Abstract
The more science progresses, the more it is evident that the physical world presents regularities. This raises a metaphysical problem: why is the world so ordered? In the first part of the article, I attempt to clarify this problem and justify its relevance. In the following three parts, I analyze three hypotheses already formulated in philosophy in response to this problem: the hypothesis that the order of the world is explained 1) by laws of nature, 2) by dispositions of the fundamental physical entities, 3) or by a memory immanent to matter (a hypothesis developed by Peirce, Bergson and James). The third hypothesis may seem surprising. However, it can be shown that the three hypotheses have a psychomorphic dimension in the sense that they give to nature properties analogous to those of mind. In addition, this third hypothesis presents several interesting arguments.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Modal Realism and the Possibility of Island Universes: Why There are no Possible Worlds
- Counterpart Theories: The Argument from Concern
- A Functional Approach to Ontology
- On the Nature of Persons; Persons as Constituted Events
- Modest Dualism and Individuation of Mind
- Proving God without Dualism: Improving the Swinburne-Moreland Argument from Consciousness
- Holism | Cosmopsychism – And the Collapse of the Wavefunction
- Laws, Dispositions, Memory: Three Hypotheses on the Order of the World
- Response to Book Review
- Self-Relating Internalism: Reply to Vallicella
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Modal Realism and the Possibility of Island Universes: Why There are no Possible Worlds
- Counterpart Theories: The Argument from Concern
- A Functional Approach to Ontology
- On the Nature of Persons; Persons as Constituted Events
- Modest Dualism and Individuation of Mind
- Proving God without Dualism: Improving the Swinburne-Moreland Argument from Consciousness
- Holism | Cosmopsychism – And the Collapse of the Wavefunction
- Laws, Dispositions, Memory: Three Hypotheses on the Order of the World
- Response to Book Review
- Self-Relating Internalism: Reply to Vallicella