Abstract
Two major types of quotation theories can be distinguished according to whether they regard marks of quotation as necessary (type-1) or not necessary (type-2) for quotation. I argue that taken at face value, the empirical evidence disqualifies type-1 theories. I then show that even if we accept that surface appearances can be deceptive – ‘unmarked’ quotations are simply not quotations, or absent marks are underlain by marks in hidden syntactic structure – type-1 theories still prove inadequate. By contrast, a particular form of type-2 theory, depiction theory, is consistent with the empirical evidence, proves compatible with syntactic analyses that posit a covert quotative operator, and is equipped to account for the grammatically deviant behavior of certain categories of quotations.
1 Introduction
To some readers, the optionality of marks of quotation in the production of quotations will come across as trivial.[1] After all, most of us will be familiar with written examples that are not signaled by any special marking, not to mention quotation in the oral medium. A moment’s reflection will bolster this initial impression. All languages have the ability to talk about themselves (‘Reflexivity’, cf. Hockett 1966: 13; Lucy 1993: 11; Lyons 1977: 5). Ever since human languages have existed – tens of thousands of years – speakers must have been able to quote words, or each other. We don’t and won’t ever know if they marked this in intonation. One thing we do know is that only about 5,000 years after the advent of writing did a more or less systematic marking of quotation get established (Finnegan 2011: 93; McKerrow 1927: 316–317; Parkes 1992: 59). Wouldn’t it be odd for something that took so long to become conventional to be necessary for quoting? Factor in the fact that a goodly number of the world’s languages remain exclusively spoken, and you may be very reluctant to take seriously the claim that there is no quotation without quotation marks, in other words the ‘Necessity Claim’.[2] (See also Johnson 2017: 288)
There is more. The ‘diplē’, the ancestor to the various shapes of quotation marks in English, French, German, etc., originally a sort of ‘>’ in the margin of manuscripts, was long used “to draw attention to something noteworthy and to separate it from the rest of the text” (Parkes 1992: 12). It subsequently acquired a specialized function, that of indicating the testimony of Scripture (Parkes 1992: 58). When ‘comma marks’ were first introduced into printing in the early 16th c., they served both functions. In English, until the 16th c., quotation, in the sense of direct discourse reports – utterances attributed to speakers – was marked not typographically but lexically, by reporting verbs (Moore 2015). Until the end of the 16th c., the comma marks remained in the margin, only loosely identifying the beginning and end of quoted passages. To cut a long story short,[3] quotation marks were long used unsystematically for distinct purposes, and ordinary quotation long remained unmarked. As Olsen (2008: 99) puts it, this casts “doubt on any program that seeks to discover the uniquely correct theory of how quotation marks work”. To which he adds that none of the authors mentioned above alludes to “the use of quotation marks for the purpose of mentioning expressions”, namely the use of quotation marks that is regarded as central or primary by philosophers of language.
Case closed? No. Compelling though the historical evidence may seem, many writers take the Necessity Claim for granted. Thus, Cappelen and Lepore (2007: 36) write, “Are quotation marks necessary for quotation? You might have thought the answer is obviously, if not definitionally, ‘yes’.” This is a striking statement to make in the light of the previous paragraphs, yet one that is widely accepted by the philosophers of language who have done most of the job of theorizing quotation.
The present article attempts to make sense of this clash between two vigorously opposed viewpoints. To that end, it will be convenient to categorize theories of quotation in terms of the role that they ascribe to marks of quotation. What I’ll call ‘type-1’ theories, which are dominant in at least the analytic-philosophical and formal-semantic literature on quotation, take marks, usually understood as pairs of single or double inverted commas, to be essential to the generation of quotation: a quotation exists as a consequence of the presence of those marks.
All adherents to the so-called ‘Name’, ‘Demonstrative’ and ‘Disquotational’ theories of quotation must be type-1 theorists.[4] The Name theorists (e.g., Gómez-Torrente 2005, 2017; Quine 1940; Tarski 1983 [1933]) endorse the Necessity Claim because they define quotations as names made up of a left quote followed by the interior[5] of the quotation marks followed by a right quote.[6] The Demonstrative theorists (e.g., Benbaji 2005; Cappelen and Lepore 1997, 2005; Davidson 1979; García-Carpintero 2004, 2017; Predelli, 2008) do so because they assume that quotation marks are the part of the quotation that ‘does the referring’, hence ensures that quotations refer metalinguistically. The Disquotationalists (e.g., Cappelen and Lepore 2007; Pagin and Westerståhl 2010) endorse the Necessity Claim because they propose a syntactic rule that turns “any well-formed expression into a complex expression referring to that expression by putting quotation marks around it” (Maier 2014b: 628). Finally, there are authors who, although not fitting easily within the above groups, are none the less adherents of type-1 theories, albeit implicitly, e.g., Geurts and Maier (2005) and Maier (2014a, 2014b).
By contrast, while ‘type-2’ theories do not usually deny that marks of quotation have a specific semantics, they take them to be mere ‘disambiguators’, i.e., conventional but optional ways of signaling a quotation. Theories of that kind have been defended by writers with a pronounced pragmatic bent, including Saka (1998, 2005,[7] Salkie (2016), ‘Identity’ theorists like Washington (1992), and a few that can be grouped under the ‘Depiction’ heading: Clark and Gerrig (1990), Clark (1996, 2016, Recanati (2000, 2001, and De Brabanter (2017a).
Let us briefly consider a pair of examples to set the scene.
