Introduction

Eleatic ontology emerged as a reaction against natural philosophy. Ancient Greek natural philosophers represented the universe as an^[1] arrangement of processes and posited an original stuff whose transformation gave rise to cosmic diversity. Parmenides, on the contrary, refused to identify ultimate reality with a specific material substance, such as water, air, or fire, and limited himself to asserting the actuality of ultimate reality in order to draw the consequences that fitted his worldview.^[2] He deemed his path-breaking deduction more fundamental than natural philosophy and set the course for Greek metaphysics by claiming that both thinking and being were coextensive with ultimate, immutable reality. Some lyric poets had already attributed to humans the power to transcend physical constraints through the apprehension of objects that do not act upon sensory organs, but Parmenides himself seems to have understood that the verb εἰμί in itself neither specifies the nature nor limits the actuality of its subject, or of what is said about that subject.^[3]

In support of this account, I will argue along the following lines:

1. Preconceptions about being prevent us from understanding Parmenidean ontology. Parmenides equated νοεῖν with εἶναι (B3) under the assumption that the content conveyed by τὸ ἐόν (= οὕνεκεν ἔστι νόημα) was the expression of νοεῖν (B8.34–36). This content is so difficult to grasp because εἰμί is not only the least meaningful verb in Ancient Greek but also a function word. Still, Parmenides’ concept of being can be revealed by linguistic analysis, for it must be captured by finite and nonfinite εἰμί-clauses.^[4]

2. Parmenides’ concept of being is symbolized by the present forms of the verb εἰμί in their functional relation to the clause, not only as lexical units conveying a certain predicable notion, which would also be expressed by the future forms of the same verb (ἔσται).^[5] As a lexical verb, εἰμί was very poor in meaning; it conjured up a very abstract notion of subsistence and took on different specific meanings according to the subject and context in question (e. g., be alive, present, actual, in force, located, etc.). Nevertheless, as an auxiliary for predication, εἰμί maintained its durative aspect and served to state arguably any content without notional interference.^[6] Moreover, leaving aside the imperfect (ἦν), the present forms of εἰμί served to state predicative content without temporal limits because they only expressed the present tense (ἔστιν) and the imperfective aspect (ἐόν and εἶναι).^[7]

3. Parmenides had reason to believe that “being” surpassed the principles proposed by Ionian natural philosophers. These principles accounted only for the positive aspect of variation across a polar continuum (e. g., for brightness, not for darkness) and were meant to explain synchronous and asynchronous differences, not what all ascertainable things have in common. Parmenidean “being,” by contrast, covered the entire extent of thought and allowed for an investigation of ultimate reality, which was supposed to transcend differences and oppositions. Now, I do not claim that Parmenides grasped reality in a way that natural philosophers could not, but rather that he thought that the verb εἰμί allowed him to grasp ultimate reality.

1 Thinking and being have the same content

Parmenides apparently claimed that thinking and being are the same thing, but scholars debate whether this is what he really meant.^[8] The identity of thinking and being seems to defy common sense,^[9] and what appears to be an obvious translation of τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι (B3^[10]), namely ‘For the same thing is thinking and being’ or ‘For the same thing is to think and to be,’ has gained many objectors over time. In what follows, I will focus on grammar as much as possible so as not to introduce bias into my interpretation of B3. Understanding Parmenides is more important to me than presenting him as a thinker who does not offend the spirit of our time.

Even if B3 is a complete main clause with the subject in the nominative, as it seems to be,^[11] νοεῖν and εἶναι do not have to be the subject of that clause. Since “[t]he Greek infinitive was originally the dative of an abstract noun,”^[12] several interpreters believe that the infinitives in B3 are datival.^[13] If that were the case, ἐστίν would not necessarily link a subject with a nonverbal predicate and the infinitives would specify the purpose or status of τὸ αὐτό, regardless of the referent of this phrase. It goes without saying that the copular nature of the clause would mainly depend on whether the datival segments are predicative or not (cf. S is there for thinking with S is for thinking). Either way, this reading does not result in the equation of νοεῖν and εἶναι, but in the claim that τὸ αὐτό is or is there for thinking and being. This is certainly not an equative sentence; however, such a construction could still involve some kind of equivalence: if τὸ αὐτό substitute for a noun phrase, B3 would imply that whatever value satisfies x is for νοεῖν also satisfies x is for εἶναι.

There are some objections against this reading despite its grammaticality.^[14] Parmenides asserts that τὸ ἐόν does not await completion (cf. ἀτέλεστον in B8.3 and ἀτελεύτητον in B8.32), but a sentence like ‘The same thing is (there) for thinking and being’ presents being as something that need not be actual. Consider a sentence like ‘All peppers are there to dry,’ which presents desiccation as something that is meant to occur but not before a certain point in time, or a sentence like ‘These pencils are for coloring,’ which presents coloring as a possibility in need of actualization. A similar problem arises if we grant a modal sense to the combination of εἰμί and infinitives.^[15] Sentences such as ‘The same thing is allowed to think and be’ and ‘The same thing can think and be’ present being as something possible, admitted, or permitted, while Parmenides claims that being is somehow necessary, obligatory, or mandatory (cf. οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι in B2.3, χρὴ […] ἐὸν ἔμμεναι in B6.1, and ἀνάγκη in B8.16). At the same time, some evidence may counter this argument, for Parmenides may also have spoken of being as something possible, admitted, or permitted (cf. ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι in B6.1).

There is another objection worth mentioning. Since the supporters of this reading usually translate B3 as ‘For the same thing is (allowed) to be thought of and be’ or ‘The same thing can be thought of and be,’ they have been accused of overlooking selectively the active voice of νοεῖν and taking τὸ αὐτό as both the object of thinking and the subject of being.^[16] This is withal a minor objection, for nothing prevents grammatical subjects from being agents and patients at the same time (e. g., ‘Bill killed John and was killed by John’s wife’). Besides, the semantic role of the subject in accordance with this reading would not be determined by the voice of the infinitives,^[17] but rather by ἐστίν, which is the verb of the sentence. From a semantic point of view, the referent of τὸ αὐτό would not be an agent or a patient, but a theme, i. e., something located in the (abstract) space; and it would be as a theme that τὸ αὐτό should be connected with the datival infinitives.

Of course, νοεῖν and εἶναι could also be in the nominative case, as often seen in sentences that link two infinitives to define one of them as a lexical entry. For example, there is a sentence structurally identical to B3 in Plato’s Cratylus: τὸ γὰρ εἴρειν λέγειν ἐστίν (398d7–8), where λέγειν is undoubtedly in the nominative. This second reading has many adherents,^[18] but presents us with a different challenge, namely to identify the subject of the resulting copular clause.^[19] Indeed, we should not exclude the possibility that the infinitives are the subject of the sentence, because, as argued by Heidel (1913), p. 720 against Burnet (1930), p. 173, “[a]ny good grammar will supply abundant examples of the substantive use of the infinitive, with or without the article, earlier than the date of Parmenides.”^[20]

Now, someone might think that τὸ αὐτό, which occupies the first position in the sequence, is clearly the subject of ἐστίν. If this were the case, τὸ αὐτό could either establish an endophoric reference, as in ‘For this very thing is thinking and being,’ or stand for anything discernible, as in ‘For x is thinking and being,’ where x = x. The latter occurs, for instance, in Metaph. Γ.3 1005^b19–20:

τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό

For the same [thing] cannot pertain and not pertain simultaneously to the same [thing] and in the same [respect]

However, neither definiteness nor word order are critical to the identification of the subject in B3. In Greek, “the subject of a copular verb may be indefinite”^[21] and word order follows a rather discursive configuration.^[22] For this reason, we may also want to explore the possibility that τὸ αὐτό is not the subject but the predicate of the sentence, considering that τὸ αὐτό does not even need to be a referential phrase. DK 90 B 1.1 shows that τὸ αὐτό can be a relational predicate:

τοὶ μὲν γὰρ λέγοντι, ὡς ἄλλο μέν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κακόν· τοὶ δέ, ὡς τὸ αὐτό ἐστι

For some say that the good is one [thing] and the bad [is] another [thing], but others [say] that [both] are the same [thing]

According to the Dissoi Logoi, some philosophers argued that τὸ ἀγαθόν and τὸ κακόν are two different things, while others argued that τὸ ἀγαθόν and τὸ κακόν are the same thing (τὸ αὐτό ἐστι). Yet, we can also render τὸ αὐτό in this passage as ‘the same (as each other)’ or ‘identical (to each other),’ which is not a referential phrase but a relational predicate, similar to ‘brother.’ Compare ‘Castor and Pollux are brothers (to each other)’ with ‘Castor is Pollux’s brother,’ where ‘Pollux’s brother’ is a concept and not an object, in Frege’s terms. This has a very simple explanation: the semantic nucleus of τὸ αὐτό is an adjective that expresses the reciprocal notion of identicalness.^[23] Not surprisingly, τὸ αὐτό sometimes behaves like relational adjectives complemented either by a dative or by καί, such as ἴσος ‘equal.’^[24] Note that Mansfeld and Primavesi (2012), p. 323 only take the first infinitive as the subject of B3: “denn das Erkennen ist dasselbe wie das Sein.”

