Predictors | Tunisia | Synthetic Tunisia | Libya | Synthetic Libya |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Life expectancy | 4.31 | 4.21 | 4.28 | 4.20 |
| Government expenditure % of GDP | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.14 | 0.16 |
| Natural resource % of GDP | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.58 | 0.39 |
| Female to labor | 0.26 | 0.40 | 0.33 | 0.32 |
| Rule of law | 0.04 | 0.04 | −0.94 | −0.38 |
| Urban | 0.66 | 0.52 | 0.77 | 0.75 |
| Region | 1.00 | 0.10 | 1.00 | 0.40 |
| Open | 0.96 | 0.76 | 0.99 | 0.89 |
| Population growth | 0.93 | 1.21 | 1.42 | 2.55 |
| Mean years of education | 6.03 | 7.29 | 6.70 | 8.16 |
| Oil rent % of GDP | 3.96 | 3.91 | 56.72 | 36.62 |
| Unemployment rate | 13.16 | 12.40 | 19.47 | 9.96 |
| Income inequality | 3.04 | 4.34 | 2.79 | 4.16 |
| Real GDP per capita (2007) | 9.15 | 9.14 | 9.99 | 10.00 |
| Real GDP per capita (2005) | 9.05 | 9.05 | 9.90 | 9.88 |
| Real GDP per capita (2003) | 8.97 | 8.97 | 9.77 | 9.78 |
Democracy predictor means before the Arab Spring with additional control variables.
| Predictors | Tunisia | Synthetic Tunisia | Libya | Synthetic Libya |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Real GDP per capita | 9.11 | 9.26 | 9.93 | 10.29 |
| Life expectancy | 4.31 | 4.14 | 4.28 | 4.28 |
| Government expenditure % of GDP | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.14 | 0.19 |
| Natural resource % of GDP | 0.05 | 0.26 | 0.58 | 0.43 |
| Female to labor | 0.26 | 0.32 | 0.33 | 0.23 |
| Rule of law | 0.04 | −0.62 | −0.94 | −0.17 |
| Urban | 0.66 | 0.60 | 0.77 | 0.74 |
| Region | 1.00 | 0.48 | 1.00 | 0.74 |
| Open | 0.96 | 0.77 | 0.99 | 0.88 |
| Population growth | 0.93 | 1.77 | 1.42 | 2.47 |
| Mean years of education | 6.03 | 7.73 | 6.70 | 8.62 |
| Oil rent % of GDP | 3.96 | 21.19 | 56.72 | 40.94 |
| Unemployment rate | 13.16 | 5.74 | 19.47 | 5.94 |
| Income inequality | 3.04 | 4.68 | 2.79 | 4.75 |
| Democracy (2003) | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| Democracy (2005) | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| Democracy (2007) | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
Corruption predictor means before the Arab Spring with additional control variables.
| Predictors | Tunisia | Synthetic Tunisia | Libya | Synthetic Libya |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Real GDP per capita | 9.11 | 9.11 | 9.93 | 9.54 |
| Life expectancy | 4.31 | 4.22 | 4.28 | 4.24 |
| Government expenditure % of GDP | 0.17 | 0.12 | 0.14 | 0.13 |
| Natural resource % of GDP | 0.05 | 0.11 | 0.58 | 0.35 |
| Female to labor | 0.26 | 0.42 | 0.33 | 0.41 |
| Rule of law | 0.04 | −0.54 | −0.94 | −0.59 |
| Urban | 0.66 | 0.66 | 0.77 | 0.63 |
| Region | 1 | 0.02 | 1.00 | 0.20 |
| Open | 0.96 | 0.71 | 0.99 | 0.93 |
| Population growth | 0.93 | 0.87 | 1.42 | 1.78 |
| Mean years of education | 6.03 | 8.32 | 6.70 | 9.40 |
| Oil rent % of GDP | 3.96 | 8.85 | 56.72 | 32.62 |
| Unemployment rate | 13.16 | 10.85 | 19.47 | 8.14 |
| Income inequality | 3.04 | 3.60 | 2.79 | 2.93 |
| Real GDP per capita (2003) | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.85 |
| Real GDP per capita (2005) | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.85 |
| Real GDP per capita (2007) | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.85 |

In-space placebo test for democracy in Tunisia and Libya.

In-space placebo test for corruption in Tunisia and Libya.
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