Tropes and Some Ontological Prerequisites for Knowledge
-
R. Scott Smith
Abstract
Many have written about trope ontology, but relatively few have considered its implications for some of the ontological conditions needed for us to have knowledge. I explore the resources of trope ontology to meet those conditions. With J. P. Moreland, I argue that, being simple, we can eliminate tropes’ qualitative contents without ontological loss, resulting in bare individuators. Then I extend Moreland’s argument, arguing that tropes undermine some of the needed ontological conditions for knowledge.
Yet, we do know many things, and trope nominalists presuppose that too. Therefore, I consider three counter-arguments, starting with David Lewis’s rebuttal based on appeal to brute facts. Second, I explore Jeffrey Brower’s recent proposal as a possible solution. Last, I consider Robert Garcia’s recent distinction between module and modifier tropes, to see if it can be of assistance. I conclude, however, that trope nominalism cannot preserve some of the needed ontology to have knowledge.
References
Brower, J. 2015. “Aquinas on the Problem of Universals.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12176.10.1111/phpr.12176Search in Google Scholar
Campbell, K. 1981. “The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars.” In Midwest Studies in Philosophy VI: the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, edited by P. French. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.10.1111/j.1475-4975.1981.tb00453.xSearch in Google Scholar
Campbell, K. 1990. Abstract Particulars. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.Search in Google Scholar
Dennett, D. 1994. “Dennett, Daniel C.” In A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind: Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, edited by S. Guttenplan. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.Search in Google Scholar
Garcia, R. 2015a. “Tropes as Divine Acts: the Nature of Creaturely Properties in a World Sustained by God.” European Journal Philosophy of Religion 7 (3): 105–30.10.24204/ejpr.v7i3.107Search in Google Scholar
Garcia, R. 2015b. “Two Ways to Particularize a Property.” Journal American Philosophy Association 1 (4): 635–52.10.1017/apa.2015.21Search in Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1983. “New Work for a Theory of Universals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4): 343–77.10.1080/00048408312341131Search in Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1996. “Elusive Knowledge.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4): 549–67.10.1080/00048409612347521Search in Google Scholar
Maurin, A. 2002. If Tropes. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.10.1007/978-94-017-0079-5Search in Google Scholar
Moreland, J. 2001. Universals. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.10.1017/UPO9781844653270Search in Google Scholar
Tye, M. 1995. Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books.10.7551/mitpress/6712.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Williams, D. 1953. “On the Elements of Being: I.” The Review of Metaphysics 7 (1): 3–18.10.1093/oso/9780198810384.003.0003Search in Google Scholar
© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Articles
- A Reply to Mellor’s “Propensities and Possibilities”
- The Aristotelian Context of the Existence-Essence Distinction in De Ente Et Essentia
- Maximality, Function, and the Many
- A Uniform, Concretist Metaphysics for Linguistic Types
- Tropes and Some Ontological Prerequisites for Knowledge
- Neutralism, Naturalism and Emergence: A Critical Examination of Cumpa’s Theory of Instantiation
- Book Review
- R. D. Ingthorsson: McTaggart’s Paradox
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Articles
- A Reply to Mellor’s “Propensities and Possibilities”
- The Aristotelian Context of the Existence-Essence Distinction in De Ente Et Essentia
- Maximality, Function, and the Many
- A Uniform, Concretist Metaphysics for Linguistic Types
- Tropes and Some Ontological Prerequisites for Knowledge
- Neutralism, Naturalism and Emergence: A Critical Examination of Cumpa’s Theory of Instantiation
- Book Review
- R. D. Ingthorsson: McTaggart’s Paradox