Judging by the oldest testimony of B3, τὸ αὐτό should be taken as a relational predicate. In his attempt to prove that Greeks were plagiarists, Clement of Alexandria (Strom. VI.2.23.3) quotes Parmenides and assumes that B3 was the model for two other passages. The first one is Hdt. 6.86γ:

τὸ πειρηθῆναι τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι ἴσον γενέσθαι^[25]

that having queried the god [i. e., having requested the god’s approval to act] and acting turn out to be equivalent

The second one is Ar. Fr. 691:

δύναται γὰρ ἴσον τῷ δρᾶν τὸ νοεῖν

For thinking is equal in power to doing

Revealingly, the alleged plagiarisms use the relational adjective ἴσος to assert that the powers, effects, or consequences of the actions denoted by the infinitives in question are somehow the same. The quote from Herodotus states that the consequence of πειρηθῆναι is equal to the consequence of ποιῆσαι, while the quote from Aristophanes states that the power of νοεῖν is equal to the power of δρᾶν. Of course, being is not an action; but thinking is an intentional action, and the content to which νοεῖν is related^[26] may coincide with the content associated by Parmenides with εἶναι. It is reasonable to believe that every object of thought can be expressed by a verb like εἰμί. Even Russell (1903) once claimed that “[b]eing is that which belongs to every conceivable term, to every possible object of thought – in short to everything that can possibly occur in any proposition, true or false, and to all such propositions themselves” (p. 449). Therefore, Parmenides could have held that νοεῖν and εἶναι have the same content, restricting the identity of νοεῖν and εἶναι to a respect that goes unmentioned in B3, namely, as to content, as if we eliminated the dative τῇ γνώμῃ that restricts the scope of ὁ αὐτός in Th. 3.38.1.1:

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι τῇ γνώμῃ

So, for my part, I am the same as to judgment

I do not mean that we should specifically insert τῇ γνώμῃ into B3, but that it is reasonably likely that the identity in B3 is tacitly limited by Parmenides (as to content) in a way analogous to how the identity is explicitly limited by Thucydides in this passage (as to judgment).

2 Cognizance and fullness of content

The correlation between νοεῖν and εἶναι suggests that what Parmenides called τὸ ἐόν may not be sensible, and that is what the second oldest testimony of B3 tells us. Just before quoting B3, Plotinus says that Parmenides “reduced ὄν and νοῦς to the same thing, and did not place τὸ ὂν among sensible things” (εἰς ταὐτὸ συνῆγεν ὂν καὶ νοῦν, καὶ τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐτίθετο, Enn. 5.1.8.16–17). Nevertheless, we should not endorse Plotinus’ words without further examination, because Parmenides associated human thought with organic processes. According to Aristotle, Parmenides did not distinguish φρόνησις ‘cognizance’ from αἴσθησις ‘sense perception,’^[27] and Parmenides himself states in B16 that human νόος depends on the physical makeup of each individual, which must include sense organs and sensory processes.

ὡς γὰρ ἑκάστοτ᾽^[28] ἔχει κρᾶσις^[29] μελέων πολυκάμπτων^[30], / τὼς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρέστηκεν^[31]· τὸ γὰρ αὐτό / ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν / καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί· τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα.

For as the combination of the much-fluctuating limbs comes about each time, so is the power to think disposed in humans; for what the constitution of the limbs in humans cognizes is the same, in each and every case; for the full is thought [i. e., for what is full is an act of thinking].

The meaning of B16 has never been clear, but I draw two conclusions from this fragment. First, human νόος attains awareness of different things through time because it depends on the temporary state of each individual cognizer. Second, what the physical constitution of all individuals cognizes (φρονέει) is the same thing in all cases, namely τὸ πλέον. Theophrastus’ commentary on B16 has led several interpreters to believe that τὸ πλέον refers here to what prevails in a mixture.^[32] But πλέος means ‘full’ in B9.3, and τὸ πλέον most likely characterizes each act of νοεῖν, each νόημα, as the adjective ἔμπλεος ‘quite full’ (lat. impleo) describes the subject of ἐστιν in B8.24.^[33]

οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ὁμοῖον· / οὐδέ τι τῆι μᾶλλον, τό κεν εἴργοι μιν συνέχεσθαι, / οὐδέ τι χειρότερον, πᾶν δ’ ἔμπλεόν ἐστιν ἐόντος. / τῶι ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστιν· ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει. (B8.22–25)

Nor is [it] separately graspable, since [it] is all alike; nor [is] there anything more, which would prevent it from holding together, nor [is there] anything less, but [it] is all quite full of being. Therefore, [it] is all continuous: for being makes contact with being.

Whatever the correct translation of πλέος is, this adjective qualifies things as not allowing any gap, and B16 is stating that φρόνησις has no blanks. Plenitude, or the corresponding quality, would be inseparable from cognizance according to Parmenides. Not even on the plane of human cognizance, where diversity prevails, would it make sense to speak of real gaps.

Since ancient times it has been said that Parmenides denied the reality of sensible things.^[34] But all he did was acknowledge the limitations of sense perception and criticize his peers for believing that synchronous and asynchronous differences allowed them to talk sense about nonbeing. B16 contains an expression that illustrates Parmenides’ understanding of human knowledge very well: τὼς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρέστηκεν ‘so is the power to think disposed in humans.’ Greek popular and religious beliefs attributed νόος not only to humans but also to gods. For example, Xenophanes’ supreme deity ὁρᾶι ‘sees,’ νοεῖ ‘apprehends,’ and ἀκούει ‘hears’ (DK 21 B 24), and surpasses humans in δέμας ‘extent’ and νόημα ‘thought’ (DK 21 B 23). Thus, in approaching Parmenides, we should keep in mind that the power to νοεῖν transcends the human condition and is not limited by particular bodily constraints. Remember that Anaxagoras, a post-Parmenidean, was fully convinced that νοῦς was a self-subsistent power controlling the universe and governing living beings from within (DK 59 B 12). Now, Parmenides regarded νοεῖν as a capability given to human beings, but he also considered human cognizance inferior to divine awareness. B6.4 uses a poetic formula that belittles the reach of human knowledge, βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν ‘mortals who know nothing.’^[35] We find the same expression in lyric poetry: for instance, when Semonides^[36] and Theognis^[37] exalt divine νόος and lament human inability to foresee and influence the course of events. Parmenides’ goddess never denies that mortals are able to νοεῖν, but she constantly deplores human inability to take full advantage of that faculty: “for the ineptitude in their chest” – she says in B6.5–6 – “directs a wandering νόος” (ἀμηχανίη^[38] γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλακτὸν νόον). Mortals fixate on sense perception and lose sight of what is not subject to synchronous and asynchronous distinctions. Note that B6.7 ridicules those who talk about nonbeing by calling them blind and deaf (κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοί τε), that is, by attributing sensory deprivation to them. Of course, for someone like Parmenides’ goddess, the worst consequence of a sensorily mediated access to reality on the part of the mortals is that, given the transitoriness of phenomena, mortals could validate and disseminate theories that involve nonbeing:

οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆι εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα· / ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα / μηδέ σ’ ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω[,^[39]] / νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν / καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγωι πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον / ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα. (B7)

For this shall not be imposed at any time, that things that are not are; so you better keep your thought away from this path of inquiry, and do not let custom force you along this much-frequented path to exercise an aimless eye and a resonant ear and tongue; rather, discern judiciously the much tested proof expounded by me.

Humans are constrained by bodily conditions, but they can still apprehend objects that are not given to their senses. This may seem obvious to us, but Parmenides lived about 500 years BC and the noun νόος and its cognates have a history of their own.^[40] If we compare Homer with the poets of the 7th and 6th centuries, we will notice that the contrast between human νόησις and αἴσθησις is weaker for the former than for the latter.^[41] As stated in Od. 1.57–59, Odysseus cannot grasp Ithaca with his νόος because he is far from his homeland:

αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεύς / ἱέμενος καὶ καπνὸν ἀποθρῴσκοντα νοῆσαι / ἧς γαίης, θανέειν ἱμείρεται

But Odysseus, longing to grasp the smoke leaping up from his land, yearns to die

Yet Sappho already assumes that human νόος can reach objects even if they are not the object of sensation:

[ ]σαρδ.[. .] / [ ⸏πόλ]λακι τυίδε̣ [ν]ῶν ἔχοισα (Fr. 96.1–2 LP)

[being in] Sardis, having often her νόος here

Parmenides is closer to Sappho than to Homer in this regard, for B4 states that human νόος is able to grasp distant objects without involving nonbeing.

