Fighting Piracy and International Public Goods: The Atalanta Experiment in the Horn of Africa V3
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Renaud Bellais
Abstract
While piracy has been an old plague, its economic costs have increased enough in the Horn of Africa since the end of 1990s to push major countries to look for specific actions, either at national level or through coordinated missions. Maritime insecurity can then be analyzed as an “international public bad” requiring a collective solution. The conceptual framework of public goods appears useful to understand how to deal with piracy as well as identify the theoretical grounds to supply maritime security as an international public good. Such a theoretical framework then helps analyze more particularly the NAVFOR Atalanta mission. Even though this is not the only on-going operation, European Union’s mission appears as the most visible reaction against piracy on the high seas and it is fruitful to understand both benefits and limits of such collective action against piracy.
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- 1
Cf. Chalk (2008).
- 2
Geopolicity (2011).
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Hence, maybe the strong increase in IMB statistics based on self-declarations from ship owners or operators. For ages it was considered that IMB statistics had underestimated the real level of pirate attacks since making declaration would result in higher insurance premiums for declaring companies. The non-disclosure of information was then the relevant strategy, for attack cost or/and ransoms payments were lower than a general increase of insurance premiums.
- 4
Shapiro (2011) places ransom payments in a historical perspective: “In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, U.S. merchant ships and crews were subject to routine attacks by pirates from the Barbary States of North Africa. For years, it was deemed cheaper to pay them off than to fight. Then, as now, this answer proved counterproductive and unsustainable.”
- 5
See especially Lane (1973) for a historical perspective.
- 6
See, for more details, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (1999) and Kaul et al. (2003).
- 7
There are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Cyprus, the Isle of Man, Liberia, Malta, the Marshall Islands and Panama.
- 8
Elinor Ostrom renewed the concept of commons. In particular, she identified eight “design principles” of stable local common pool resource management. One can refer to her 1990 book: Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge University Press).
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Mahan (1890).
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Territorial sovereignty has mainly been defined by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, but the legal frame also created a primary exception to this principle through the concept of international commons (Shackelford 2009).
- 11
- 12
Atalanta mission was launched in support of Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846 (2008) and 1897 (2009) by the United Nations’ Security Council.
- 13
When the exclusion cost is sufficiently low and utilization can be monitored, users can form a club and provide themselves with the shared good. Non-members are then excluded, while members share the costs (usually through a toll).
- 14
ICC-IMB (2009).
- 15
U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (2010, 1).
- 16
Brauer and Caruso (2013) underline the necessity of structural changes in economy to suppress the roots of violence and thus of piracy. They particularly discuss the concepts of negative and positive peace in terms of economic effectiveness.
- 17
Séminaire “Renforcement des capacités maritimes dans la Corne de l’Afrique: une architecture innovante au service de l’approche globale, La privatisation des espaces communs n’est pas une fatalité,” Paris, French Ministry of Defense, 16 July 2012.
© 2013 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin / Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Shape and Consequences of Military Missions
- Mission Afghanistan: Who Bears the Heaviest Burden
- Policy Implications of Demographic Changes in the VHA Veteran Population Following OEF/OIF
- Fighting Piracy and International Public Goods: The Atalanta Experiment in the Horn of Africa V3
- How Many Wars Is the US Fighting Today?
- Shape and Consequences of Military Missions: An Introduction
- Winning Hearts and Minds: Public Good Provision in the Shadow of Insurgency
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Shape and Consequences of Military Missions
- Mission Afghanistan: Who Bears the Heaviest Burden
- Policy Implications of Demographic Changes in the VHA Veteran Population Following OEF/OIF
- Fighting Piracy and International Public Goods: The Atalanta Experiment in the Horn of Africa V3
- How Many Wars Is the US Fighting Today?
- Shape and Consequences of Military Missions: An Introduction
- Winning Hearts and Minds: Public Good Provision in the Shadow of Insurgency