‘Boston’ is disyllabic.[8] |
Boston is disyllabic. |
(Quine 1940: 23) |
With respect to (1), type-1 and type-2 theories agree that a quotation occurs in subject position but disagree as to what brings the quotation about. Type-1 theories have an easy ride, as they ascribe that role to the marks of quotation. Type-2 theories, which argue that the marks merely help the reader work out that Boston is quoted, are accountable for providing a distinct account (see ‘recruitment’ in Section 2). As regards (2), it is type-2 theories that are in a more comfortable situation since whatever explanation they supplied for the quotation in (1) will also hold in this instance. Type-1 theorists, on the other hand, must either say that (2) involves no quotation and is therefore false, or provide evidence that marks are present at a non-superficial level of structure.
This first glance at the data shows that each type of theory may have its strengths and weaknesses. In this article, I will argue in favor of type-2 theories. To that end, I start by sketching my preferred type-2 theory, ‘Depiction’ theory, and briefly characterize different uses of quotation (Section 2). I then see if there is empirical data supporting type-2 theories. In Section 3, I look at the data relevant to the (non-)realization of marks of quotation in writing. In Section 4, I do the same for speech. By that time, it will have become quite clear that the Necessity Claim cannot be taken literally. In Section 5, I evaluate what I identify as type-1 theorists’ two main responses to the many examples of unmarked quotations: (i) denying that they are literally quotations and appealing to pragmatic repair to obtain the quotational interpretation, and (ii) postulating an underlying quotative operator often but not always realized by marks of quotation. I conclude that neither alternative rescues the Necessity Claim. In Section 6, I sketch how the Depiction theory can handle the challenges raised by the grammatical effects of the presence of quotations in sentences. A conclusion follows in Section 7.
2 The ‘Depiction’ theory
According to the Depiction theory, quotation belongs with a different category of communicative acts than most linguistic acts. Prototypically, linguistic acts depend on conventions pairing forms with meanings. Quotations, on the other hand, mean ‘pictorially’; they are what Peirce called ‘icons’, viz. signs which signify through selective resemblance, not convention (see Clark 1996, 2016; Clark and Gerrig 1990; De Brabanter 2017a).
Iconic communicative acts, or ‘demonstrations (Clark and Gerrig 1990), are characterized by two core properties: their selective resemblance to their demonstratum and their ‘nonseriousness’ (Clark and Gerrig 1990). Besides, demonstrations are not necessarily linguistic. Witness (3):
I got out of the car, and I just [ demonstration of turning around and bumping his head on an invisible telephone pole ]. |
(Clark and Gerrig 1990: 782) |
The part between square brackets describes an act performed in a conversation. That act succeeds in communicating a content through partial likeness to the action it depicts, but it is not that action, hence the second core property of being nonserious. Quotation works the same way.
All quotations share these core properties of meaning iconically and being nonserious. But they can interact differently with conventional linguistic acts. Either the quotation is not embedded within a syntactic frame or it is so embedded. Typical instances of pure quotation (PQ, as in (1) and (2)) and of direct discourse reports (DD), as in (4), are of the latter kind. When a quotation is not embedded but concurrent with part of a linguistic act, as in (5), it is ‘hybrid’.
John keeps crying and saying ‘Nobody likes me’ . |
(Recanati 2001: 649) |
The president differentiated militant groups from the “billion Muslims who reject their ideology” . |
(The Guardian online, 19 Feb 2015) |
Due to the particular issues it was addressing and its exclusive focus on written language, the philosophical literature has treated (1), marked embedded pure quotation, as being the basic type of quotation. However, as argued by Recanati (2001), those cases are not basic, as they additionally undergo the process of being ‘linguistically recruited’ (2001: 649). Linguistic recruitment, which can be understood as “coercion of the quotation into functioning as a syntactic constituent”, is not a defining characteristic of quotation. It is just that extra box that is ticked by cases like (1), (2) and (4).[9] Appreciate too that what is recruited linguistically is not a string of words but the very communicative act of quoting (de Vries 2008: 26; Recanati 2001). I return to this point in Section 6.
The deeply pragmatic account just sketched does not deny a role to marks of quotation. As a type-2 theory, the Depiction account has it that they are disambiguators. That function stems from their semantics: marks of quotation conventionally mean that the token-string within the marks is displayed (presented with the intention of drawing the addressee’s attention to it) in order to demonstrate certain aspects of that which it targets, e.g., John’s actual utterances of Nobody likes me in the original utterance situation. (See Recanati 2001: 639–647 for details)
The absence of marks does not prevent quotation from occurring, because quoting is performed by a quoter, not by some morpheme.[10] What the quoter will do is rely on contextual factors to ensure that the unmarked quotation is identified as such by the addressee. Those contextual factors can be linguistic (e.g., a metalinguistic predicate as in (2)) or not (e.g., coherence with other viewpoints expressed by the speaker; genre – e.g., academic or news writing requires much more systematic use of marks of quotation than informal writing or conversation).
Note that what the Depiction theory assumes about the role of marks has its analogue in Speech Act Theory. For example, the indicative mood is particularly expedient when making statements, and the imperative mood when issuing directives. But, as has been persuasively argued notably by Kissine (2013: esp. 112–118), the performance of traditional speech acts does not require these particular forms. Analogously, neither does the production of a quotation necessitate the use of quotation marks.
2.1 A note on hybrid quotation
Because the label is not widely used, hybrid quotation (henceforth HQ) deserves a quick introduction. The label is derived from Recanati’s terminology and is intended to encompass ‘mixed quotation’ (e.g., Cappelen and Lepore 1997) and ‘scare quoting’ (e.g., McCullagh 2017) but also a range of instances that do not readily fall under either of these categories (see De Brabanter 2017a: 238).