λεῦσσε δ’ ὅμως ἀπεόντα νόωι παρεόντα βεβαίως· / οὐ γὰρ ἀποτμήξει τὸ ἐὸν τοῦ ἐόντος ἔχεσθαι / οὔτε σκιδνάμενον πάντηι πάντως κατὰ κόσμον / οὔτε συνιστάμενον.

But, even so, gaze upon distant things as [being] certainly present to [the] νόος: for you will not stop being from holding on to being, neither by dispersing [it] everywhere everyway according to an arrangement nor by putting [it] together.

Sense perception limits cognizance in that the perceiver only becomes aware of certain differences and proximate objects, but the ability to νοεῖν has a wider scope. It is not impeded by bodily constraints and is capable of considering distinct things as cohering into a subsistent whole.^[42]

The notion of plenitude characterizes any form of cognizance, whether human or divine, and plays a major role in both parts of Parmenides’ poem. However, the fullness of thought does not really clarify why Parmenides equates the content of thinking with the content of being. Such equivalence is difficult to elucidate, but B2 gives us a clue to understanding the relationship between thinking and being. At the methodological bifurcation preceding the Way of Truth, Parmenides’ goddess proposes two mutually exclusive schemes of inquiry, to wit, “is” and “is not,” and B2.5–8 makes it reasonable to infer that τὸ ἐόν can not only be thought, but also expressed, considering that τὸ μὴ ἐόν amounts to lack of knowable and expressible content.^[43]

εἰ δ’ ἄγ’ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας, / αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι· / ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν^[44] τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι, / Πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος (Ἀληθείηι γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ), / ἡ δ’ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι, / τὴν δή τοι φράζω παναπευθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπόν· / οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐὸν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν) / οὔτε φράσαις.

Come on, then, I myself will tell – and you retain the message once you have lent an ear – precisely which are the only ways of inquiry to think over: the one, that ____ is^[45] and that it is not [possible ~ allowed ~ right] that ____ is not, is the way of Conviction (for it attends upon Truth); the other, that ____ is not and that it is a requirement that ____ is not, this one I surely declare utterly inscrutable: for you could not even notice [i. e., become aware of] nonbeing (for [this is] not achievable) nor could you tell it.

Before exploring the connection between being and verbal expression, I would like to address two issues of interest:

1. Lewis (2009) has criticized the modal upgrades of ἔστιν and οὐκ ἔστιν in B2 (i. e., οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι and χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι, respectively). His point is that Parmenides could have incurred in the fallacy “of shifting from the necessity of the consequence to the necessity of the consequent” (p. 5). That is, Parmenides could have failed to differentiate necessarily (is, then is) from (is, then necessarily is) and necessarily (is not, then is not) from (is not, then necessarily is not). However, Parmenides’ modal expressions have a strong deontic flavor and could have a more directive meaning than we think. Methodologically speaking, the first alternative (ἔστιν) is a necessary condition for noetic investigation, and since no intellectual investigation can be carried out without an object toward which thought is directed, the second alternative (οὐκ ἔστιν) must be rejected. The modal upgrade could simply mean that both scenarios, which are mutually exclusive, must be maintained as such at all times throughout the investigation, i. e., must not be combined. We should not forget that Parmenides’ goddess is initiating a young man into the quest for truth.

2. The lack of a subject for ἔστιν in B2 is also a concern. Some scholars have even suggested that Parmenides makes an impersonal use of ἔστιν,^[46] but εἰμί is never an impersonal verb in the strict sense. No one would ask what or who is raining when faced with the statement It’s raining. Such a question could be answered by turning to preternatural participants, such as Zeus (ὗε Ζεύς, Il. 12.25), which are not necessary to understand the state of affairs in question; that is why they have tended to disappear throughout history. In contrast, a statement like It is or It is so triggers the question What is that which is? or What is that which is so?, respectively. Ancient Greek is a pro-drop language and does not require overt pronouns occupying the position of the subject because Greek morphology is sufficiently informative. The subject of ἔστιν is in the third person singular, nominative case,^[47] and Parmenides must have had a reason for not making explicit reference to it. Perhaps he believed that his recipients knew what he was talking about; perhaps he did not want to specify that subject by lexical means; perhaps he was thinking of anything that could be an object of thought. What stands out is that B2 gives more importance to the verb than to the subject in question.

3 Being as the content of judging and thinking

If τὸ ἐόν purports expressible content, then the fact that Parmenides’ mouthpiece speaks Ancient Greek will facilitate our understanding of such content. Natural language displays a variety of information, and two things are clear from a linguistic point of view: Parmenides discards some forms of the verb εἰμί when talking about being and combines ἔστιν, εἶναι, and ἐόν in a very informative way. I will look at the two things separately.

Concerning the first point, Parmenidean “being” is inseparable from the imperfective aspect: a type of grammatical aspect that presents states of affairs without considering their limits, if they have any. Besides present forms, the verb εἰμί only has non-perfect future forms, which are neutral with regard to aspect.^[48] It did not develop the forms that express the perfective and the perfect aspect, that is, aorist and perfect forms, respectively.^[49] Therefore, εἰμί could not bring boundaries into focus, which is necessary to highlight the discontinuity, the liminal nature, the attainment of completion, or the outcome of a given state of affairs. I will discuss this peculiarity in more detail in Section 5, where I will also address Parmenides’ exclusive use of the present tense of εἰμί.

What I want to emphasize now is that, in crucial passages of Parmenides’ poem, ἔστιν appears in nominal clauses. B2.3, B2.5, and B8.9 introduce ἔστιν in ὅπως/ὡς-clauses, implying that “being” can be the notional content of a complement clause. Moreover, it seems that “being” could be the object of verbs of saying and intellectual knowledge, or the content of the corresponding actions, because Parmenides associates it with φράζω, φημί, λέγω, γιγνώσκω, and νοέω,^[50] that is, with verbs that are usually complemented by declarative infinitives, supplementary participles, or finite forms introduced by complementizers, such as ὅτι, ὡς, ὅπως, or οὕνεκα.^[51] Now, my point is that since the finite form ἔστιν, the participle ἐόν, and the infinitive εἶναι could complement verbs of saying and intellectual knowledge, Parmenides must have thought that the information provided by εἰμί was intellectually apprehensible and verbally expressible, and that is exactly what I read in B8.34 and B6.1.

Similar to B3, B8.34 establishes the equivalence of thinking and being:

ταὐτὸν δ’ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκεν ἔστι νόημα

Thinking is the same as [indefiniteness] thought that ____ is [Or, incorporating the conclusions of Section 1: To think amounts to an(y)^[52] act of thinking that ____ is]

However, what Parmenides considers equivalent to νοεῖν here is not εἶναι as in B3, but νόημα (οὕνεκεν ἔστι), whose linear order, i. e., (οὕνεκεν ἔστι) νόημα, could be an example of hyperbaton. Other interpreters believe that the second relatum of the equivalence is not νόημα, but οὕνεκεν, to which they attribute some sort of causal value.^[53] For that reason, they translate B8.34 along the following lines: ‘Thinking and that on account of which there is thought are the same,’ ‘Thinking and that for which there is thought are the same,’ and ‘Thinking and that because of which there is thought are the same.’ Yet, to read οὕνεκεν ἔστι as a nominal clause specifying the content of νόημα^[54] is consistent with both the intentional nature of thinking and the concept of “being” as object of thought (cf. B2.7, B4). According to my interpretation, οὕνεκεν ἔστι and ἐόν are two ways of presenting the same thing, and the νόημα οὕνεκεν ἔστι is equivalent to νοεῖν in that it expresses the act of thinking. That is why Parmenides adds the following explanation:

οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ὧι πεφατισμένον ἐστιν, / εὑρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν (B8.35–36)

for without being, in which [it] is expressed, you will not find thinking

Parmenides’ goddess is telling the κοῦρος that ἐόν (= οὕνεκεν ἔστι) is the manifestation of νοεῖν, and her clarification is pertinent because neither νοεῖν nor the νόημα οὕνεκεν ἔστι are found among sensible things.^[55]

B6.1 argues along the same lines. Due to the many factors at play, there are many ways to construe χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ’ ἐὸν ἔμμεναι.^[56] Does this sentence contain one or two nonfinite clauses? Which infinitive is complementing the χρή-clause? Is τό an article proper or a demonstrative pronoun? Is ἐόν the object of λέγειν and νοεῖν, the subject of ἔμμεναι, or a predicative expression? Does ἔμμεναι act as a copula? In my view, the sentence contains a main χρή-clause with an elided copula and a subordinate nonfinite existential clause, namely ἐὸν ἔμμεναι. The function of λέγειν and νοεῖν is not clear, but I read the whole phrase τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τε as an accusative of respect. The meaning that follows from this reading is very simple: Judging and thinking must be about being, for those actions have some content rather than none, i. e., for the content of judgment and thinking cannot be nothing at all.

χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε^[57] νοεῖν τ’ ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, / μηδὲν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν (B6.1–2)

It is required that, in judging^[58] and thinking, there be something that is: for [that]’s [allowed] to be,^[59] and [it] is not nothing.^[60]

Both translations coincide to some extent with Parmenides’ claim according to Simplicius: “whatever one says or thinks is being” (ὅπερ ἄν τις ἢ εἴπῃ ἢ νοήσῃ τὸ ὄν ἐστι, in Ph. 86.29). Furthermore, B6.1–2 explains why Parmenides’ doctrine was famously applied in good or bad faith to reject the falsity of any act of λέγειν^[61] and why the Stranger of Elea in Plato’s Sophist is so interested in justifying falsehood. Still, as we will see in Section 6, the content of what Parmenides called λέγειν and νοεῖν was epistemically grounded in the notion of plenitude; it was not just any representation.

4 The meaning of τὸ εἶναι and τὸ ὂν ψιλόν according to Aristotle

Assuming that “being” can be expressed in words, I will shed light on the Parmenidean notion of being by resorting to the most comprehensive explanation of λόγος before the Hellenistic period, namely the Aristotelian theory of sentencehood. This theory revolves around the distinctions between ὄνομα and λόγος, λόγος σημαντικός and λόγος ἀποφαντικός, and ὄνομα and ῥῆμα, the last of which will prove to be very helpful in understanding the semantic import of the verb εἰμί.

According to Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, speech has meaning because it consists of conventional tokens (σύμβολα) of nonconventional soul affections (παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς) that resemble (ὁμοιώματα) things (πράγματα).^[62] However, not all linguistic unities are semantically comparable. Words (ὀνόματα) and sentences (λόγοι), for example, signify in a different manner: while the meaning of words coincides (ἔοικε) with a thought (νόημα) without composition or division (ἄνευ συνθέσεως καὶ διαιρέσεως),^[63] the meaning of sentences depends on the combination of words.^[64] To put it another way: lexical forms, such as house and shelter, signify differently than grammatical units such as A house is a shelter, which is a clause, and, as it stands, also a complete sentence.^[65]

Every sentence is a meaningful arrangement of words, but only declarative sentences are part of a potential contradiction^[66] and may be true or false.^[67] For example, ‘Be polite’ is a meaningful string of words, but such a sentence does not make a statement, even though it has a negative counterpart in ‘Don’t be polite.’ ‘You are polite,’ on the other hand, is a declaration (ἀπόφανσις) because it does make a statement that contradicts ‘You are not polite.’ Note that these pairs of examples differ in mood, for it seems that Aristotle associated indicative mood with declarative sentences.^[68] Now, what is beyond doubt is that Aristotle could not conceive of declaration without tense: “It is necessary” – he says – “that every declarative sentence consists of a verb or a [verb] variation:^[69] for not even the formula of ‘man,’ unless ‘is,’ ‘will be,’ ‘was,’ or something like this is added, is a declarative sentence at all.”^[70]

Moreover, it is because a ῥῆμα encodes tense that it is something more than a word, as we read in the following passage:

Ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, οὗ μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρίς· ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ’ ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημεῖον. λέγω δ’ ὅτι προσσημαίνει χρόνον, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ὄνομα, τὸ δ’ ὑγιαίνει ῥῆμα· προσσημαίνει γὰρ τὸ νῦν ὑπάρχειν. καὶ ἀεὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σημεῖόν ἐστιν, οἷον τῶν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου. […] – αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν καθ’ αὑτὰ λεγόμενα τὰ ῥήματα ὀνόματά ἐστι καὶ σημαίνει τι, – ἵστησι γὰρ ὁ λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ὁ ἀκούσας ἠρέμησεν, – ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή οὔπω σημαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι σημεῖόν ἐστι τοῦ πράγματος, οὐδ’ ἐὰν τὸ ὂν εἴπῃς ψιλόν. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστιν, προσσημαίνει δὲ σύνθεσίν τινα, ἣν ἄνευ τῶν συγκειμένων οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι. (Int. 3 16^b6–10, 16^b19–25)

Verb is what indicates time; none of its parts signifies separately; it is a sign of the [things] that are said with respect to something else. I say that it indicates time in the sense that health [is] a name, while is-healthy^[71] [is] a verb: for the latter indicates ‘to pertain now.’ And it is always a sign of the things that pertain, such as those concerning a subject. […] Now, verbs, insofar as they are said by themselves, are names and signify something – for he who says [them] brings the process of thinking to a standstill and he who listens remains still –, but they do not yet mean whether [the signified thing] is or [is] not. Indeed, to be or not to be are not a sign of the πρᾶγμα, not even if you merely utter ‘being.’ Indeed, this is [i. e., means] nothing; it rather indicates a composition that cannot be thought of without its components.

The Aristotelian notion of ῥῆμα does not perfectly coincide with the part of speech that we call ‘verb,’ but it does make sense if we refine our view of syntactic categories. Aristotle’s notion of ὄνομα merges our concepts of word and noun/name,^[72] while his notion of ῥῆμα conflates our concepts of inflected verb form and predicate. However, such a discrepancy loses significance when we realize that Aristotle is distinguishing the lexical meaning of content words from the grammatical categories marked on Greek verbs, above all tense. Therefore, without reading too much into Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, we may say that a ῥῆμα is both a predicate and a predicator.^[73] It is a predicate because it says something about a subject, and it is a predicator because it encodes functional information that most theorists would consider necessary for predication, especially tense.^[74]

If we consider the verb εἰμί in the light of the Aristotelian notion of ῥῆμα, we will see how peculiar this verb is. If τὸ εἶναι does not signify any πρᾶγμα and τὸ ὂν ψιλόν does not represent anything in particular, it is because the verb εἰμί needs categorematic terms to acquire specific meaning. The Aristotelian notion of πρᾶγμα is often misunderstood. It is true that πρᾶγμα is the concrete noun of πρᾶξις ‘action,’ but this does not justify Ackrill’s (1963) translation of πρᾶγμα as ‘actual thing.’ If πράγματα were actual things, why would Aristotle refer to universal terms as πράγματα in Int. 7 17^a38–b3? Swiggers and Wouters (1996), pp. 133–134 find support in Aristotle’s Organon for their translation of πρᾶγμα in the Τέχνη γραμματική as ‘object of thought’ because in a logical and linguistic context the word πρᾶγμα stands for categorematic or referring terms (e. g., ἄνθρωπος as καθόλου and Καλλίας as καθ’ ἕκαστον). Moreover, the word πρᾶγμα often stands for predicative content that lacks functional information needed for ἀπόφανσις. This is clear in Cat. 10 12^b5–16, where we learn that finite forms, such as τὸ κάθηται – οὐ κάθηται ‘sits – sits not’ are examples of ἀπόφανσις, while nonfinite forms, such as τὸ καθῆσθαι – μὴ καθῆσθαι ‘sitting – not-sitting/to sit – not-to-sit’ are examples of πρᾶγμα.^[75]

Making a technical use of a practice that we already observe in Plato, Aristotle uses εἰμί to represent the functional values involved in predication. Even when he explains propositions like ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος as opposed to propositions like ἔστι δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος, where ἔστι is a third term attached to a predicative expression,^[76] he does not emphasize the lexical meaning of εἰμί. Even then, he emphasizes the temporal value of verbs: τὸ γὰρ ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται ἢ ἦν ἢ γίγνεται ἢ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, ῥήματα ἐκ τῶν κειμένων ἐστίν· προσσημαίνει γὰρ χρόνον ‘For ‘is,’ ‘will be,’ ‘was,’ or ‘becomes,’ and all other things like these are verbs based on what has already been established: indeed, they indicate time’ (Int. 10 19^b13–14).

Aristotle uses εἰμί as a tense marker because this verb plays the role of predicator to perfection but requires the concurrence of other terms to convey specific predicative content, that is, content that may or may not pertain (ὑπάρχειν) to a subject. This is why εἰμί stands out from all other lexical, copulative, or auxiliary verbs. No other Greek verb distinguishes the two aspects of predication with the same clarity, as can be shown by using the Aristotelian figures of predication. The σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας typify predicates under the heading τὸ ὄν because the verb εἰμί could predicate any content with as little lexical interference as possible.^[77] Table 1 separates the functional values of predication, expressed by the verb εἰμί, from the categorial content of verbal and nonverbal predicates.

The verb εἰμί surely appears sometimes as the main or only word in the verb phrase, and someone could argue that, in such cases, it has enough lexical content to be a predicate in its own right. However, the question is not whether εἰμί can be a predicate, but whether its meaning can be specified without expressing categorial content, such as position in time, position in space, quantity, or some abstract formulation of these notions. It is certainly said that εἰμί conveys the rather obscure concept of existence, to which lexicologists so confidently cling, but such a preconception deserves closer examination.

