Counterpart Theories: The Argument from Concern

Harriet E. Baber

doi:10.1515/mp-2021-2020

Article

Counterpart Theories: The Argument from Concern

Harriet E. Baber

Published/Copyright: February 17, 2021

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From the journal Metaphysica Volume 22 Issue 1

Abstract

Modal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s possibly being F with its having a counterpart that is F at another possible world; temporal counterpart theory, the stage view, according to which people and other ordinary objects are instantaneous stages, identifies a thing’s having been F or going to be F, with its having a counterpart that is F at another time. Both counterpart theories invite what has been called ‘the argument from concern’ (Rosen, G. 1990. “Modal Fictionalism.” Mind 99 (395): 327–54). Why should I be concerned about my counterparts at other possible worlds or other times? I care about how things might have gone for me—not how they go for other people at other possible worlds; I care about my prospects—not the way go for other people at other times. Jiri Benovsky has argued that while modal counterpart theory can be defended against this style of argument, temporal counterpart theory cannot (Benovsky, J. 2015. “Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation.” Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29: 18–34). I argue that temporal counterpart theory, like modal counterpart theory, resists the argument from concern.

Keywords: counterpart theory; stage theory; identity; modality

Corresponding author: Harriet E. Baber, Department of Philosophy, University of San Diego, San Diego, CA 92110, USA, E-mail: baber@sandiego.edu

References

Benovsky, J. 2015. “Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation.” Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29: 18–34.10.1515/krt-2015-290103Search in Google Scholar

Kripke, S. A. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Lewis, D. 1983. “Survival and Identity.” In Philosophical Papers, I. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195032047.003.0005.Search in Google Scholar

Rosen, G. 1990. “Modal Fictionalism.” Mind 99 (395): 327–54.10.1093/mind/XCIX.395.327Search in Google Scholar

Published Online: 2021-02-17

Published in Print: 2021-04-27

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Articles in the same Issue

https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-2020

Keywords for this article

counterpart theory; stage theory; identity; modality