Quantum Entanglement Undermines Structural Realism

Seungbae Park

doi:10.1515/mp-2021-0001

Article

Quantum Entanglement Undermines Structural Realism

Seungbae Park

Published/Copyright: August 30, 2021

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From the journal Metaphysica Volume 23 Issue 1

Abstract

Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that an extrinsic property of an object is determined by its intrinsic properties. So structural realists might be tempted to cite quantum entanglement as evidence for structural realism. I argue, however, that quantum entanglement undermines structural realism. If we classify two entangled electrons as a single system, we can say that their spin properties are intrinsic properties of the system, and that we can have knowledge about these intrinsic properties. Specifically, we can know that the parts of the system are entangled and spatially separated from each other. In addition, the concept of supervenience neither illuminates quantum entanglement nor helps structural realism.

Keywords: intrinsic property; quantum entanglement; relational property; structural realism; supervenience

Corresponding author: Seungbae Park, PhD, Professor, School of Liberal Arts, Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology, Ulju-gun, Ulsan 44919, The Republic of Korea, E-mail: nature@unist.ac.kr

Funding source: Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea

Funding source: National Research Foundation of Korea doi.org/10.13039/501100003725

Award Identifier / Grant number: NRF-2018S1A5A2A01039606

Research funding: This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2018S1A5A2A01039606).

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Received: 2021-01-01

Accepted: 2021-03-29

Published Online: 2021-08-30

Published in Print: 2022-04-27

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Articles in the same Issue

https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0001

Keywords for this article

intrinsic property; quantum entanglement; relational property; structural realism; supervenience