Abstract
This paper estimates the effect that wealth and power have on criminal justice outcomes by exploiting the random matching of drivers to pedestrians in traffic accidents. If justice is impartial, we should observe the same share of rich offenders both for poor and rich victims, conditional on location and time. Rich victims act as a control group to estimate the proportion of missing rich offenders whose victims are less powerful. I use this estimation approach on data from Russia, and find that its justice system is not impartial. The same approach can be applied not only to other countries but also to other characteristics that should be irrelevant to judicial outcomes in an impartial legal system, such as race and gender.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. I am grateful to Andrea Ichino and Andrea Mattozzi for their supervision, and my peers at the European University Institute for the constructive feedback. This project would not have been possible without Vadim Volkov, Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Irina Chetverikova and other members of the Institute for the Rule of Law at the European University at Saint-Petersburg who provided invaluable advice and data access. Data used in this study was created with support of the Russian Science foundation grant 17-18-01618. This paper has benefited from the comments by reviewers and conference participants at the Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies at Duke Law School, November 2016; seminar participants at Nazarbayev University, August 2015. Special thanks to Jérôme Adda, Gözde Ç örekçioğlu, Ada González-Torres, Anastasia Antsygina, Sylta Cornils, and Matteo Sostero.
References
Acemoglu, D., and Robinson J. A.. 2013. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York, NY: Crown Business.10.1355/ae29-2jSuche in Google Scholar
Alesina, A., and La Ferrara E.. 2014. “A Test of Racial Bias in Sentencing,” Capital 104 (11) The American Economic Review 3397–3433.10.1257/aer.104.11.3397Suche in Google Scholar
Angrist, J. D., and Pischke J.-S.. 2008. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.10.2307/j.ctvcm4j72Suche in Google Scholar
Arlen, J. H. 1992. “Should Defendants’ Wealth Matter?” 21 (2) The Journal of Legal Studies 413–429.10.1086/467912Suche in Google Scholar
Bacher, J.-L., Bouchard M., Tremblay P., and Paquin J.. 2005. “Another Look at the ‘Corporate Advantage’ in Proceedings,” Routine Criminal 47 (4) Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 685–708.10.3138/cjccj.47.4.685Suche in Google Scholar
Champion, D. J. 1989. “Private Counsels and Public Defenders: A Look at Weak Cases, Prior Records, and Leniency in Bargaining,” Plea 17 (4) Journal of Criminal Justice 253–263.10.1016/0047-2352(89)90031-7Suche in Google Scholar
Clark, L. D. 1997. “All Defendants, Rich and Poor, Should Get Appointed Counsel in Criminal Cases: The Route to Justice,” True Equal 81 (1) Marquette Law Review 47–78.Suche in Google Scholar
Coatsworth, J. H. 2008. “Inequality, Institutions and Economic Growth in Latin America,” 40 (3) Journal of American Latin Studies 545–569.10.1017/S0022216X08004689Suche in Google Scholar
D’Alessio, S. J., and Stolzenberg L.. 1993. “Socioeconomic Status and the Sentencing of the Traditional Offender,” 21 (1) Journal of Criminal Justice 61–77. ISSN: 00472352.10.1016/0047-2352(93)90006-9Suche in Google Scholar
Dell, M. 2010. “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita.” 78 (6) Econometrica 1863–1903. ISSN: 1468-0262.10.3982/ECTA8121Suche in Google Scholar
Garoupa, N., and Gravelle H.. 2003. “Efficient Deterrence Does Not Require that the Wealthy Should Be Able to Buy Justice,” ISSN: 09324569.10.1628/0932456032954765Suche in Google Scholar
Glaeser, E., Scheinkman J., and Shleifer A.. 2003. “The Injustice of Inequality,” 50 (1) Journal of Monetary Economics 199–222. ISSN: 03043932.10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00204-0Suche in Google Scholar
Glaeser, E. L., and Sacerdote B.. 2003. “Sentencing in Cases Homicide and the Role of Vengeance,” 32 (2) The Journal of Legal Studies 363–382.10.1086/374707Suche in Google Scholar
Glaeser, E. L., La Porta R., Lopez-de Silanes F., and Shleifer A.. 2004. “Do Institutions Cause Growth?” 9 (3) Journal of Economic Growth 271–303. ISSN: 1573–7020.10.1023/B:JOEG.0000038933.16398.edSuche in Google Scholar
Greene, W.H. 2004. “The Behaviour of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator of Limited Dependent Variable Models in the Presence of Effects,” Fixed 7 (1) The Econometrics Journal 98–119.10.1111/j.1368-423X.2004.00123.xSuche in Google Scholar
Hagan, J. 1982. “The Corporate Advantage: A Study of the Involvement of Corporate and Individual Victims in a System,” Criminal Justice 60 (4) Social Forces 993–1022.10.1093/sf/60.4.993Suche in Google Scholar
Hartley, R. D., Miller H. V., and Spohn C.. 2010. “Do You Get What You Pay for? Type of Counsel and Its Effect on Criminal Court Outcomes,” 38 (5) Journal of Criminal Justice 1063–1070.10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2010.07.009Suche in Google Scholar
Ichino, A., Polo M., and Rettore E.. 2003. “Are Judges Biased by Labor Market Conditions?” 47 (5) European Economic Review 913–944.10.1016/S0014-2921(02)00269-6Suche in Google Scholar
