Abstract
In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the existence of the infinite plurality of concrete and abstract possible worlds, posited by David K. Lewis and Alvin Plantinga. This assessment will be carried out within the (modified) explanatory framework of Richard Swinburne, which will lead to the conclusion that the existence of God provides a true fundamental explanation for these specific entities. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we have another good abductive argument for God’s existence and grounds for affirming a weaker form of the principle of methodological naturalism in our metaphysical theorising.
References
Adams, R. 1974. “Theories of Actuality.” Noûs 8: 211–31. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214751.Search in Google Scholar
Almeida, M. J. 2017a. “Theistic Modal Realism I: The Challenge of Theistic Actualism.” Philosophy Compass 12 (7): 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12419.Search in Google Scholar
Almeida, M. J. 2017b. “Theistic Modal Realism II: Theoretical Benefits.” Philosophy Compass 12 (7): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12418.Search in Google Scholar
Almeida, M. J. 2017c. “The Multiverse and Divine Creation.” Religions 8 (258): 1–10.10.3390/rel8120258Search in Google Scholar
Alvarado, J. 2019. “Are Tropes Simple?” Teorema 38: 51–72.Search in Google Scholar
Armstrong, D. 1997. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Benacerraf, P. 1973. “Mathematical Truth.” Journal of Philosophy 70: 661–79. https://doi.org/10.2307/2025075.Search in Google Scholar
Bennett, K. 2011. “By Our Bootsraps.” Philosophical Perspectives 25: 27–41. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2011.00207.x.Search in Google Scholar
Bennett, K. 2017. Making Things Up. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/oso/9780199682683.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Benovsky, J. 2013. “New Reasons to Motivate Trope Theory: Endurantism and Perdurantism.” Acta Anal 28: 223–7. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0166-0.Search in Google Scholar
Brentano, F. 1870. Logik (EL 80), online. Also available at http://gams.uni-graz.at/archive/objects/o:bag.el.80-html-norm/methods/sdef:HTML/get.Search in Google Scholar
Bricker, P. 2001. “Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality.” In Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis, vol. 27–56, edited by G. Preyer, and F. Siebelt. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.Search in Google Scholar
Bricker, P. 2007. “Concrete Possible Worlds.” In Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, edited by T. Sider, J. Hawthorne, and D. W. Zimmerman, 111–34. Oxford: Blackwell.Search in Google Scholar
Cameron, R. 2009. “God Exists at Every (Modal Realist) World: Response to Sheehy.” Religious Studies 45: 95–100. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412508009827.Search in Google Scholar
Cameron, R. 2010. “How to have a Radically Minimal Ontology.” Philosophical Studies 151: 249–64. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9442-2.Search in Google Scholar
Campbell, K. 1990. Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Blackwell.Search in Google Scholar
Collier, M. J. 2019. “God’s Necessity on Anselmian Theistic Concretism.” Sophia 58: 331–48. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0659-4.Search in Google Scholar
Collier, M. J. 2021. “God’s Place in the World.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 89: 43–65. https://doi.org/10.1007/S11841-018-0659-4.Search in Google Scholar
Divers, J. 2002. Possible Worlds. New York: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar
Divers, J. 2007. “The Modal Metaphysics of Alvin Plantinga.” In Alvin Plantinga, edited by D.-P. Baker, 71–92. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511611247.004Search in Google Scholar
Douven, I. 2021. “Abduction.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Also available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/abduction/.Search in Google Scholar
Draper, P. 2005. “God, Science and Naturalism.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, edited by W. J. Wainwright, 272–303. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0195138090.003.0012Search in Google Scholar
Ehring, D. 2011. Tropes: Properties, Objects and Mental Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608539.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Finocchiaro, P. 2021. “High-Fidelity Metaphysics: Ideological Parsimony in Theory Choice.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4): 613–32. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12349.Search in Google Scholar
Fischer, B. 2017. “Modal Empiricism: Objection, Reply, Proposal.” In Modal Epistemology After Rationalism, edited by B. Fischer, and F. Leon, 263–80. Switzerland: Springer.10.1007/978-3-319-44309-6_14Search in Google Scholar
Fisher, A. R. J. 2018. “Instantiation in Trope Theory.” American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2): 153–64. https://doi.org/10.2307/45128609.Search in Google Scholar
Fisher, A. R. J. 2020. “Abstracta and Abstraction in Trope Theory.” Philosophical Papers 49 (1): 41–67. https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2019.1571938.Search in Google Scholar