The best way to make plain the difference between hybrid quotation and embedded quotation is to focus on grammar. Let us start with embedded cases. The typical instances of DD in (6) and PQ in (7) have been recruited as NPs in clause structure. They are replaceable by a non-quotational NP like, e.g., that.
DD: And then Kim said, “Quite red, that one!” . (invented example) |
PQ: ‘In a minute’ is not an adverb. (invented) |
The internal syntactic structure of the quotations is segregated from their surroundings: never mind that the quoted string in (6) is a sequence of an AdjP and an NP. The complement of said is not generated via a phrase-structure rule like VP ⇒ V AdjP NP. Remember that what has been recruited is the communicative act, not a string of words. Semantically, the quotation refers to Kim’s speech act, not to some object that is quite red. Likewise with (7): syntactically, it is not generated by a rule that states that PPs can be subjects; semantically, it is about a certain grammatical structure, not a time interval. Note further that strings instantiating just any syntactic structure (or no structure at all, e.g., She the with me six) can occur as recruited quotations, without altering the grammaticality of the host sentence, witness (8) and (9):
DD: And then Kim said, “She the with me six” . At least that’s what I thought I heard. (invented) |
PQ: ‘She the with me six’ is not a well-formed English sentence. |
(invented) |
Just the opposite can be observed with HQs, as they involve strings of words whose internal structure is part and parcel of the host structure. Consider (5) again, in which the nominal[11] billion Muslims who reject their ideology is quoted at the same time as it functions normally as the head of the NP the billion Muslims who reject their ideology: you could not substitute an NP or AdvP or VP or finite clause for that nominal without making the host structure ungrammatical. Similarly with (10): nothing else than a ditransitive verb could fit into the boldfaced slot.
Gary hounded her for the $4.96 that she still “owed” him for six six-inch bolts, and she countered by asking, “Is that a new watch?” |
(Jonathan Franzen, The Corrections, 648) |
This different grammatical behavior of HQs is a direct consequence of their not being recruited syntactically. Another consequence is that removing the quotational dimension does not result in unacceptability, and that the resulting sentence expresses a proposition that is meant by the speaker. That is because in HQ a quotation is superimposed on a structure that is already viable without.[12] Compare this to what normally happens with recruited quotation: remove the quotational dimension from (6)–(7), and even more strikingly (8)–(9), and you end up with unacceptable strings of words.
3 Empirical observations I: writing
I now turn to presenting evidence that writers and speakers do not mark quotation systematically.[13]
3.1 Pure and direct quotation
I start with cases where it is uncontroversial that we are dealing with a quoted string of words, namely PQ and DD. In those, quotations are purely metalinguistic or metadiscursive. i.e., they refer to linguistic material, be it abstract lexemes or concrete utterances.
First, let me point out that the absence of marking is not carelessness. It is encountered not just in informal genres, such as text messages:
I want daggardly to be a word, whatever it means. |
(personal corpus) |
It is also widely observed in carefully edited writing. (12)–(13) and (14)–(15) are examples of DD and PQ, respectively, that occurred in fiction.[14]
He still thought Ashley was a boy’s name (wasn’t it from Gone With The Wind?), but then if the Watts wanted to call their children Dean and Darren and Ashley , he supposed that was up to them. Could have been Elvis and Tarquin and Marilyn . |
(Russell Banks, The Crow Road) |
He leads me through a side door and down into what some homes call a basement, but this one has a theater room and wine cellar, so we need to find a new term. Lower level , maybe? (Harlan Coben, Don’t Let Go, 2017) |
George poked Winnie in the cheek and she groaned and tried to roll away from him […], a reluctant smile tugging at one corner of her mouth. George said see, she can move, look, she can move when she wants to . |
(Denise Mina, Resolution) |
But Shaw was the worse of the two. Hunger in Russia? He had asked rhetorically. Nonsense, I’ve been fed as well as anywhere in the world . And it was he who said, ‘You won’t frighten me with the word “dictator”.’ |
(Julian Barnes, The Noise of Time, 107) |
In (12), being a boy’s name denotes a property that can only be ascribed to a linguistic entity, not a person. Similarly with the other boldfaced words. In (13), the non-embedded Lower level is introduced as a ‘new term’; it must therefore stand for a linguistic entity, not a floor in a building. In (14), the complement of said is an unmarked embedded DD report. Use of the imperatives see and look and of the present tense demonstrates that it cannot be an indirect discourse (ID) report. The boldfaced strings in (15) are instances of non-embedded DD. They ‘voice’ a character different from the narrator. Note that the author cannot be suspected of quote-mark avoidance since he marks both the embedded DD that follows and the PQ contained in it.
Quotations in all relevant respects similar to the unmarked quotations in (12)–(15) can also occur with quotation marks, without a meaning difference. I take this to be uncontroversial with respect to DD (cf. the embedded DD that occurs in (14) and in (15)). I also take it that quote-marking lower level is unproblematic and would not affect its interpretation in (13). What of the quotations that occur as predicative complements of call in (12)? Corpus evidence shows that those complements tend not to be quote marked, notably when the quoted material is a proper noun. Still, there exist straightforward quote-marked occurrences of names as predicative complements of call, strongly hinting that the absence-presence of marks makes no semantic difference.[15] Consider (16) and, strikingly, (17):
Mrs. Clinton stood at a customized lectern designed to minimize the ten-inch height discrepancy between the rivals. She called him “Donald” from the start. He asked if he could call her “Secretary Clinton” . |
(http://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/clinton-rattles-racist-trump-in-heated-first-debate-2prbb3zj5) |
I went through a six-month stretch of being searched by the same middle-aged Sikh guy. I instinctively started calling him Uncle , as is the custom for Asian elders. He started calling me “beta” , or son, as he went through my luggage apologetically. (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/15/riz-ahmed-typecast-as-a-terrorist) |
Example (17) is particularly illuminating. Both occurrences of calling are semantically indistinguishable, yet one is marked while the other is not. (Beta is both quote-marked and italicized in the original example.) It may be that the journalist made the pragmatic decision to (double-)mark it because a foreign word was quoted.
3.2 Hybrid quotation
So far I have shown that PQ and DD can occur with or without marks of quotation with no difference in meaning. But can HQ also occur unmarked? Again, most accounts of HQ take for granted that the marks are necessary (Benbaji 2005; García-Carpintero 2005; Geurts and Maier 2005; Maier 2014a). The data initially seem compelling:
The question, Shepard Smith said on Fox last week, is “if there is really a way to put a hold on ” those who might run amok |
(www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/opinion/14rich.html) |
Neither in (18) nor in previous examples like (5) or (10) is it likely that a reader would detect the quotations in the absence of any marking. It is therefore legitimate to ask if certain types of written quotation are necessarily marked.
I argued in Section 2 that there are good grounds for regarding quotation as one and the same phenomenon in PQ, DD or HQ. That view is threatened if unmarked HQs do not exist. Below, I adduce two types of evidence that they do. The first consists of allusions to well-known sayings in English (see De Brabanter 2013: 140–141), the second of unmarked ‘intrusions’ of a reported speaker’s perspective, typically but not exclusively into ID reports.
In (19) and (20), the boldfaced strings echo a poem and a saying, respectively. Those are ‘others’ words’, to use Benbaji’s (2005) apt phrase, and are expected to be recognized as such by the reader.
So ended the attempts of these poor, yearning, tired huddled masses to gain asylum in the US. |
(New Statesman, 17/01/2000, 16) |
BPM files weren’t of good quality, and, since beauty is in the eye of the beholder , I’ve pulled out some of the screens that I like. |
(BNC) |
The boldfaced NP in (19) refers to a group of Haitians who tried to enter U.S. territory clandestinely. It is also intended to be recognized as an echo of the Emma Lazarus poem inscribed on the base of the Statue of Liberty.[16] In (20), even without any signaling, the proverb beauty is in the eye of the beholder is sufficiently well-known to be widely identified as an echoic HQ.
Some usage manuals actually advocate not marking echoic allusions. Thus, in a discussion of indirect discourse, Strunk and White (2000: 37) write:
Proverbial expressions and familiar phrases of literary origin require no quotation marks.
These are the times that try men’s souls.
He lives far from the madding crowd.
Target readers of these examples would be expected to recognize the first example as a Thomas Paine quotation. The second quotes the title of Thomas Hardy’s novel Far from the madding crowd. Both quotations are hybrid in the sense that their meaning-without-quotation is meant by their putative utterer.[17]
The second kind of evidence relevant here is found typically in those frequent instances of ID that stray from the canonical template. Canonically, ID presents an utterance or thought entirely from the reporter’s perspective (Evans 2013: 68). The examples below contain words or phrases that are intended to be understood as being the source speaker’s, not the narrator’s (here, narrator = reporter). We should therefore analyze them as quotational superimpositions on ID, one of the forms that HQ can take.
Toner announced to the gathered crowd that the day he took a drink from a bit of Scottish cunt was the day he’d fucking retire. |
(Denise Mina, Exile, 2000) |
Out in the street, two gangs of tired ten-year-olds were fighting about a football. A mum hung out of a window, calling someone in for bed and telling them to learn to fucking behave, for fuck’s sake . |
(Denise Mina, Resolution, 2001) |
In (21), the taboo phrases are not the narrator’s, as is unmistakably noticed by the reader, who is by now familiar with the narrator. They are demonstrations of Toner’s words, designed to provide indirect information on that character. A similar analysis applies to (22).
Comparable examples can occur even outside ID. In the following – taken from online readers’ comments on a Guardian article (https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/mar/29/grammar-pedant-personality-type) which used the spelling extravert instead of the more frequent extrovert – reader Edgeley pokes fun at the grammar pedants who complain about the unusual spelling, indirectly reminding them that the term was originally coined with an a not an o:
Extravert is a better spelling than the “correct” extrovert. The latter seems to have been extrovagantly changed from its original. [18] |
The word extrovagantly is both used to mean what extravagantly normally means and ‘displayed for depictive purposes’: the quoter conspicuously uses the spelling with o as an echo to the grammar pedants’ preferred spelling of extrovert. The point of the demonstration is to gently mock the pedants.
3.3 Intermediate conclusion
Section 3 has shown that all uses of quotation (PQ, DD, HQ) can occur with or without marks of quotation. It must be conceded that there is a preference for not omitting marks in HQ. A tentative explanation is that a non-recruited quotation is less conspicuous than a recruited one. Hence, it would be unwarranted, when the words quoted are not obviously not the writer’s, to expect a reader to recognize a depictive intention behind those words without the help of any marking.
4 Empirical observations II: speech
Many writers on quotation assume that there is no oral parallel to marks of quotation (Washington 1992: 588; Saka 1998: 118–119, and especially 2011b; Wertheimer 1999: 515; Johnson 2017: 288). This includes diehard defenders of the view that written quotations require marks (e.g., Cappelen and Lepore 1997: 431, fn 5).
What are the empirical facts? The relevant literature is concerned with two main questions:
Whether in spontaneous oral production there is a systematic counterpart to conventionalized marks of quotation;
Whether overt marks are realized acoustically in reading.
I start with the more fundamental question (a).
4.1 Systematic prosodic counterpart to written marks?
There have been two main approaches to this question: conversation-analytic (CA) and, for lack of a better word, acoustic. Since the vast majority of the relevant studies focused exclusively on DD, this section does not address PQ or HQ.
The CA studies focus mainly on the distinctions between DD and ID, and between DD and narrative. The findings are that variable prosodic means are used to signal quotation (Bolden 2004; Günthner 1999; Sams 2010). The following is a list of signals identified in various studies:
breathy voice;
high pitch;
slower delivery;
faster delivery;
combination of breathy voice and low pitch;
combination of low pitch and slower delivery;
combination of breathy voice and slower delivery;
combination of higher pitch and louder volume;
combination of creaky voice and lower pitch.
Next to this array of signals, several core functions of prosodic marking are identified too, not all of them the kinds of meanings that supporters of the Necessity Claim ascribe to marks of quotation:
demarcating DD from surrounding narrative (Bolden 2004; Günthner 1999);
animating different characters and ‘tracking’ them (Günthner 1999; Klewitz and Couper-Kuhlen 1999);
depicting the mental states of a character (Günthner 1999; Sams 2010).
Based on the rich descriptive material collected, the CA studies conclude that prosodic marking is not systematic (Günthner 1999; Klewitz and Couper-Kuhlen 1999; for the offset of reported speech see Bolden 2004; also Biber et al. 1999: 1118–1119).
In sum, although stretches of conversational reported speech are frequently marked prosodically, it would be an overstatement to claim that prosodic marking is used systematically as a sign of reported speech in talk the way quotation marks are in texts. For one, not only direct but also ‘indirect’ reported speech is often prosodically marked. Moreover, oral quotations may be cued as such by virtue of being prosodically unmarked if they are embedded in a prosodically marked environment. And more importantly, quotations in speech may not receive any kind of special prosodic formatting at all. (Klewitz and Couper-Kuhlen 1999: 473)
As for the acoustic analyses, most are conducted within an NLP framework. A general observation about meanings that are marked prosodically is that speakers are not constrained to use prosodic marking. When they do, several means appear to be available and used (Collier et al. 1993; Hirschberg 1999). Different studies identify different such means. In some, pitch range and/or pitch reset are singled out as significantly marking DD boundaries (Hanote 2015; Jansen et al. 2001; Oliveira and Cunha 2004). Some studies also highlight intonational phrase breaks as marking boundaries (Hanote 2015; Jansen et al. 2001). Elsewhere, Bertrand and Espesser (2002) also propose that Pitch (F0) significantly marks DD containing self-quotations (but Jansen et al. 2001 disagree). Finally, Hanote (2015) points out that there are major differences in terms of prosodic marking according to the position of the reporting frame – initial, medial, final.
All in all, even though all studies find that there is some marking at least some of the time, the evidence remains inconclusive. First, although some analyses report significant effects of certain prosodic factors on the distinction between DD and ID/narration, these significant effects never amount to systematic marking; hence they provide insufficient support for the Necessity Claim. Second, the considerable variation in the means used to signal quotation does not support the hypothesis that a single morpheme/operator, realized prosodically, is responsible for generating quotation in speech.
4.2 Oral realization of written marks?
The inconclusive results reported in the previous section nonetheless leave open the possibility that readers are sensitive to the presence/absence of marks of quotation. In a recent article, Schlechtweg and Härtl (2020) investigated the potential acoustic correlates of marks in two different contexts, ‘name-informing’ as in (24), and ‘non-name-informing’ as in (25). They recorded their subjects reading short discourses like:
Diese Blütenknospen werden in Essig oder Öl eingelegt. Man nennt sie Kapern / „Kapern“ in vielen Regionen. |
‘These flower buds are pickled in vinegar or oil. One calls them (‘)capers(’) in many regions’ |
Diese Blütenknospen werden in Essig oder Öl eingelegt. Man kennt die Kapern / „Kapern“ in vielen Regionen. |
‘These flower buds are pickled in vinegar or oil. One knows the (‘)capers(’) in many regions.’ |
One of their key findings is that “nouns highlighted with quotation marks are pronounced differently from the same nouns without quotation marks” (2020: 15). In other words, marks of quotation have acoustic correlates. This means that readers perceive quotation marks as “linguistically relevant markers” (2020: 22). Still, Schlechtweg and Härtl also found that “[c]rucially, in quotational contexts in which the target item is not embraced by quotation marks an acoustic correlate was not found” (2020: 22–23). In other words, in name-informing contexts, in which a lexical item already invites a quotational reading (nennt in (24)), there are no significant prosodic differences between the quote-marked and unmarked conditions, suggesting that the presence of a predicate like nennen is enough for the identification of quotation. This leads the authors to conclude that their results are “not compatible with approaches that implement quotation marks and their acoustic equivalents as an essential part of a quotational construction and its semantic compositional representation” (2020: 22).
4.3 Taking stock
The data reviewed in Sections 3 and 4 are inconsistent with the view that marks of quotation are mandatory. This confirms the skepticism that arose from the brief outline of the history of marks of quotation in the Introduction.
All the same, I don’t think the case is closed. It makes sense to speculate that type-1 theorists have something else in mind than a literal claim. Incidentally, that does make one wonder why the question of the actual import of the Necessity Claim is not more often tackled head-on. Its proponents might argue that what I have called unmarked quotations are only apparent counterexamples. One reason might be that those unmarked quotations are not, in fact, quotations. In that case, they can be simply dismissed as irrelevant. Another reason might be that there is more to unmarked quotation than meets the eye: though not visible or audible, marks of quotation ‘are there’ in the underlying structure. Both of these responses are examined in Section 5.
But before we proceed to this discussion, I need to consider another possibility. Some writers might submit that the Necessity Claim is valid for only some kinds of quotation, or for some definitions of quotation. Thus, Cappelen and Lepore seem ready to accept that separate theories are needed for written and spoken quotations: “In reply to [the claim that in spoken language, no obvious correlates of quotation marks exist], we will reject the idea that a theory of quotation should accommodate utterances in which there genuinely are no quotation marks […]. We’re interested in theories for sentences that contain the syntactic devices [left and right inverted commas]; other sentences aren’t our concern in this study of quotation” (2007: 13). There is a prescriptive strand in some type-1 theories of quotation that deserves careful consideration.[19] Still, type-1 theorists have usually presented their proposals as ‘theories of quotation’, thus making it legitimate for me to regard them as descriptive accounts of an empirical phenomenon. That is how I will continue treating them in what follows.
5 Are counterexamples only apparent?
The empirical data for unmarked quotation constitute counterexamples to the Necessity Claim only if we endorse these two assumptions: First, that these unmarked instances were well and truly quotations. Second, that absence of marking in surface structure is to be taken at face value: if there is no phonetic or prosodic or orthographic marking, there are no marks of quotation.
As said above, each assumption has been challenged. I start with those who have denied that there actually exist unmarked quotations. I then move on to the suggestions that marks of quotation are there even when unheard and unseen. Some writers hold both views, albeit for distinct categories of cases. Cappelen and Lepore (2007) are a case in point.
5.1 Pragmatic repair of false statements
Though promoting distinct theories of quotation, several scholars have claimed that utterances like (26) and (27) are false (Cappelen and Lepore 2007: 42–43; García-Carpintero 2004: 677; Gómez-Torrente 2001: 130; Quine 1940: 23) because they predicate a linguistic property of a city and a person, respectively.
Boston is disyllabic. |
Donald is Davidson’s name. |
Both Gómez-Torrente and García-Carpintero (see also Cappelen and Lepore 2007; Harth 2011: 203) none the less acknowledge that these utterances can succeed in making statements about the words Boston and Donald, via a mechanism of pragmatic repair. Gómez-Torrente appeals to speaker’s reference (vs. the semantic reference that makes (26) and (27) false), while García-Carpintero writes that these examples involve flouts of Grice’s first maxim of Quality which trigger conversational implicatures with the intended metalinguistic meaning.
Though initially attractive, these suggestions are marred by a major flaw. The pragmatic repair described assumes that the writers who produced (26) and (27) intended for it to be manifest to the reader that they were literally false. Let us focus for a moment on García-Carpintero’s proposed solution. Within a Gricean framework, there are no accidental implicatures: a conversational implicature is a proposition the utterer means. Accordingly, one should assume that metalinguistic statements that are not marked for quotation are produced in circumstances where reliance on conversational implicatures are apt, while quote-marked ones are produced in circumstances in which literality is required, and likewise for reliance on speaker’s versus semantic reference. In other words, if Gómez-Torrente and García-Carpintero are right, writers who produce (26) and (27) are happy to omit marks because they consciously rely on readers’ ability to make the right inferences.
There’s the rub. In their own writings, those very writers alternately produce marked and unmarked quotations in relevantly similar contexts. Below, I include additional examples by Cappelen and Lepore, who endorse the pragmatic-repair story for some unmarked cases. I hasten to add that Gómez-Torrente and García-Carpintero are amongst the most careful and precise writers that I know. This hints that the vast majority of writers will display the same kind of variation in their usage.
… an account of what Evans called E-type anaphora […]. |
(García-Carpintero 1998: 139) |
… instantiating some abstract patterns called “logical forms” . |
(García-Carpintero 1998: 542) |
A quotation-mark name is, in Tarski’s terminology, what we have been calling a quotation . |
(Gómez-Torrente 2001: 139) |
The expression between the quotation marks in a quotation we will call ‘the quoted expression’ . |
(Gómez-Torrente 2001: 123) |
(what Recanati calls c-content ) |
(Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 63) |
(what we call ‘semantic content’ ) |
(Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 62); |
… they constitute what we might call the total speech-act content of the utterance (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 55) |
Each pair of examples in (28)–(30) presents syntactically and semantically matching environments. We can see each writer sometimes using marks of quotation and sometimes not. There is no indication – given the matching contexts – that this variability signals different intentions on the writer’s part. In particular, there is no reason to believe that in the unmarked cases the writers chose to rely on conversational implicature or on the speaker’s reference for the metalinguistic dimension of their statements to be processed by the readers.
I take these examples to demonstrate that the ‘pragmatic-repair’ accounts are empirically flawed.
5.2 Unrealized quotative operator
Linguists of all stripes admit that there may be aspects of structure that are not explicitly realized. So the question whether quotation marks might ‘be there’ even when they are not seen or heard is one that must be taken seriously. Cappelen and Lepore, for instance, claim that “there are elliptical quotation marks […] for example, if the expression without quotation marks is of the wrong grammatical category” (2007: 41), as in Since is a five-letter word.[20]
Cappelen and Lepore hint at an account according to which marks of quotation are the realization of an underlying functional element that is always there when quotation takes place, in other words, an account that endorses the Necessity Claim. In what follows, I will refer to that putative element of syntax as the ‘quotative operator’, because that is the label under which something like it has most often surfaced in the relevant literature. The understanding is that this operator occurs either overtly (e.g., in the form of inverted commas in writing or a special cluster of prosodic features in speech)[21] or covertly.
