Home Philosophy Are Radical Realists Hypocrites about Intuition-Dependence?
Article
Licensed
Unlicensed Requires Authentication

Are Radical Realists Hypocrites about Intuition-Dependence?

  • Ben Cross ORCID logo EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: June 15, 2023

Abstract

Radical realists criticise the role that moral intuitions play in moralist political philosophy. However, radical realists may also rely on certain epistemic intuitions when making use of their theories of ideology critique. Hence, one might wonder whether radical realists’ criticism of moralists’ intuition-dependence is hypocritical. Call this the intuition asymmetry objection. My aim in this article is to show that the intuition asymmetry objection fails. After examining the basis of objections by radical realists to the role of moral intuitions in moralist political philosophy, I show that the presence of intuitions in radical realist theories of ideology critique is consistent with their criticism of moralism.


Corresponding author: Ben Cross, School of Philosophy, Wuhan University, Bayi Rd 299, Wuchang District, Wuhan, Hubei Province, 430072, P.R. China, E-mail:

Acknowledgments

I am indebted to Ugur Aytac, Thomas Besch, Elliot O’Donnell, and two anonymous reviewers for invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

References

Aytac, U., and E. Rossi. 2022. “Ideology Critique without Morality: A Radical Realist Approach.” American Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422001216.Search in Google Scholar

BonJour, L. 1998. In Defense of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511625176Search in Google Scholar

Beer, J. S. 2014. “Exaggerated Positivity in Self-Evaluation: A Social Neuroscience Approach to Reconciling the Role of Self-Esteem Protection and Cognitive Bias.” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 8 (10): 583–94. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12133.Search in Google Scholar

Beer, J. S., A. E. Rigney, and J. E. Koski. 2018. “Self-Evaluation.” In Stevens’ Handbook of Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience, edited by J. T. Wixted.10.1002/9781119170174.epcn416Search in Google Scholar

Beetz, J. P, and E. Rossi. 2017. “The EU’s Democratic Deficit in a Realist Key: Multilateral Governance, Popular Sovereignty and Critical Responsiveness.” Transnational Legal Theory 8 (1): 22–41, https://doi.org/10.1080/20414005.2017.1307316.Search in Google Scholar

Bennhold, K. 2010. “In Greek Debt Crisis, a Window to the German Psyche.” 4 May. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/business/global/04iht-euro.html (accessed May 9, 2023).Search in Google Scholar

Cappelen, H. 2012. Philosophy Without Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.001.0001Search in Google Scholar

Chalmers, D. 2014. “Intuitions in Philosophy: A Minimal Defense.” Philosophical Studies 171 (3): 535–44. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0288-x.Search in Google Scholar

Climenhaga, N. 2018. “Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy.” Mind 127 (505): 69–104, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw032.Search in Google Scholar

Conte, S. J. 2022. “Are Intuitions Treated as Evidence? Cases from Political Philosophy.” The Journal of Political Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12277.Search in Google Scholar

Cross, B. 2021. “Apocalypticism as Radical Realism? On the Benefits and Dangers of Wishful Thinking for Prefigurative Politics.” Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217211018407.Search in Google Scholar

Cross, B. 2022a. “How Radical Is Radical Realism?” European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3): 1110–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12710.Search in Google Scholar

Cross, B. 2022b. “Normativity, Morality and Radical Disadvantage in Bernard Williams’ Realist Theory of Legitimacy.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 56 (3): 379–93. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-020-09780-z.Search in Google Scholar

Cross, B., and J. Prinz. 2023. “Can Narratives about Sovereign Debt Be Generally Ideologically Suspicious? An Exercise in Broadening the Scope of Ideology Critique.” Journal of Social Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12511.Search in Google Scholar

Cummins, R. 1998. “Reflecting on Reflective Equilibrium.” In Rethinking Intuition, edited by M. DePaul, and W. Ramsey, 113–28. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.Search in Google Scholar

Deutsch, M. E. 2015. The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.10.7551/mitpress/9780262028950.001.0001Search in Google Scholar

Duff, K. 2017. “The Criminal Is Political: Policing Politics in Real Existing Political Liberalism.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (4): 485–502. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2017.39.Search in Google Scholar

Erman, E., and N. Möller. 2021. “Is Ideal Theory Useless for Non-Ideal Theory?” The Journal of Politics 81 (4): 525–40. https://doi.org/10.1086/714764.Search in Google Scholar

Finlayson, L. 2011. “Death Camps and Designer Dresses: The Liberal Agenda and the Appeal to ‘Real Existing Socialism’.” Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Philosophy 58 (126): 1–26. https://doi.org/10.3167/th.2011.5812601.Search in Google Scholar