Garcia, R. 2015a. “Two Ways to Particularize a Property.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1: 635–52. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2015.21.Search in Google Scholar
Garcia, R. 2015b. “Is Trope Theory a Divided House?.” In The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy, edited by G. Galluzzo, and M. Loux, 133–55. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Garcia, R. 2016. “Tropes as Character-Grounders.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94: 499–515. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2015.1106567.Search in Google Scholar
Heil, J. 2003. From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0199259747.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Husserl, E. 1901. Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band I: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.Search in Google Scholar
Inwagen, P. V. 1986. “Two Concepts of Possible Worlds.” Midwest Studies In Philosophy 11: 185–213. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1986.tb00494.x.Search in Google Scholar
Keinänen, M., J. Hakkarainen, and A. Keskinen. 2016. “Why Realists Need Tropes.” Metaphysica 17: 69–85. https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2016-0006.Search in Google Scholar
Kretzmann, N. 1991. “A General Problem of Creation: Why Would God Create Anything at All?” In Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, edited by M. Scott, 208–28. New York: Cornell University Press.10.7591/9781501728372-011Search in Google Scholar
Kripke, S. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.Search in Google Scholar
Korman, D. 2015. Objects: Nothing Out of the Ordinary. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732532.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Lewis, D. K. 1983. “Postscripts to “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”.” Philosophical Papers: 40–6.10.1093/0195032047.003.0003Search in Google Scholar
Lewis, D. K. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.Search in Google Scholar
Lewis, D. K. 1999. “Anselm and Actuality.” In Particulars, Actuality, and Identity over Time, Vol. 4, edited by M. Tooley, 283–97. New York: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar
Lovejoy, A. 1936. The Great Chain of Being. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Lowe, E. J. 2006. The Four Category Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0199254397.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Loux, M. 2015. “An exercise in Constituent Ontology.” In The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy, edited by G. Galluzzo, and M. Loux, 9–45. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781316181539.002Search in Google Scholar
Maurin, A.-S. 2002. If Tropes. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.10.1007/978-94-017-0079-5_2Search in Google Scholar
Maurin, A.-S. 2018. “Tropes.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Also available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tropes/.Search in Google Scholar
Maurin, A-S. 2019. “Grounding and Metaphysical explanation: It’s Complicated.” Philosophical Studies 176: 1573–94. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1080-0.Search in Google Scholar
McDaniel, K. 2001. “Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects.” Philosophical Studies 104: 269–90. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010310503120.10.1023/A:1010310503120Search in Google Scholar
McDaniel, K. 2004. “Modal Realism with Overlap.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82: 137–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/713659792.Search in Google Scholar
McDaniel, K. 2006. “Modal Realisms.” Philosophical Perspectives 20: 303–31. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2006.00109.x.Search in Google Scholar
Melia, J. 1992. “A Note on Lewis’ Ontology.” Analysis 52 (3): 191–2. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/52.3.191a.Search in Google Scholar
Menzel, C. 2013. “Possible Worlds.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Also available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-worlds/.Search in Google Scholar
Molnar, G. 2003. Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Morganti, M. 2009. “Tropes and Physics.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 78: 185–205. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789042026056_009.Search in Google Scholar
Mumford, S., and R. L. Anjum. 2010. “A Powerful Theory of Causation.” In The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations, edited by A. Marmadoro, 143–59. London: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar
Nozick, R. 2001. Invariances. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Oppy, G. 2019. Atheism: The Basics. New York: Routledge.10.4324/9781315150383Search in Google Scholar