Existential sentences^[81] are correctly associated with the quantificational concept of existence, but the fact that such constructions frequently include grammaticalized locative expressions might suggest that they belong to the spectrum of locative sentences.^[82] English there, Spanish -y, or Italian -ci would be examples of such “grammatical fossilization.” Moreover, existential constructions with verbs like εἰμί have been explained as inverse copular sentences that use expletive pronouns as placeholders for a nonverbal predicate, obtained by detaching a determiner from a determiner phrase.^[83] I will not start a digression on formal syntax, but will merely stress that existential constructions delimit the extension of a noun phrase by focalizing indefinite determiners or non-universal quantifiers, which are more important for their existential meaning than the verb.^[84] For example, German geben and Spanish haber are used in them, and εἰμί is not the only Greek verb used in existential constructions. For example, the verb κεῖμαι ‘lie, be placed, be set’ is also used to assert existence in Greek, and this allows us to appreciate the lexical poverty of the verb εἰμί contrastively. The verb κεῖμαι contributes predicative content that is missing in εἰμί-sentences, and this content can be translated into English with a predicative expression such as ‘available’, as in Int. 3 16^a30–31: τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ὄνομα· οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ κεῖται ὄνομα ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν αὐτό ‘‘Not man’ is not a name; and there is not even a name available by which one should call that.’

In all persons, when εἰμί is used as a standard intransitive verb, it seems more clearly to express a lexical predicate. Yet the lack of semantic specificity is evident in these cases too, for we cannot specify the meaning of εἰμί unless we know what is being talked about, unlike what would happen if we come across a verb whose lexical content is obvious, say, to swim. Here we have an example:

Ητ. ἀλλ’ ἀνατρέψω γ’ αὔτ’ ἀντιλέγων·

οὐδὲ γὰρ εἶναι πάνυ φημὶ δίκην.

Κρ. οὐκ εἶναι φῄς;

Ητ. φέρε γάρ, ποῦ ’στιν;

Κρ. παρὰ τοῖσι θεοῖς.

Ητ. πῶς δῆτα δίκης οὔσης ὁ Ζεὺς

οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν, τὸν πατέρ’ αὑτοῦ

δήσας; (Ar. Nu. 901–906)

Inferior judgment [ἥττων λόγος]. But I will overturn them by contradicting them: for I claim that Justice is not at all.

Superior judgment [κρείττων λόγος]. Are you saying that she is not?

IJ. Come on! Where is she?

SJ. Among the gods.

IJ. How, then, Justice being [in force], Zeus has not perished for fettering his father?

If we only read the first two lines of this excerpt, we might think that εἶναι means ‘to exist’ and not ‘to live,’ for Justice, whose reality is in question, is not precisely an individual living being. Of course, if we take into consideration that the status of δίκη is comparable to that of a law, we might say that εἶναι means ‘to be in force.’ After all, the verb εἰμί in the passage does entail vigor, that is, some sort of effectiveness that Aristophanes constricts to a certain realm (cf. ποῦ, παρά).

The meaning of εἰμί in its standard intransitive use can be glossed with a wide variety of durative, stative, or locative predicates depending on the semantic type of the subject and the context of use (e. g., S is… alive, present, actual, in force, located, etc.). We can certainly associate the verb εἰμί in these cases with the traditional notion of existence, but we must also recognize that the term ‘existence’ is just a wild card that blurs differences that can be better described with specific predicates. Aristotle famously explored the meaning of ‘being’ considering these differences, especially the differences associated with the various kinds of οὐσίαι. According to his theory, each thing has actual being in a different way. This particular way of having being was expressed by Aristotle with stative predicates that describe a specific form or certain constitution of matter,^[85] such as those underlined below, for he thought that matter, and not the terms by which we refer to concrete entities, is the real subject of such differences:

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἔστι τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται· οὐδὸς γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτι οὕτως κεῖται, καὶ τὸ εἶναι τὸ οὕτως αὐτὸ κεῖσθαι σημαίνει, καὶ τὸ κρύσταλλον εἶναι τὸ οὕτω πεπυκνῶσθαι. ἐνίων δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ὁρισθήσεται, τῷ τὰ μὲν μεμῖχθαι, τὰ δὲ κεκρᾶσθαι, τὰ δὲ δεδέσθαι, τὰ δὲ πεπυκνῶσθαι, τὰ δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις διαφοραῖς κεχρῆσθαι (Metaph. H.2 1042^b25–31)

Therefore, it is clear that ‘is’ is also said in so many ways: for [it] is a threshold because [it] is placed in such a way, and ‘being’ means its being placed in such a way, and ‘being ice’ [means] being solidified in such a way. The being of some things will even be defined by all of these [differences], some [parts] being mixed, others being blended, others being bound, others being solidified, and others being subject to the remaining differences.

 

τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι πᾶσιν ἡ οὐσία, τὸ δὲ ζῆν τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ εἶναί ἐστιν, αἰτία δὲ καὶ ἀρχὴ τούτου ἡ ψυχή. (de An. II.4 415^b12–14)

For the causative of being in all things is beingness, and for living beings ‘being’ is [i. e., means] ‘living,’ the cause and principle of which is the soul.

5 The meaning of Parmenidean “being”

To clarify the Parmenidean notion of being, I will focus on natural language. More specifically, I will pay attention to the fact that εἰμί plays the role of predicator providing a minimum of lexical meaning. Verb morphology is the best starting point for an investigation of εἰμί as a predicator, since we have seen Aristotle using forms of εἰμί to make metalinguistic reference to verb inflection. However, Parmenidean “being” could still involve lexical features. Aristotle tells us that “being” cannot be thought of (νοῆσαι) without categorematic terms, but B8.34 implies that οὕνεκεν ἔστι is a νόημα, and this could mean that ἔστι-clauses convey certain meaning as a whole (e. g., propositional content) or that ἔστι has meaning of its own (i. e., lexical content). In what follows, I will show that both possibilities may concur, for nothing prevents the lexical features of a verb from operating above the level of the lexical predicate. Otherwise, there would be no difference between εἰμί and γίγνομαι in their copulative function, but in fact these two verbs affect the semantics of predication differently^[86] when they link a subject to a nonverbal predicate (e. g., Human beings are ~ become cruel).^[87]

Grammatical categories not exclusively marked on verbs are of minor importance in the study of a predicator. The third person marked on ἔστιν only reaffirms that neither the goddess nor the youth whom she is addressing is a suitable subject for this form. The singular number of ἐόν and ἔστιν is of little use without a nominal phrase that allows us to make sense of it. In Greek, “neuter plural subjects normally fail to trigger plural agreement on the verb,”^[88] and we cannot even assume that τὸ ἐόν is semantically singular because substantivized adjectives and participles can express a covert quantification (e. g., what is > something ~ anything ~ everything that is). The neuter of τὸ ἐόν is not very significant either, for it only tells us that the gender distinction is irrelevant when it comes to the referent of such an expression, which could even be linguistic in nature, given that many languages refer to predicative expressions or complete propositions in the neuter. Consider the pronominalization of predicative expressions in Spanish: – ¿Acaso la vida es bella_[fem.]? – Sí, lo_[neut.] es.

Since we are dealing with verb forms, we should concentrate on the grammatical information encoded by Greek verbs only. With this in mind, we could start by pointing out that the active voice of ἔστιν, ἐόν, and εἶναι does not allow us to describe the subject of those forms as an agent, for being is not an action.^[89] If we continue to analyze verb morphology, we will notice the indicative mood of ἔστιν, and it will seem obvious to us that Parmenides verbalizes the ways of inquiry in the indicative mood, since the epistemic disposition of declarative mood and the factuality expressed by the realis modality befit a sentential scheme that attends upon truth or reality. However, Parmenides does not focus on mood, but rather on tense. There is no doubt that the present tense is constitutive of Parmenidean “being,” because the goddess thinks that it is not proper to speak about it in the past or the future tense:^[90]

οὐδέ ποτ’ ἦν οὐδ’ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, / ἕν, συνεχές (B8.5–6)

nor was [it] at some time, nor will [it] be, since [it] is now all together, one, continuous

I have already alluded to tense and aspect at the beginning of Section 3. Since εἰμί had past and future forms, the rejection of non-present forms depended on Parmenides’ deliberation to some extent. The exclusion of the perfective and the perfect aspect, however, was never a matter of choice, because εἰμί had only imperfective and aspect neutral forms.

