Punishment Severity and Crime: The Case of Arkansas
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Mehdi Barati
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of a marginal change in punishment severity on the incidence of crime. I explore Arkansas’ (AR) milder punishment for theft, which was adopted in 2011 in order to deal with prison overcrowding. The decrease in punishment contributed to growing theft rates in AR, suggesting criminals respond to the reduced crime-specific punishment. The findings also indicate that the likely lower incarceration for theft did not lead to an increase in other types of crime.
Appendix
Effect of punishment severity on crime rates in AR: the DD approach using states obtained from SCM as the control group.
| Variables | Larceny theft | Motor vehicle theft | Aggravated assault |
|---|---|---|---|
| Punishment | 0.0533 | 0.0146 | −0.0321 |
| (0.0180) | (0.0251) | (0.0335) | |
| Property Crime Rate | 0.747 | 0.445 | – |
| (0.0885) | (0.100) | – | |
| Violent Crime Rate | – | – | 0.295 |
| – | – | (0.0570) | |
| Unemployment Rate | −0.0136 | −0.197 | −0.0313 |
| (0.0147) | (0.0730) | (0.0375) | |
| Population | 0.164 | 0.699 | 0.506 |
| (0.0572) | (0.568) | (0.271) | |
| Population per Square Mile | 0.210 | 0.112 | −0.447 |
| (0.0824) | (0.559) | (0.0609) | |
| Male 10–19 | −0.577 | 19.88 | −4.317 |
| (0.950) | (6.967) | (2.886) | |
| Male 20–29 | −0.455 | 0.498 | −6.082 |
| (1.645) | (1.247) | (3.104) | |
| Male 30–39 | 0.695 | 11.28 | 3.137 |
| (2.302) | (4.397) | (2.700) | |
| Male 40–49 | −2.027 | −0.544 | −3.071 |
| (1.779) | (3.973) | (2.452) | |
| Male 50–64 | 2.051 | 5.346 | −0.416 |
| (0.737) | (4.241) | (4.532) | |
| Male over 65 | 0.107 | 5.865 | 3.453 |
| (0.907) | (1.688) | (2.576) | |
| Female 10–19 | 3.611 | −7.170 | −0.169 |
| (1.133) | (5.048) | (2.608) | |
| Female 20–29 | 3.764 | 8.020 | 4.740 |
| (1.990) | (1.934) | (1.914) | |
| Female 30–39 | 0.919 | −7.912 | −2.710 |
| (1.976) | (4.089) | (2.183) | |
| Female 40–49 | 2.084 | 1.932 | 2.795 |
| (2.666) | (4.665) | (3.123) | |
| Female 50–64 | −0.443 | 0.626 | 1.240 |
| (1.133) | (6.413) | (3.606) | |
| Female over 65 | 3.070 | 0.367 | −4.323 |
| (0.701) | (4.363) | (2.409) | |
| Black | −0.104 | 0.359 | −0.00549 |
| (0.110) | (0.237) | (0.111) | |
| White | −0.0346 | −0.687 | −3.048 |
| (0.671) | (2.126) | (0.994) | |
| Constant | −26.41 | −82.94 | 22.29 |
| (8.836) | (27.11) | (12.54) | |
| Observations | 576 | 504 | 648 |
Effect of punishment severity on crime rates in AR: the DD approach using southern states as the control group.
| Variables | Larceny theft | Motor vehicle theft | Aggravated assault |
|---|---|---|---|
| Punishment | 0.0619 | −0.0529 | −0.0999 |
| (0.0266) | (0.0339) | (0.0853) | |
| Property Crime Rate | 0.618 | 0.837 | – |
| (0.0924) | (0.0880) | – | |
| Violent Crime Rate | – | – | 0.627 |
| – | – | (0.0876) | |
| Unemployment Rate | −0.00669 | −0.278 | −0.0824 |
| (0.0252) | (0.0311) | (0.0533) | |
| Population | 0.0760 | 0.202 | 0.620 |
| (0.0411) | (0.0845) | (0.141) | |
| Population per Square Mile | −0.0976 | −0.0736 | 0.118 |
| (0.0541) | (0.0989) | (0.214) | |
| Male 10–19 | 0.830 | −4.497 | −13.14 |
| (2.346) | (3.815) | (9.293) | |
| Male 20–29 | 1.722 | −5.600 | −15.19 |
| (1.139) | (1.615) | (2.809) | |
| Male 30–39 | 0.721 | 4.034 | 3.641 |
| (0.920) | (1.554) | (3.972) | |
| Male 40–49 | −7.291 | −14.94 | −10.70 |
| (1.343) | (3.567) | (7.098) | |
| Male 50–64 | 3.119 | −8.427 | −9.124 |
| (1.430) | (2.349) | (6.602) | |
| Male over 65 | 6.388 | 1.997 | 11.93 |
| (0.736) | (1.500) | (3.097) | |
| Female 10–19 | 0.568 | −0.471 | 1.697 |
| (1.826) | (4.741) | (8.878) | |
| Female 20–29 | 1.689 | −1.205 | 7.744 |
| (0.944) | (1.969) | (4.905) | |
| Female 30–39 | 2.020 | −9.153 | −15.25 |
| (1.454) | (2.935) | (6.612) | |
| Female 40–49 | 9.384 | 11.89 | 1.890 |
| (1.725) | (3.708) | (6.484) | |
| Female 50–64 | −1.137 | 4.899 | 6.236 |
| (1.410) | (1.771) | (5.409) | |
| Female over 65 | −5.092 | −6.185 | −16.90 |
| (0.787) | (1.590) | (2.576) | |
| Black | 0.00129 | −0.472 | −0.231 |
| (0.0529) | (0.0736) | (0.178) | |
| White | 0.327 | −2.345 | −2.584 |
| (0.232) | (0.287) | (0.712) | |
| Constant | −23.48 | 62.10 | 98.94 |
| (7.463) | (23.24) | (49.26) | |
| Observations | 1,008 | 1,008 | 1,008 |
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