Several semanticists have proposed detailed formal accounts of the formation of quotations which take marks of quotation to be that operator. Predelli (2008) has done this for a Demonstrative account of pure quotation. Pagin and Westerståhl (2010: 405) have proposed a mechanism for the generation of pure quotation via a “syntactic operation k that puts quote marks around any expression e, and interprets the result as referring to e”. And Maier has done the same for PQ and HQ (2014a, 2014b). But these syntactic rules simply postulate that it is marks of quotation that do the relevant syntactic work. They make no predictions as to the conditions under which the marks can or cannot be omitted from surface structure, which is what you would expect if those marks are overt realizations of an underlying element.
An analogy is useful in this regard. Consider the functional projection CP (for Complementizer Phrase) and its head C0 in generative syntax. C0 is sometimes realized phonetically, and sometimes not (it then has a ‘null phonetic spell out’). Let us for a moment focus on the (non-)realization of C0 in English declarative content clauses.
When C0 is realized in that environment, it takes the form of the subordinator that (31). When it is not, a ‘null’ complementizer heads the CP (32).
Alex believes that the end is near. |
(invented) |
Alex believes ø the end is near. |
(invented) |
Syntacticians agree that there are conditions under which C0 must be overt, other conditions under which it must be null, and finally conditions under which realization is optional and depends on non-grammatical factors. I give illustrations of the first two cases below. Optionality has just been exemplified by (31) and (32).
That/*ø the end is near is obvious to Alex. |
(invented) |
Who does she think ø/*that is the ringleader? |
(invented) |
(For more on those conditions, see Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 952–954; Radford 2009: 112–114). Note also that, within the Minimalist Program, syntacticians widely assume English declarative main clauses too to be headed by a C0, albeit one that must be null/covert.
The main point is that there are well-defined conditions for the (non-)realization of C0 in finite clauses. The same is true of the (non-)realization of C0 in non-finite clauses, just as it is true of other functional heads (e.g., definite and indefinite articles) that may be overt or null in English. It would therefore have been reasonable to expect the semanticists who champion the Necessity Claim to provide an account of the rules that govern the surface realization or not of the quotative operator. But they don’t. Do syntacticians provide such an account?
There are a number of analyses of (particular types of) quotation within generative syntax, the family of approaches to grammar most likely to postulate null elements. The following overview is based on Collins and Branigan (1997), Collins (1997), Suñer (2000), de Vries (2006, 2008, Haddican and Zweig (2012), and Kluck and de Vries (2015). I take this set of articles to be representative of generative approaches. All of them postulate some quotative operator. It is impossible to go into the details of the different proposals, nor is that called for. It will do to highlight the features most relevant to present purposes.
First, these proposals are not intended to account for quotation in general. Collins and Branigan (1997), Collins (1997), and Suñer (2000) postulate a quotative operator in order to explain the grammar of DD with a reporting frame and especially cases of inversion between subject and verb in the reporting frame of examples like (35)–(36); de Vries (2006, 2008 and Kluck and de Vries (2015) posit a quotative operator only in sentences in which the reporting frame is parenthetical (36)–(37); while Haddican and Zweig’s (2012) proposal concerns quotative be like and its Dutch counterpart hebben zoiets van (literally ‘have such-something of’) (38):
Said Jones, 54: “One of the real struggles is that I was really looking forward to having access to the White House in this administration.” |
(COCA) |
‘This spacecraft is not glamorous,’ said Dr Floor van Leeuwen. |
(BNC) |
‘That idiot Amanda’ , Hortensia said, ‘has let her long hair grow even longer during the hols and her mother has plaited it into pigtails’ . |
(BNC) |
Aaron was like “ Ok, fine” . |
(Haddican and Zweig 2012: 1) |
None of these proposals invokes a quotative operator to explain pure quotation or non-embedded DD, for example. None of them is conceived as a syntactic account of quotation at large.
On all the proposals, the quotative operator is base-generated either as a direct object or an adjunct within the VP of the reporting frame or as a nominal complement of like in Haddican and Zweig (2012). It is explicitly not part of the quotation. That is its raison d’être: it must be able to move without the quotation itself moving. As for the quotation, which supplies the quotative operator with an antecedent, Collins and Branigan (1997: 11–12) and Suñer (2000: 540) agree that it is ‘discourse generated’, i.e., not generated by some lexical element like the reporting verb (or like). These facts throw light on why the syntactic analyses reviewed here could not be extended to all quotations.
It is striking that no mention is made in any of the proposals of any role of marks of quotation in generating the quotation.[22] The quotative operator is never associated to marks of quotation or involved in making predictions about the (non-)occurrence of marks of quotation. For Collins and Branigan, Collins and Suñer, the quotative operator is necessary for feature-checking purposes: some element must move to the specifier position of a higher functional projection, and that element clearly cannot be the DD itself, since it can appear not just in initial position (36), but also in final position (as in most examples of DD so far) or discontinuously (37). For de Vries and Kluck and de Vries, the operator makes it possible to understand how reporting frames in Dutch and German, which seem to have V1 word order, actually instantiate V2, as befits main clauses. For Haddican and Zweig, evidence shows that the DD itself cannot be the complement of like, hence something else must hold its place: the quotative operator.
