Abstract
Playing a bargaining game, the players with non-conforming expectations were trying to enlarge their share of a sugar-pie. The first player, who was not very keen on sweets, placed an emphasis on quality. In contrast, for the second player, all sweet options, whatever they might be, were open. Thus, this paper aims to determine the negotiating power of the first player, if equal division of the pie was desirable, i. e., both players aimed to get 1/2 of the available sweets.
Published Online: 2014-5-19
Published in Print: 2014-8-30
©2014 Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
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Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
Game theory;
bargaining power;
non-conforming expectations