Imbens, G. W., and Wooldridge J. M.. 2009. “Recent Developments in the Econometrics of Evaluation,” Program 47 (1) Journal of economic literature 5–86.10.1257/jel.47.1.5Suche in Google Scholar
Johansson, S., and Nygren O. (1991). “The Missing Girls of China: A New Demographic Account,” 17 (1) Population and Development Review 35–51. ISSN: 00987921, 17284457.10.2307/1972351Suche in Google Scholar
Knowles, J., Persico N., and Todd P.. 2001. “Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence,” 109 (1) Journal of Political Economy 203–229. doi:10.1086/318603.Suche in Google Scholar
Kobayashi, B. H., and Lott J. R.. 1996. “In Defense of Criminal Defense Expenditures and Plea Bargaining,” 16 (4) International Review of Law and Economics 397–416. ISSN: 01448188.10.1016/S0144-8188(96)00034-8Suche in Google Scholar
Levitt, S. D., and Porter J.. 2001. “How Dangerous Are Drinking Drivers?” 109 (6) Journal of Political Economy 1198–1237. doi:10.1086/323281.Suche in Google Scholar
Lott Jr, J. R. 1987. “Should the Wealthy Be Able to ‘buy justice’?” 95 (6) Journal of Political Economy 1307–1316.10.1086/261517Suche in Google Scholar
Nunn, N., and Puga D.. 2012. “Ruggedness: The Blessing of Bad Geography in Africa,” 94 (1) Review of Economics and Statistics 20–36.10.1162/REST_a_00161Suche in Google Scholar
Paneyakh, E. 2014. “Faking Performance Together: Systems of Performance Evaluation in Agencies Russian Enforcement and Production of Bias and Privilege,” 30 (2–3) Post-Soviet Affairs 115–136.10.1080/1060586X.2013.858525Suche in Google Scholar
Rattner, A., Turjeman H., and Fishman G.. 2008. “Public Versus Private Defense: Can Money Buy Justice?” 36 (1) Journal of Criminal Justice 43–49.10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2007.12.005Suche in Google Scholar
Shayo, M., and Zussman A.. 2011. “Judicial Ingroup Bias in the Shadow of Terrorism,” 126 (3) Quarterly Journal of Economics 1447–1484.10.1093/qje/qjr022Suche in Google Scholar
Shi, Y., and Kennedy J. J.. 2016. “Delayed Registration and Identifying the ‘Missing Girls’ in China,” 228 The China Quarterly 1018–1038.10.1017/S0305741016001132Suche in Google Scholar
Shklyaruk, M. 2014. Traektoria ugolovnogo dela v oficialʼnoi statistike [The criminal case trajectory in official statistics]. SPB: Institute for the Rule of Law.Suche in Google Scholar
Sklyaruk, M., and Skougarevsky D.. 2015. Kriminalʼnaya statistika: mekhanizmy formirovaniya, prichiny iskazheniya, puti reformirovaniya [crime statistics: How it is constructed, tampered with, and could be reformed (analytical report)]. Moscow: Norma-SPB.Suche in Google Scholar
The World Justice Project. 2014. Rule of Law Index. Washington, DC: The World Justice Project.Suche in Google Scholar
Trochev, A. 2014. “How Judges Arrest and Acquit,” in Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe, 152. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781107286191.008Suche in Google Scholar
Ulmer, J. T. 2012. “Recent Developments and New Directions in Research,” Sentencing 29 (1) Justice Quarterly 1–40.10.1080/07418825.2011.624115Suche in Google Scholar
Volkov, V. 2016. “Legal and Extralegal Origins of Sentencing Disparities: Evidence from Russia’s Criminal Courts,” 13 (4) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 637–665.10.1111/jels.12128Suche in Google Scholar
Yoav, D. 1999. “Do the Haves Still Come Out Ahead-resource Inequalities in Ideological Courts: The Case of the Israeli high Court of Justice,” 33 Law & Soc’y Review 1059.Suche in Google Scholar
Zatz, M. S., and Hagan J.. 1985. “Crime, Time, and Punishment: An Exploration of Selection Bias in Sentencing Research,” 1 (I) Journal of Quantitative Criminology 103–126. ISSN: 07484518.10.1007/BF01065251Suche in Google Scholar
Supplemental Material
The online version of this article offers supplementary material (https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2017-0001).
© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Empirical Legal Studies: CELS and CELSE
- Missing Rich Offenders: Traffic Accidents and the Impartiality of Justice
- Are Advocates General Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Voting Behavior of the Advocates General at the European Court of Justice
- The More Med-Mals, the Shorter the Litigation: Evidence from Florida
- Police Incentives, Policy Spillovers, and the Enforcement of Drug Crimes
- Determinants of Judicial Efficiency Change: Evidence from Brazil
- Cartels as Defensive Devices: Evidence from Decisions of the European Commission 2001–2010
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Empirical Legal Studies: CELS and CELSE
- Missing Rich Offenders: Traffic Accidents and the Impartiality of Justice
- Are Advocates General Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Voting Behavior of the Advocates General at the European Court of Justice
- The More Med-Mals, the Shorter the Litigation: Evidence from Florida
- Police Incentives, Policy Spillovers, and the Enforcement of Drug Crimes
- Determinants of Judicial Efficiency Change: Evidence from Brazil
- Cartels as Defensive Devices: Evidence from Decisions of the European Commission 2001–2010