A Short Argument against Truthmaker Maximalism
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Oleh Bondar
Abstract
Mark Jago has introduced a short Fitch-style argument for truthmaker maximalism – the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker. In response to Jago, Trueman argues that the Fitch-style reasoning allows us to prove the opposite – no truth has a truthmaker. In the article, we consider the debates between Jago’s truthmaker maximalism and Trueman’s truthmaker nihilism. Also, we introduce a short Grim-style argument against Jago’s truthmaker maximalism.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Quantum Entanglement Undermines Structural Realism
- A Belief Expressionist Explanation of Divine Conceptualist Mathematics
- A Short Argument against Truthmaker Maximalism
- The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense
- The Dead Past Dilemma
- The Role of Logic in Metaphysical Theorizing
- Reducing Constitution to Composition
- On Armstrong’s Radical Absolutism
- Objective Facts
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Quantum Entanglement Undermines Structural Realism
- A Belief Expressionist Explanation of Divine Conceptualist Mathematics
- A Short Argument against Truthmaker Maximalism
- The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense
- The Dead Past Dilemma
- The Role of Logic in Metaphysical Theorizing
- Reducing Constitution to Composition
- On Armstrong’s Radical Absolutism
- Objective Facts