Parmenides’ concept of being is undeniably associated with the present tense and the imperfective aspect, but it must contain more temporal information than the Greek verbal system provides. Otherwise, Parmenides would not have contrasted the present tense of εἰμί with temporal expressions that have a different lexical meaning. B8.5 only distinguishes the present tense (ἔστιν) from the non-present tenses (ἦν and ἔσται), but B8.20 formulates a similar distinction in terms that can no longer be reduced to tense, as they combine information from various domains:

εἰ γὰρ ἔγεντ’, οὐκ ἔστ(ι), οὐδ’ εἴ ποτε μέλλει ἔσεσθαι

for if [it] had an origin, [it] is not, nor if [it] is going to be at some point in the future

B8.20 replaces the tense markers ἦν and ἔσται with forms that convey a specific lexical meaning. The form ἔγεντο indicates past tense, and as an aorist that expresses perfective aspect, it certainly alludes to bounded past events by grammatical means. Nevertheless, the verb γίγνομαι, as a lexical item, denotes emergence and entails a temporal limit, a beginning. Similarly, μέλλει ἔσεσθαι expresses more than futurity. Unlike ἔσται, which only indicates that something will hold in the future,^[91] the prospective periphrasis μέλλω + infinitive is “more modal than temporal.”^[92] The combination μέλλω + infinitive should have originally meant some sort of intention, and in Parmenides’ time, it surely denoted some kind of predetermination, either that of predestined, probable, or imminent events. Now, why did Parmenides use these other temporal expressions? The forms ἦν and ἔσται in B8.5 are marked for tense, but tense is a deictic category that tells us more about the position from which the time deixis is made than about the state of affairs in question.^[93] For example, the fact that some state of affairs obtained before, or will obtain later, does not imply that it does not obtain now. It all depends on the logical subject under discussion and what is said about it. Expressions such as ἔγεντο and μέλλει ἔσεσθαι, in comparison, presuppose that something, either the subject or what is said about it, is not actual at some point in time. That is why Parmenides reinforces the tense marking in B8.5–6 with adverbials: οὐδέ ποτέ rejects the discontinuity, νῦν reaffirms the actuality, and ὁμοῦ πᾶν ἕν asserts the simultaneity of τὸ ἐόν.

Some clarifications will be helpful in understanding the relationship between Parmenidean “being” and time. Natural language encodes time by means of tense, grammatical aspect, lexical aspect, temporal adverbs, temporal particles, and discourse patterns.^[95] Yet all temporal distinctions expressed by these means reflect primitive topological notions, such as after, within, overlap, or before.^[96] As shown in Table 3, tense and grammatical aspect result from ordering time intervals according to such primitives. Tense interrelates the time of a temporal reference with the time of an event, that is, it “deictically refers to the time of the event or state denoted by the verb in relation to some other temporal reference point.”^[97] Aspect interrelates a focused time with the time of an event, that is, it determines “a temporal view of the event or state expressed by the verb.”^[98] Therefore, both grammatical categories depend on the event denoted by the verb, and more specifically on the type of that event: while tense points to a certain event from a given position, aspect highlights a particular status or phase of that event. For instance, if we consider the present tense of Parmenides’ ἔστιν, the reference falls within, not outside^[99] (after or before) the event. If we consider the imperfective aspect of Parmenides’ ἔστιν, ἐόν, and εἶναι, the focus falls within the event too, because it is neither outside nor overlapping with that event. However, this is not the whole story, because the state denoted by εἰμί has no inherent limits and because Parmenides used εἰμί to make a statement that is not restricted to a particular time. I will deal with these two issues separately.

Verbal event boundaries can be brought into focus by grammatical means, but the concrete expression of grammatical aspect depends on the lexical content of verbs. This is evidenced by the fact that certain verbs are incompatible with some types of grammatical aspect. For example, some durative verbs did not develop aorist forms because the perfective aspect expressed by the aorist requires a possible ending that the meaning of prototypical durative verbs does not entail.^[100] This kind of lexical coercion could explain the defectiveness of εἰμί, whose lexical aspect is said to be durative, adynamic, and atelic (i. e., the state of affairs expressed by it persists over time, does not involve any type of change, and has no inherent endpoint).^[101] In any case, the lexical content of εἰμί does not involve the succession of two different or opposite states,^[102] unlike functionally similar intransitive verbs, such as the semicopula γίγνομαι. Table 4 shows that εἰμί and γίγνομαι have different temporal entailments even if they express the same tense and grammatical aspect. When εἰμί is considered without regard to a particular subject or predicative content, it does not entail temporal limits; γίγνομαι, in contrast, implies limits under the same conditions.

These entailments are brought about by εἰμί as a predicator and must be involved in all εἰμί-sentences, whether ascriptive, equative, existential, or other, for there is no sentence without a grammatical predicate. It makes no difference whether εἰμί links a subject to a nonverbal predicate or not because there are lexical features that persist through the process of verbal copularization, i. e., of applying an intransitive verb to link a subject to a nonverbal predicate.^[103] Take for example another Greek semicopula, namely, πέλω ‘be in motion, come into being, turn out to be.’

συμφερτὴ δ’ ἀρετὴ πέλει ἀνδρῶν καὶ μάλα λυγρῶν (Il. XIII.237)

but collective valor arises even from badly battered men

οὐ μέν πως ἅλιον πέλει ὅρκιον… (Il. IV.158–59)

but by no means does an oath prove fruitless…

While πέλει in Il. XIII.237 is the semantic core of the predicate, πέλει in Il. IV.158–59 is an auxiliary for nonverbal predication. Yet the lexical content of πέλω has similar implications in both cases. Il. XIII.237 presents the subject of πέλει as the result of adding forces, whereas Il. IV.158–59 presents the predicative as the outcome of a sequence of events.

Now, tense does not bring event boundaries into focus, but can be more or less relevant depending on what is being said. Tense marking is particularly important when an utterance can fall outside the time of an event, that is, when someone is talking about something temporary or saying something that does not always apply to what is being talked about. For example, the present tense of ‘are three’ makes a significant distinction when I talk about my brother’s children, considering that my brother’s children were not always three. But the present tense of ‘is three’ is much less significant when I talk about the sum of two and one, given that the sum of two and one is three irrespective of time. We mark the present tense on the latter sort of assertions because our utterance occupies a position in time and makes reference to something that is actual at that time, not because our utterance refers to something whose actuality is temporally limited. Parmenides uses the present tense of εἰμί in the Way of Truth because the lexical content of εἰμί always applies to what I call ‘ultimate reality,’ i. e., that which is common to all that is and whose actuality is not restricted to a particular time.

This explains why Parmenides mentions timelessness and immutability in B8.36–38, right after asserting the equivalence of thinking and being.

ταὐτὸν δ’ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκεν ἔστι νόημα. / οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ὧι πεφατισμένον ἐστιν, / εὑρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν· οὐδ’ οἷ χρόνος ἐστὶν<,> ἢ ἔσται / ἄλλο πάρεξ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ’ ἐπέδησεν / οὖλον ἀκίνητόν τ’ ἔμεναι· … (B8.34–38)

To think amounts to an act of thinking that ____ is. For without being, in which [thinking] is expressed, you will not find thinking. And there is no time [interval] for this, or there will be something else besides being, since Moira certainly bound it to be whole, immutable: …

Simplicius transmits two versions of B8.36. The most edited one is οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται ‘for nothing is or will be,’ or οὐδὲν γὰρ <ἢ> ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται with Preller’s supplement.^[104] However, Coxon (2009) argues convincingly that this first version is “an adaptation of Parmenides’ words made by Simplicius to bolster his misinterpretation of [B6.1–2]” (p. 333), whereas the second version, namely, οὐδ’ εἰ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἢ ἔσται,^[105] reproduces Parmenides’ words, albeit faultily.^[106] Since it is difficult to make sense of εἰ in this second version, Coxon transforms οὐδ’ εἰ χρόνος into οὐδὲ χρόνος and translates “And time is not nor will be another thing alongside Being.” In my opinion, Marcinkowska-Rosół (2010) offers a better solution: she transforms οὐδ’ εἰ χρόνος into οὐδ’ οἷ χρόνος and translates “Und für dies gibt es keine Zeit, oder es wird etwas anderes außer dem Seienden geben” (p. 141), for she understands ἢ to mean ‘or else, otherwise.’ Her reading is certainly consistent with the timelessness of Parmenidean “being.”^[107] The noun χρόνος seems to derive from a verb denoting the action of seizing (PIE *ǵ^her-),^[108] and B8.36–38 definitely alludes to the temporal limits of change. Moira allotted time to transient things, but destined τὸ ἐόν to remain complete and immutable. Moreover, it is the wholeness and immutability of τὸ ἐόν that makes the typical notions of natural philosophy inapplicable to the subject matter of the Way of Truth, considering that the actuality of ultimate reality is beyond synchronous and asynchronous differences.

… τῶι πάντ’ ὄνομ(α) ἔσται, / ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ, / γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι, εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί, / καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διά τε χρόα φανὸν ἀμείβειν. (B8.34–41)

… in regard to it, just words will be all that mortals posited, convinced that it is true, to be born and to perish, to be and not to be, to change place and to transmute the shining face.

Before I close this section, I want to tie up a few loose ends in order to appreciate the benefits of the verb εἰμί for Parmenides’ philosophy.

1. Parmenides was in a position to claim that thinking and being share content because εἰμί-clauses could express any thought without notional interference (e. g., compare how γίγνομαι and πέλω provide significant additional meaning and affect predication by lexical means). By way of illustration, the complement clause in the formula The νόος thinks that [S] is [P] would stand for the νόημα οὕνεκεν ἔστι as the expression of thinking.

