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Quantum Entanglement Undermines Structural Realism

  • Seungbae Park ORCID logo EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: August 30, 2021
Metaphysica
From the journal Metaphysica Volume 23 Issue 1

Abstract

Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that an extrinsic property of an object is determined by its intrinsic properties. So structural realists might be tempted to cite quantum entanglement as evidence for structural realism. I argue, however, that quantum entanglement undermines structural realism. If we classify two entangled electrons as a single system, we can say that their spin properties are intrinsic properties of the system, and that we can have knowledge about these intrinsic properties. Specifically, we can know that the parts of the system are entangled and spatially separated from each other. In addition, the concept of supervenience neither illuminates quantum entanglement nor helps structural realism.

Keywords: intrinsic property; quantum entanglement; relational property; structural realism; supervenience
Corresponding author: Seungbae Park, PhD, Professor, School of Liberal Arts, Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology, Ulju-gun, Ulsan 44919, The Republic of Korea, E-mail:

Funding source: Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea

Funding source: National Research Foundation of Korea doi.org/10.13039/501100003725

Award Identifier / Grant number: NRF-2018S1A5A2A01039606

  1. Research funding: This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2018S1A5A2A01039606).

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Received: 2021-01-01
Accepted: 2021-03-29
Published Online: 2021-08-30
Published in Print: 2022-04-27

© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Original Papers
  3. Quantum Entanglement Undermines Structural Realism
  4. A Belief Expressionist Explanation of Divine Conceptualist Mathematics
  5. A Short Argument against Truthmaker Maximalism
  6. The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense
  7. The Dead Past Dilemma
  8. The Role of Logic in Metaphysical Theorizing
  9. Reducing Constitution to Composition
  10. On Armstrong’s Radical Absolutism
  11. Objective Facts
https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0001
Keywords for this article
intrinsic property; quantum entanglement; relational property; structural realism; supervenience

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Original Papers
  3. Quantum Entanglement Undermines Structural Realism
  4. A Belief Expressionist Explanation of Divine Conceptualist Mathematics
  5. A Short Argument against Truthmaker Maximalism
  6. The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense
  7. The Dead Past Dilemma
  8. The Role of Logic in Metaphysical Theorizing
  9. Reducing Constitution to Composition
  10. On Armstrong’s Radical Absolutism
  11. Objective Facts
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