Peacekeeping and Economic Recovery from Conflict

Lars Jensen

doi:10.1515/peps-2021-0018

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Peacekeeping and Economic Recovery from Conflict

Lars Jensen

Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 28. April 2022

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Aus der Zeitschrift Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Band 28 Heft 2

Abstract

To better understand the large country-level heterogeneity found with respect to post-conflict economic recovery, this paper examines the potential role and impact of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) using a dataset which includes key information on civil conflicts and UN PKOs spanning 124 developing economies from 1990 to 2018. Analytical results provide evidence in support of PKOs’ positive impact on post-conflict economic recovery. Recovery growth (defined as a real GDP growth above peacetime growth) is found to only occur when a PKO is deployed and the relationship is stronger for, and likely driven by, the so-called transformative PKOs. Across robustness tests results imply that PKOs are, on average, associated with recovery rates of growth between 2 to 4 percentage points, and thus that peacekeeping could be an important factor in reducing and eliminating conflict-attributable macroeconomic losses. Foreign direct investments (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) are explored as two potential channels that could help explain the growth results. While results for FDI are inconclusive, ODA results imply that there is a strong association between periods of recovery and ODA (as a percentage of GDP) when recovery periods coincide with the presence of a PKO, and again much stronger for transformative PKOs.

Keywords: peacekeeping; conflict; foreign direct investments; official development assistance; growth

Corresponding author: Lars Jensen, UNDP, United Nations, 304 East 45th Street, New York, 10017, USA, E-mail: 3.larsjensen@gmail.com, lars.jensen@undp.org

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank everyone who took time to provide insightful comments and contributions to guide the paper. Joanna Kata-Blackman from the International Finance Corporation (IFC), Paul Antony Barbour from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and Jeffrey R. Kucik from the University of Arizona. Jascha Scheele, Lorraine Reuter, Rachel Scott, Michael Lund, Riad Meddeb, Biplove Choudhary, and George Gray Molina from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Kaylin McNeil from the University of Denver, and not least Håvard Mokleiv Nygård from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and Hannes Mueller from the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (GSE).

Conflict of interest: I am an employee (economist) at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This paper was written based on some of my earlier work at UNDP which has also been published as a UNDP report/working paper. I have not received any specific funding for this work. The views expressed in the paper are those of the author and do not neccesarily reflect those of the United Nations, including UNDP.

Appendix

A Peacekeeping Missions

Hegre et al., (2019) define the different PKOs as below.

Traditional

Observer missions — restricted to observing actions such as a truce, troop withdrawal, or a buffer zone. Always deployed with the consent of the parties to the conflict. Examples are United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) and United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) in Croatia.
Traditional missions — also deployed with the consent of the parties, but with somewhat extended mandates such as policing a buffer zone and assisting in negotiating a peace agreement. Examples are United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPRESEP) in Macedonia and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Transformational

Multidimensional missions — referred to as “second-generation operations,” the mandates, also consent-based, are extended with activities intended to go to the roots of the conflict, such as economic reconstruction, institutional transformation (reform of police, army, judicial system, elections). Examples are United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (UNOSAL) and United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).
Enforcement missions — “third-generation operations” that do not require the consent of both parties and therefore must draw on the authority of UN Charter articles 25, 42, and 43 to apply force to protect the activities of the operation. Examples are United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia and United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).

Table A1 provides an overview of the UN PKOs included in the dataset used in this paper.

Table A1:

UN Peacekeeping missions.

Traditional PKOs				Transformative PKOs
Observer missions				Multidimensional missions
Name	Country	Start	End	Name	Country	Start	End
UNDOF	Syria	Jun-74	Present	UNTAG	Namibia	Apr-89	Mar-90
UNAVEM I	Angola	Jan-89	Jun-91	ONUSAL	El Salvador	Jul-91	Apr-95
ONUCA	Costa Rica	Nov-89	Jan-92	UNTAC	Cambodia	Mar-92	Sep-93
	El Salvador			ONUMOZ	Mozambique	Dec-92	Dec-94
	Guatemala			UNMIBH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Dec-95	Dec-02
	Honduras			MINURCA	CAR	Apr-98	Feb-00
MINURSO	Morocco	Apr-91	Present	UNMISET	Timor-Leste	May-02	May-05
UNAMIC	Cambodia	Oct-91	Mar-92	UNMIT	Timor-Leste	Aug-06	May-12
UNOMUR	Rwanda, Uganda	Jun-93	Sep-94	Enforcement missions
UNOMIG	Georgia	Aug-93	Jun-09	UNPROFOR	Croatia	Feb-92	Mar-95
UNOMIL	Liberia	Sep-93	Sep-97		Bosnia Herzegovina
UNASOG	Chad	May-94	Jun-94		Macedonia
UNMOT	Tajikistan	Dec-94	May-00	UNOSOM II	Somalia	Mar-93	Mar-95
UNMOP	Croatia, Yugoslavia	Jan-96	Dec-02	UNMIH	Haiti	Sep-93	Jun-96
MIPONUH	Haiti	Dec-97	Mar-00	UNTAES	Croatia	Jan-96	Jan-98
UNPSG	Croatia	Jan-98	Oct-98	UNMIK	Kosovo	Jun-99	Present
Traditional missions				UNTAET	Timor-Leste	Oct-99	May-02
UNFICYP	Cyprus	Mar-64	Present	UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone	Oct-99	Dec-05
UNIFIL	Lebanon	Mar-78	Present	MONUC	Congo DRC	Nov-99	May-10
UNGOMAP10	Afghanistan and Pakistan	May-88	Mar-90	UNMIL	Liberia	Sep-03	Mar-18
UNAVEM II	Angola	Jun-91	Feb-95	UNOCI	Cote d’ivory	Apr-04	May-17
UNOSOM I	Somalia	Apr-92	Mar-93	MINUSTAH	Haiti	Jun-04	Oct-17
UNAMIR	Rwanda	Oct-93	Mar-96	ONUB	Burundi	Jun-04	Dec-06
UNAVEM III	Angola	Feb-95	Jun-97	UNMIS	Sudan	Mar-05	Dec-11
UNPREDEP	Macedonia	Mar-95	Feb-99	UNAMID	Sudan	Jul-07	Present
UNCRO	Croatia	May-95	Jan-96	MINURCAT	CAR, Chad	Sep-07	Dec-10
UNSMIH	Haiti	Jul-96	Jul-97	MINUSMA	MAli	Apr-13	Present
MINUGUA	Guatemala	Jan-97	May-97	MONUSCO	Congo DRC	Jul-10	Present
MONUA	Angola	Jun-97	Feb-99	UNMISS	South Sudan	Jul-11	Present
UNTMIH	Haiti	Aug-97	Dec-97	MINUJUSTH	Haiti	Oct-17	Present
UNOMSIL	Sierra Leone	Jul-98	Oct-99	MINUSCA	CAR	Apr-14	Present

B Alternative Growth Regression

The regression output in Table B1 is from the combination of robustness checks that produces the smallest coefficients on the PKO variables; a maximum allowed recovery period of 5 years, the alternative conflict definition (see table note), and controlling for past growth.

Table B1:

Regression output – growth.

	Dependent variable:
	Real GDP growth
	Recovery	Recovery w/wo PKO	Recovery w/wo type of PKO
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Growth(t-1)	0.146^***	0.146^***	0.146^***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Minor conflict	−0.916^**	−0.898^*	−0.930^**
	(0.464)	(0.464)	(0.465)
First year of major conflict	−6.894^***	−6.863^***	−6.873^***
	(0.850)	(0.849)	(0.849)
Following years of major conflict	−3.374^***	−3.373^***	−3.395^***
	(0.704)	(0.704)	(0.704)
Recovery	0.390
	(0.403)
Recovery wo. PKO		0.178	0.164
		(0.416)	(0.416)
Recovery w. PKO		2.325^**
		(1.018)
Recovery w. transformative PKO			3.355^**
			(1.329)
Recovery w. traditional PKO			1.020
			(1.486)
Observations	3,367	3,367	3,367
R²	0.097	0.099	0.099
Adjusted R²	0.054	0.055	0.055
F Statistic	10.494^*** (df = 33; 3211)	10.321^*** (df = 34; 3210)	10.070^*** (df = 35; 3209)

^*p < 0.1; ^**p < 0.05; ^***p < 0.01. Fixed Effects estimator with year dummies. Recovery is a maximum of 5 years after end of conflict. A major conflict year is defined as when BRDs exceed 0.08 per 1,000 capita. A minor conflict year is a year that is not a major conflict year and where BRDs > 24.

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Received: 2021-04-25

Accepted: 2022-04-04

Published Online: 2022-04-28

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https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2021-0018

Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel

peacekeeping; conflict; foreign direct investments; official development assistance; growth