Peacocke, C. 1999. Being Known. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0198238606.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Phillipse, H. 2012. God in the Age of Science? A Critique of Religious Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697533.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Plantinga, A. 1974. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Plantinga, A. 1980. Does God Have a Nature? (The Aquinas Lecture: 1980). Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Plantinga, A. 2003. Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality. Oxford University Press.10.1093/0195103769.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Plantinga, A. 2011. Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812097.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Pollock, J. 1984. The Foundations of Philosophical Semantics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Reinach, A. 1921. Gesammelte Schriften. Halle: Max Niemeyer.Search in Google Scholar
Rouse, J. 2008. “How Successful Is Naturalism?” In Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Also available at https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/how-successful-is-naturalism/.Search in Google Scholar
Russell, B. 1918. “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.” In Logic and Knowledge. London: George Allen & Unwin.10.5840/monist19182843Search in Google Scholar
Schaffer, J. 2001. “The Individuation of Tropes.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79: 247–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/713659225.Search in Google Scholar
Schaffer, J. 2009. “Spacetime the One Substance.” Philosophical Studies 145: 131–48. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9386-6.Search in Google Scholar
Schaffer, J. 2015. “What Not to Multiply without Necessity.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93: 644–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2014.992447.Search in Google Scholar
Schaffer, J. 2016. “Grounding in the Image of Causation.” Philosophical Studies 173: 49–100. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0438-1.Search in Google Scholar
Schaffer, J. 2017. “Laws for Metaphysical Explanation.” Philosophical Issues 27: 302–21. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12111.Search in Google Scholar
Schaffer, J. 2021. “Ground Functionalism.” In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 1, edited by U. Kriegel, 171–207. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/oso/9780198845850.003.0007Search in Google Scholar
Sheehy, P. 2009. “Reply to Cameron.” Religious Studies 45: 101–4. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412508009839.Search in Google Scholar
Sider, T. 2001. Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/019924443X.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Sider, T. 2013. “Against Parthood.” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8: 237–93. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682904.003.0006.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682904.003.0006Search in Google Scholar
Sijuwade, J. 2021a. “Divine Simplicity: The Aspectival Account.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion: 1–37. https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2021.3306.Search in Google Scholar
Sijuwade, J. 2021b. “Building the Monarchy of the Father.” Religious Studies: 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412521000020.Search in Google Scholar
Sijuwade, J. 2021c. “Fundamentality and the Existence of God.” Manuscrito: 1–76. https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.V44N4.JS.Search in Google Scholar
Sijuwade, J. 2021d. “Grounding and the Existence of God.” Metaphysica: 1–53. https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0029.Search in Google Scholar
Simons, P. 1987. Parts: A Study in Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Simons, P. 1994. “Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 553–75. https://doi.org/10.2307/2108581.Search in Google Scholar
Smith, B. 1989. “Logic and the Sachverhalt.” The Monist 72: 52–69. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist19897212.Search in Google Scholar
Swinburne, R. 2001. Epistemic Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0199243794.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Swinburne, R. 2004. The Existence of God. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271672.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Swinburne, R. 2010. Is There a God?. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Swinburne, R. 2016. The Coherence of Theism, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198779698.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Textor, M. 2018. “States of Affairs.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Also available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/spacetime-theories/.Search in Google Scholar
Thomasson, A. L. 2021. “How Can We Come to Know Metaphysical Modal Truths?” Synthese 198: 2077–106. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1841-5.Search in Google Scholar
Williams, D. C. 1953. “On the Elements of Being II.” Review of Metaphysics 7: 171–92.Search in Google Scholar
Williams, D. C. 1986. “Universals and Existents.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64: 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408612342191.Search in Google Scholar
Wilson, A. 2018. “Metaphysical Causation.” Noûs 52: 723–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12190.Search in Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. 1918. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar
© 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston