Acquaintance with Universals

Peter Forrest

doi:10.1515/mp-2017-0013

Article

Acquaintance with Universals

Peter Forrest

Published/Copyright: March 28, 2017

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From the journal Metaphysica Volume 18 Issue 1

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the problems solved by universals require not merely that we know they exist but that we know them by acquaintance. I begin by explicating this thesis of acquaintance with universals. I then show how it solves some familiar problems. After that I reply to the objection that something weaker will do such as David Lewis’ distinction between natural and artificial classes of possibilia.

Keywords: acquaintance; grue/bleen; knowledge; natural classes; quaddition; Raven’s Paradox; resemblance

Acknowledgments

I am indebted to Frank White, for persuading me to take seriously the idea of acquaintance with universals, and to Javier Cumpa for his helpful comments.

I have previously argued (Forrest 2005) that universals are good candidates for sense-data. This paper reaches the same conclusion from a different direction, arguing that the reasons we have for realism about universals have the corollary that we are acquainted with them.

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Published Online: 2017-3-28

Published in Print: 2017-4-1

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https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2017-0013

Keywords for this article

acquaintance; grue/bleen; knowledge; natural classes; quaddition; Raven’s Paradox; resemblance