Hybrid Ethical Theory and Cohen’s Critique of Rawls’s Egalitarian Liberalism
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Jamie Buckland
Abstract
This article examines G. A. Cohen’s endorsement of a hybrid ethical theory and its relationship to his critique of John Rawls’s egalitarian liberalism. Cohen claimed that Rawls’s appeal to special incentives was a distortion of his own difference principle. I argue that Cohen’s acceptance of a personal prerogative (the central element of Samuel Scheffler’s version of a hybrid ethical theory) has several untoward consequences. First, it illuminates how any reasonable challenge to Rawls’s liberalism must recognise Thomas Nagel’s arguments concerning the problems that arise when one attempts to implement a political theory analogous to a hybrid theory of ethics. Second, it undermines Cohen’s critique of Rawls. Third, it undermines the plausibility of Cohen’s ethos-driven social egalitarianism. The article concludes that, despite Nagel’s concerns, the most plausible form of egalitarianism—one that can accommodate the requirements of a hybrid ethical theory—will be Rawlsian, rather than Cohen’s ethos-based system.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Alan Thomas for helpful discussions and comments on drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Articles
- Hybrid Ethical Theory and Cohen’s Critique of Rawls’s Egalitarian Liberalism
- Ideal Theory and Real Politics: The Politics in Political Liberalism
- Are Radical Realists Hypocrites about Intuition-Dependence?
- The Deliberative Duty and Other Individual Antidiscrimination Duties in the Dating Sphere
- Dimensions of Global Justice in Taxing Multinationals
- Situating the Moral Basis for Secession in Territorial Rights: A Dualist and Nonalienation Account
- Moral Reasoning in the Climate Crisis: A Personal Guide
- Is It Wrong to Benefit from Injustice?
- Self-Respect and the Importance of Basic Liberties
- Why Military Conditioning Violates the Human Dignity of Soldiers
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Articles
- Hybrid Ethical Theory and Cohen’s Critique of Rawls’s Egalitarian Liberalism
- Ideal Theory and Real Politics: The Politics in Political Liberalism
- Are Radical Realists Hypocrites about Intuition-Dependence?
- The Deliberative Duty and Other Individual Antidiscrimination Duties in the Dating Sphere
- Dimensions of Global Justice in Taxing Multinationals
- Situating the Moral Basis for Secession in Territorial Rights: A Dualist and Nonalienation Account
- Moral Reasoning in the Climate Crisis: A Personal Guide
- Is It Wrong to Benefit from Injustice?
- Self-Respect and the Importance of Basic Liberties
- Why Military Conditioning Violates the Human Dignity of Soldiers
