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Institutions and Moral Demandingness

  • Jelena Belic ORCID logo EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 7. März 2022

Abstract

How much should we sacrifice for the sake of others? While some argue in favour of significant sacrifices, others contend that morality cannot demand too much from individuals. Recently, the debate has taken a new turn by focusing on moral demands under non-ideal conditions in which the essential interests of many people are set back. Under such conditions, in some views, moral theories must require extreme moral demands as anything less is incompatible with equal consideration of everyone’s interests. The insistence on the extremeness of moral demands, however, presupposes a simplistic account of non-ideal conditions as characterized mainly by the non-compliance of many individuals. Non-ideal conditions are also characterized by institutional non-compliance, whereby institutions often do not do what they ought to do. Institutional non-compliance is significant as it increases the size of moral demands significantly, thereby exacerbating the conflict between these demands and the self-interest of individuals subjected to these institutions. I argue that individuals have a meta-interest in not experiencing such internal conflicts as these can undermine their affirmation of self-respect. Meta-interest can be advanced by adopting the promotion of just institutions as an ultimate aim, as such institutions lessen the conflict and, accordingly, enable us to live more harmonious lives. Moreover, the promotion of just institutions allows us to affirm our sense of self-respect under non-ideal conditions too. Because the promotion of just institutions is in our self-interest, this is not an extreme but a moderate moral demand.


Corresponding author: Jelena Belic, Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, Turfmarkt 99 2511 DP The Hague, Netherlands, E-mail:

Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to Brian Berkey, Stephanie Collins, Viktor Ivankovic, Yuliya Kanygina, Janos Kis, Dragan Kuljanin, Tim Meijers, Tom Theuns, participants of the Demandingness in Practice Workshop at the University of Munster, and members of CEU POLEMO research group, as well as two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on previous versions of this article. I would also like to thank Marius Jakstas and Thomas Rooney for their stylistic comments and copy-editing.

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Published Online: 2022-03-07
Published in Print: 2023-04-25

© 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Heruntergeladen am 9.9.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/mopp-2019-0012/pdf
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