Finlayson, L. 2015. The Political is Political: Conformity and the Illusion of Dissent in Contemporary Political Philosophy. London: Rowman and Littlefield.Search in Google Scholar

Geuss, R. 2003. Public Goods, Private Goods. Second Edition with a New Preface from the Author. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Geuss, R. 2008. Philosophy and Real Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.10.1515/9781400835515Search in Google Scholar

Geuss, R. 2017. “Realism, Wishful Thinking, Utopia.” In Political Uses of Utopia, edited by S. Chrostowska and J. Ingram, 233–47. New York: Columbia University Press.10.7312/chro17958-013Search in Google Scholar

Hall, E. 2014. “Contingency, Confidence, and Liberalism in the Political Thought of Bernard Williams.” Social Theory and Practice 40 (4): 545–69, https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract201440433.Search in Google Scholar

Handby, E. 2022. “Assessing the Uses of Intuitions in Contemporary Political Theory.” The Journal of Politics 84 (3): 1595–606. https://doi.org/10.1086/719270.Search in Google Scholar

Haslanger, S. 2012. Resisting Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199892631.001.0001Search in Google Scholar

Nietzsche, F. (1886) 2002. Beyond Good and Evil, edited by R. P. Horstman and J. Norman. Translated by J. Norman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Nozick, R. 1989. The Examined Life. New York: Simon and Schuster.Search in Google Scholar

Prinz, J. 2016. “Raymond Geuss’s Radicalisation of Realism in Political Philosophy.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 42 (8): 777–96. https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453715583711.Search in Google Scholar

Prinz, J., and P. Raekstad. 2020. “The Value of Genealogies for Political Philosophy.” Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1762729.Search in Google Scholar

Prinz, J., and E. Rossi. 2017. “Political Realism as Ideology Critique.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20 (3): 334–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2017.1293908.Search in Google Scholar

Prinz, J., and E. Rossi. 2022. “Financial Power and Democratic Legitimacy: How to Think Realistically about Debt.” Social Theory and Practice 48 (1): 115–40. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract2021121144.Search in Google Scholar

Pust, J. 2001. “Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical Intuitions.” Philosophical Studies 106 (3): 227–58. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1013356707899.10.1023/A:1013356707899Search in Google Scholar

Raekstad, P. 2021. “The Radical Realist Critique of Rawls: A Reconstruction and Response.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2021.1891377.Search in Google Scholar

Rawls, J. 1999. A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition. Harvard: Belknap University Press.10.4159/9780674042582Search in Google Scholar

Rawls, J. 2005. Political Liberalism, Expanded edition. New York: Columbia University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Rossi, E. 2019. “Being Realistic and Demanding the Impossible.” Constellations 26 (4): 638–52. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12446.Search in Google Scholar

Rossi, E., and C. Argenton. 2021. “Property, Legitimacy, Ideology: A Reality Check.” The Journal of Politics 83 (3): 1046–59. https://doi.org/10.1086/710781.Search in Google Scholar

Schaefer, A., and R. Weston Siscoe. 2020. “Incoherent but Reasonable: A Defense of Truth-Abstinence in Political Liberalism.” Social Theory and Practice 46 (3): 573–603. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract202071598.Search in Google Scholar

Schäuble, W. 2012. Talking to Wolfgang Schäuble (Harald Schumann on the Trail—The Complete Interview). URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XXdmJ5cVDXU (accessed May 9, 2023).Search in Google Scholar

Silva, P. 2013. “Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism about Intuition.” Philosophical Studies 164 (3): 579–89. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9870-2.Search in Google Scholar

Singer, P. 2005. “Ethics and Intuitions.” The Journal of Ethics 9 (3/4): 331–52. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-005-3508-y.Search in Google Scholar

Sleat, M. 2024. Forthcoming. “Against Realist Ideology Critique.” Social Philosophy and Policy.Search in Google Scholar

Stahl, T. 2022. “What (If Anything) Is Ideological about Ideal Theory?” European Journal of Political Theory. https://doi.org/10.1177/14748851221107198.Search in Google Scholar

Street, S. 2010. “Constructivism in Metaethics.” Philosophy Compass 5 (5): 363–84. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00280.x.Search in Google Scholar

Tersman, F. 2008. “The Reliability of Intuitions: A Challenge from Neuroscience.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3): 389–405. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400802002010.Search in Google Scholar

Williams, B. 2002. Truth and Truthfulness. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Williams, B. 2011. Ethics and the Limits of Moral Philosophy. Oxon: Routledge.10.4324/9780203828281Search in Google Scholar

Received: 2022-11-17
Accepted: 2023-05-09
Published Online: 2023-06-15
Published in Print: 2024-10-28

© 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Downloaded on 12.12.2025 from https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/mopp-2022-0062/html
Scroll to top button