2. Unlike Aristotle, who emphasized that τὸ ὄν indicates a composition that cannot be thought of without its components, Parmenides did not attach much importance to categorematic terms because he took for granted that τὸ ἐόν involves conceivable and expressible content. Proof of his commitment to noematic content is the identification of τὸ μὴ ἐόν with lack of content (B2.5–8).

3. Parmenides highlighted the present imperfective forms of εἰμί over categorematic terms because he was mostly interested in the functional information provided by εἰμί-clauses. Parmenidean “being” amounts to categorial content^[109] + functional information, including the lexical features that affect predication above the level of the lexical predicate. The common content of νοεῖν and εἶναι (infinitives) is therefore the νόημα (noun) οὕνεκεν ἔστι (noun clause), which is expressed by τὸ ἐόν (substantivized participle) and carries two kinds of content: proper predicative content, which is not conveyed by the verb εἰμί itself and falls under one of the Aristotelian categories, and functional information, such as tense and aspect.

4. Although Parmenidean “being” was conceivable and expressible, we cannot say whether Parmenides distinguished between objects and concepts, concepts and propositions, propositions and states of affairs, states of affairs and facts, facts and entities, entities and attributes, etcetera.^[110] He certainly associated the information provided by ἔστι, ἐόν, and εἶναι with the actuality of what is – whether this means the actuality of what subsists, obtains, endures, or pertains – and coupled this actuality with ultimate reality.

5. What Parmenides called “being” held up despite the passage of time and was probably seen as necessary, in the sense that actual being necessarily excludes the opposite possibility^[111] or that obtaining states of affairs are fixed and cannot change.^[112] What is certain is that the lexical content of εἰμί did not entail temporal limits. Even if εἰμί was the least meaningful verb in Ancient Greek, it still expressed [+durativity], [-dynamicity], and [-telicity], and did not imply the succession of two different or opposite states.

6. Parmenides did not think of being in specific terms, according to which being P is opposed to not being P. He was interested in being without specifications and thought that even if something is not P, it can still be something else, regardless of whether it is different or even contrary to P.^[113] Parmenidean τὸ μὴ ἐόν is akin to Plato’s μηδαμῶς ὂν (Sph. 237b7, 240e2, 240e5), not to Plato’s ἕτερον (Sph. 257b3–4), for it is not the denial of a positive determination, as when we say that something is not bright because it is dark.^[114] Parmenides opposed being something (either P or other than P) to being nothing (neither P nor other than P)^[115] and argued for the impossibility of the latter. This applies to both synchronous and asynchronous differences: indeed, if the difference between P and not P does not involve a break in being, and if being holds up despite the passage of time, then the transition from P to not P will be irrelevant to the study of being. I will discuss this in more detail in the next section.

7. Since nonbeing is ungraspable and unspeakable from Parmenides’ perspective (B2), anything P or non-P falls within the scope of thinking and being on the condition that both P and non-P represent conceivable and expressible content (e. g., bright and non-bright, i. e., dark). That is why thought is necessarily full of being and makes no room for lack of content according to Parmenides (B16, B4), who found in noematic completeness a foothold to theorize about ultimate reality. It is true that what all objects of thought have in common cannot be grasped separately (B8.22), but unlike nonbeing, ultimate reality cannot be missing in anything that is (cf. παντὸς ἐδεῖτο in B8.33). The last section of this article will make it clear that the coextension of ultimate reality with thinking and being gives meaning to Parmenides’ entire poem, not only to its first part.

6 Overcoming natural philosophy?

Parmenides’ goddess delivers two speeches, each with a different epistemic status.^[116] The first one renders the “imperturbable heart of quite-compelling Truth,”^[117] which is both “a reliable explanation and a thought about reality.”^[118] The second one is “a deceptive array of words”^[119] that brings into alignment humanlike conjectures that cannot be fully trusted.^[120] “I let you know this orderly disposition, adjusted in every respect,” – says the goddess to the κοῦρος – “so that no mortal theory will ever get past you.”^[121]

Parmenides’ whole poem became known as a work περὶ φύσεως,^[122] but only its second part really deals with the evolutionary process denoted by the verb φύω ‘produce, make grow, beget’ and its derivatives.^[123] The first part concerns something immutable (ἀκίνητον)^[124] and divine, in the Aristotelian sense.^[125] It displays Parmenides’ view of the world sub specie aeternitatis and tries to prove that ultimate reality subsists in spite of synchronous and asynchronous differences. Note that each σῆμα in Table 5 symbolizes a way in which ultimate reality fills τὸ πᾶν, which is seen as a plenum.

Parmenides’ doctrine has been fairly associated with the Orphic tradition.^[127] The epithet πολύποινος ‘much-punishing’ appears only in Parmenides’ proem (B1.14) and in the orphic fragment 233 (Bernabé = 158 Kern = Procl. In R. 2.145.3), and in both cases it is applied to Δίκη ‘Justice.’ This is illuminating because Parmenidean Δίκη allows the κοῦρος to enter the realm of revelation, beyond synchronous and asynchronous differences,^[128] while Orphic Δίκη signals the presence of Zeus, ἀρχὸς ἁπάντων ‘ruler of everything.’^[129] There is no doubt that the Way of Truth is theological in some sense, but Parmenides did not aim to demonstrate the existence or attributes of God.^[130] He was concerned with proving the plenitude of the universe, whose content was supposed to be immediately apprehensible by an unimpeded thought, as the one that Xenophanes ascribed to the most powerful of gods. Parmenides’ teaching is not comparable to the natural theology of monotheistic religions. It should be contrasted with Ionian natural philosophy, for it attempted to avoid two unfortunate implications of material monism,^[131] namely, the identification of ultimate reality with something that cannot cover the full extent of thought (hereafter ‘Thales’ mistake’) and the confusion of actuality with present occurrence (hereafter ‘Anaximander’s mistake’).

Thales’ mistake. Material principles^[132] used to explain differences across a polar continuum cannot be identified with ultimate reality because they do not cover the entire scope of thought. Whether Thales of Miletus held that all things reduce to water^[133] or not, whoever claims such a thesis must admit the lack of water in addressing the difference between, say, dirt and mud. Since dry things contain less water than wet things, dirt must lack water in comparison to mud, and water must fall short as a universal principle. As we move across the continuum towards the dry pole, our mind, not our senses, notices that more and more parts of water are missing, that water covers less and less volume. Such cognizance is possible because the mind is always aware of the totality or, as stated in B16.4, because τὸ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα.

The same applies to Anaximenes’ theory, which attributed natural priority to air^[134] and explained cosmic diversity in terms of density. Anaximenes conceived μεταβολή ‘transformation’ as the generation (γένεσις) of different material configurations.^[135] According to him, air gives rise to different consistencies depending on its degree of rarefaction or condensation. When extremely rarefied, air assumes the form of fire, but it gradually turns into wind, vapor, water, and earth, until it reaches the maximum degree of condensation and takes the form of rock. Although Anaximenes claimed that both fire and rock are made of air, the distribution of air across the scale πῦρ > ἄνεμος > νέφος > ὕδωρ > γῆ > λίθος could not be homogeneous.^[136] The aggregation^[137] of primeval matter would have to be greater, say, in granite than in fire, and the air mass would have to admit larger and smaller interstices. We also know that because τὸ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα.

Anaximander’s mistake. Milesian philosophers emphasized the temporal aspect of change. Anaximenes himself “said that unlimited air is the principle out of which [all things] originate, those that originate [now], those that have originated [until now], and those that will be [from now on], as well as god and deities, while the rest [of things originate] from the descendants of these [things].”^[138] Temporality was especially important for Anaximander, who believed that time confined beings within limits: “He also speaks of time” – says Hippolytus – “as if the generation and the destruction of beings were bounded.”^[139] Anaximander described change as a sequence of events and used the present participle of εἰμί in a way that Parmenides would not have approved. Indeed, the only seemingly authentic fragment of Anaximander implies a hiatus in being:

Τῶν δὲ ἓν καὶ κινούμενον καὶ ἄπειρον λεγόντων Ἀναξίμανδρος μὲν Πραξιάδου Μιλήσιος Θαλοῦ γενόμενος διάδοχος καὶ μαθητὴς ἀρχήν τε καὶ στοιχεῖον εἴρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον, πρῶτος τοῦτο τοὔνομα κομίσας τῆς ἀρχῆς. λέγει δ’ αὐτὴν μήτε ὕδωρ μήτε ἄλλο τι τῶν καλουμένων εἶναι στοιχείων, ἀλλ’ ἑτέραν τινὰ φύσιν ἄπειρον, ἐξ ἧς ἅπαντας γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους· ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών. διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν, ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ λέγων… (Simp. in Ph. 24.13–21)

Among those who say that [the principle] is one, mutable, and unlimited, Anaximander, son of Praxiades, Milesian, who became Thales’ successor and disciple, said that the principle and element of beings is the unlimited, having introduced for the first time this very term of ‘principle.’^[140] He claims that^[141] this [principle] is neither water nor any other of the so-called ‘elements,’ but some other unlimited nature, from which all heavens and arrangements in such [heavens] originate: in the things where the origin of beings resides, towards them the destruction [of beings] takes place too,^[142] as required. For these [i. e., beings,] grant justice and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the array of time, claiming such things in this way, with very inventive words…

Since Parmenides referred the present forms of εἰμί to some sort of timeless actuality, he would never have said that “being” – what actually is – begins or ends at some point in time. Perhaps he called “being” what we would call “subsistent.” Perhaps he was an actualist for whom being belonged to everything that is ever the case in the actual world regardless of when it takes place. Perhaps he associated “being” with the actuality of a universal substance.^[143] What is clear is that Parmenidean “being” holds up despite the passage of time.

I have argued elsewhere that Parmenides could have used another verb to talk about what appears and disappears with time, namely πέλω.^[144] My point is that we should seriously consider the possibility that πέλειν does not stand for εἶναι in B6.8,^[145] contrary to what practically all interpreters assume in adherence to the questionable belief that πέλω was a poetic equivalent of εἰμί for Homer.^[146] Unlike εἰμί, which stemmed from the stative root *h₁es- ‘be,’ πέλω was originally a motion verb stemming from *k^wlh₁- ‘go round,’ as does the Skt. cárati ‘to move around, wander, drive (on the meadow), graze.’^[147] Now, there is hardly any doubt that Homeric πέλω evoked dynamicity,^[148] and it sometimes flatly denoted a telic event,^[149] e. g., in the aorist^[150] and in the middle voice,^[151] which is the most common in Homer. So if πέλω was still some kind of eventive verb for Parmenides, then B6.8–9 could be criticizing the confusion of occurring (or recurring) and not-being:

[…] οἱ δὲ φοροῦνται^[152] / κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοί τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα, / οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταὐτὸν νενόμισται / κοὐ ταὐτόν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος. (B6.6–9)

[…] and they are carried away again and again, deaf as well as blind, stupefied, undiscerning hordes, for whom to occur and not to be are usually considered the same, and not the same, the journey of all [of them] is reversible.

If πέλω had been an eventive verb for Parmenides, B6.6–9 would not directly condemn the contradictory coordination of being and not being, but the inability of mortals to avoid Anaximander’s mistake. Accordingly, the goddess would deny that phenomenal succession entails nonbeing. Mortals would believe that the succession of two events, say, X and Y, involves nonbeing, either because Y was not before taking place or because X will not be after “granting justice” to Y. However, mortals would not be able to witness or show nonbeing at any time, and they would find it difficult to maintain the annihilation of X once X reappears. Natural phenomena were almost certainly seen as recurring events by Parmenides, who most likely drew on Hesiod’s representation of day and night as a recurrent relay (cf. B1.11–14 with Theog. 736–757).

This is not to say that Parmenides was not interested in natural development, for he dealt extensively with generation and destruction (B19). Moreover, there are no solid grounds for denying that the second part of the poem, where we still find Ἀνάγκη (B10.6) and a female deity ruling everything (B12.3), expounds Parmenides’ own natural philosophy. Although the goddess rejects the truth of mortal beliefs, she conforms humanlike opinions to the Truth and proposes a theory of nature.

Taking B9 at face value, Parmenides’ natural philosophy supposed two complementary principles, which covered the whole universe:

αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ πάντα φάος καὶ νὺξ ὀνόμασται / καὶ τὰ κατὰ σφετέρας δυνάμεις ἐπὶ τοῖσί τε καὶ τοῖς, / πᾶν πλέον ἐστὶν ὁμοῦ φάεος καὶ νυκτὸς ἀφάντου / ἴσων ἀμφοτέρων, ἐπεὶ οὐδετέρωι μέτα μηδέν.

Nevertheless, since all things were designated light and night and these [designations were applied] to these and those things according to the corresponding powers, all is full of light and night without shine, both of them equal, since nothing [comes] with neither of them.

Both principles must have interacted erotically, as is often the case in theogonies and cosmogonies. Such a cosmic intercourse would at least explain the meaning of B13, where Eros is said to be the first god to be excogitated by the personification of genesis: πρώτιστον μὲν Ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων ‘As the very first of all deities, [Γένεσις] excogitated Eros.’^[153]

Parmenides has gone down in history as a recalcitrant monist, but the deceptive nature of the goddess’ second speech lies precisely in its dualism. The second speech covers with two principles what the first speech covers with the sole notion of being. Parmenides’ natural philosophy was not true according to the high standards of the goddess; neither was it monist. Aristotle tells us that Parmenides assumed two principles to account for phenomenal diversity,^[154] and the final part of B8 seems to expose the failure of material monism. Milesian philosophers assumed two distinct aspects of nature, but they only recognized one, believing that a gradualist explanation of phenomenal differences allowed them to dispense with acknowledging the other (i. e., what is not P, not water, not air, not bright, etc.).

μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν· / τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστιν – ἐν ὧι πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν – / τἀντία δ’ ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ’ ἔθεντο / χωρὶς ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων, τῆι μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ, / ἤπιον ὄν, μέγ’ ἐλαφρόν, ἑωυτῶι πάντοσε τωὐτόν, / τῶι δ’ ἑτέρωι μὴ τωὐτόν· ἀτὰρ κἀκεῖνο κατ’ αὐτό / τἀντία νύκτ’ ἀδαῆ, πυκινὸν δέμας ἐμβριθές τε. (B8.53–59)

Regarding appearances,^[155] they actually decided to designate two means of distinction: one of which is not required – in this they are misled –.^[156] They judged [them] contrary as to [their] mass and placed [their] features apart from each other: here, the ethereal fire of flame, which is mild, extremely light, identical to itself in every respect, but not identical to the other; and yet also that which is in itself the opposite, unconscious^[157] night, a tight and heavy mass.

Now I come to the end of this work. The contrast with Milesian philosophy makes it easier to appreciate the two main benefits of the verb εἰμί for Parmenides’ philosophy in its historical context.

1. The verb εἰμί arguably served to present any predicative content without significantly affecting the lexical semantics of predication (Section 4), thus preventing Parmenides from identifying ultimate reality with something that could not cover the full extent of thought (Thales’ mistake). Noematic plenitude must have had methodological consequences for Parmenides, for whom different and even opposite contents had the same right to be insofar as they were, not only thinkable, but also required by the completeness of thought (i. e., for explanatory purposes). For example, the bright principle and its opposite are both necessary to account for dimness, and verbs like εἰμί can be used to speak “impartially” of lightness and darkness, i. e., of what is light or lightening (what lightens or makes things light) and what is dark or darkening (what darkens or makes things dark).

2. The verb εἰμί also prevented Parmenides from confusing actuality with present occurrence (Anaximander’s mistake). Parmenidean “being” evoked some kind of timeless actuality that was accessible to the νόος and expressible by the verb εἰμί. The connection between timelessness and thought does not require much explanation. Noetic, intellectual activity is usually understood as the apprehension of immutable objects, whether abstract, ideal, or real. However, in order to understand why ἔστι, ἐόν, and εἶναι are the most suitable verb forms to express atemporal states of affairs, we must recognize certain linguistic facts: first, present imperfective forms do not put temporal limits into focus; second, and more importantly, the lexical content of εἰμί does not imply the succession of different or opposite states (Section 5).^[158]

These advantages enabled Parmenides to theorize about ultimate reality without restricting its nature or actuality by discursive means. It is true that B8.42–49 ascribes an ultimate limit to the universe, but such a limit represents the all-encompassing extent of thinking and being. Besides, since Parmenides could not conceive of an endless actual plenum,^[159] he found it necessary to take a stand on the first Kantian antinomy (i. e., Die Welt ist in Grenzen eingeschlossen). The connection between full actuality and determinacy was common among Greek philosophers,^[160] and viewing the world as a closed totality is a commonplace of philosophy in general.^[161]

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πεῖρας πύματον, τετελεσμένον ἐστί / πάντοθεν, εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκωι, / μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντηι· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον / οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῆι ἢ τῆι. / οὔτε γὰρ οὐκ ἐὸν ἔστι, τό κεν παύοι μιν ἱκνεῖσθαι / εἰς ὁμόν, οὔτ’ ἐὸν ἔστιν ὅπως εἴη κεν ἐόντος / τῆι μᾶλλον τῆι δ’ ἧσσον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ἄσυλον· / οἷ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἶσον, ὁμῶς ἐν πείρασι κύρει.

However, since there is a farthest limit, it is perfect from anywhere, similar to the volume of a well-rounded sphere, equally matched from the center in all directions: for it is required that it does not turn out to be a bit bigger or a bit smaller here or there. For neither is there nonbeing, which could prevent it from reaching what is one-and-the-same, nor is there being such that there could be, of being, more here and less there, since it is all inviolable: indeed, equal to itself from anywhere, it stretches evenly within limits.