On all the proposals but one, the quotative operator is always null (in Standard English), quite unlike an operator that could surface as inverted commas. The one exception is found in de Vries (2006) and Kluck and de Vries (2015), who take it that their operator can be realized overtly, as zo in Dutch and so in German:
“Bananen,” (zo) grijnsde/twijfelde/raaskalde Joop, “zijn krom.” |
‘“bananas” so grinned/doubted/raved Joop “are bent”’ (de Vries 2006: 217) |
For Dutch at least, they explain the possible (and actually very frequent) non-realization of the operator as follows: zo is anaphoric to the immediate syntactic context, hence it is a topic. Dutch permits ‘topic drop’, and that is what happens when zo is unrealized (2015: 115–117). This way Kluck and de Vries fulfill the requirement voiced previously that when a functional element can be overt or covert, any proper theory should state the conditions for its non-realization at the surface – a requirement that, to my knowledge, is never met by type-1 theorists. The main point here, however, is that this laudable explicitness of Kluck and de Vries’s account is of no help to type-1 theorists: the (non-)realization of the zo/null operator and the (non-)realization of quotation marks are separate and independent issues.
A last point, again in connection with Kluck and de Vries (2015), is that their zo/null operator is not assumed to be involved only in quotational contexts: it is a feature of ‘comment and reporting parentheticals’ at large, including examples like (40):
Bob is, (zo) vermoed ik, een echte charmeur. |
‘Bob is, (so) I suspect, a real charmer’ |
In other words, it is not exclusively a quotative operator.
The lesson from this scrutiny of the generative analyses of quotation is clear. There is currently no syntactic account that takes marks of quotation to be the overt realization of an abstract operator. In other words, generative analyses provide no support for the Necessity Claim.
5.3 Intermediate conclusion: are unmarked examples just apparent counterexamples?
Type-1 theorists proposed basically two (non mutually exclusive) ways of dealing with unmarked quotations: pragmatic repair and a null quotative operator. I have made a case for the empirical untenability of the repair account. Then, I have shown that the quotative operator postulated by several generative proposals offers no support for the Necessity Claim, for two reasons. First, that operator is not articulated with the presence/absence of quote-marking. The generative analyses start from the observation that there is a quotation (DD) and then posit that a null element is necessary to explain certain grammatical peculiarities of sentences containing DD. The second reason lies in the way the quotation itself is generated: on the generative accounts, it is discourse-generated; on the type-1 theorists’, it is generated syntactically. This is an irreconcilable difference.
To those advocates of the Necessity Claim that might want to object that semanticists and syntacticians are talking about different quotations, the former about PQ (and HQ), the latter about DD, I would respond that most type-1 theorists “make a not unreasonable assumption that [the syntax of sentences containing DD] is pretty much the same as that of pure quotation sentences” (Cappelen and Lepore 2007: 131). This means that the semanticists’ and the syntacticians’ analyses can be compared. And shown to be incompatible in their current state.
There is more. Even if this irreconcilable difference was put right, it is unlikely that a single quotative operator will ever be proposed which would match the range of uses of marks of quotation. We saw in the previous section that only framed DD was linked to a quotative operator. In the studies (co-)authored by de Vries, however, embedded DD was not. And no study suggested that unframed DD would require a quotative operator. PQ is not tackled in the set of studies reviewed above. If a quotative operator was postulated for PQ, it would have to be different from the one for DD. Remember that the latter was base generated as a complement or adjunct to a reporting verb. Such reporting verbs are not normally involved in PQ (though distinct metalinguistic predicates often are).
And then there is the case of HQ. On the theory I defend, sentences with hybrid quotation are just ordinary sentences on a segment of which a quoting act is superimposed (Section 2.1). My contention (contra Maier 2014a, for example) is that these sentences are nothing special from a grammatical point of view, unlike sentences containing recruited quotation. Hence, I see no reason to postulate a quotative operator in an account of their grammar.[23] However, if it turned out that a quotative operator was proposed for HQ too, it would again have to be different from the one for DD and any putative one for PQ. That is because the operator could not be base generated by a reporting verb (which may or may not be there, and which licenses ID when it is) or by a metalinguistic predicate. Another crucial reason is that the putative HQ operator would not be employed to explain any of the grammatical effects associated with framed DD and PQ. As pointed out in Section 2.1, the internal syntactic structure of (embedded) DD and of PQ is segregated from the syntax of the host sentence, leading to all sorts of interesting grammatical consequences. That is not the case with HQ.
Section 6 will briefly sketch how a Depiction theory can account for the grammatical consequences just mentioned. But before getting there, it is useful to see how type-2 theories fare in the light of the generative proposals reviewed in Section 5.2. Surprisingly – maybe – the generative proposals are compatible with type-2 theories, as they (i) make no connection between the quotative operator and marks of quotation, and (ii) assume that quotations are discourse generated, not generated by any syntactic process that encloses strings of words within marks of quotation. They are therefore consistent with the view that marks of quotation are disambiguators. In consequence, type-2 theorists can accept a null quotative operator as the instrument of syntactic recruitment. After all, there are manifest grammatical consequences to recruitment. At the same time, the type-2 theorist is not committed to such an operator. Whether recruitment needs to be captured by such an operator depends on whether the type-2 theorist judges that these grammatical consequences must be traced to an element of linguistic structure or can be explained pragmatically.
6 Does Depiction theory do the job?
In this section, I will consider a sample of three undeniable effects that (recruited) quotations have on grammar. These effects, which a formal linguist would typically seek to explain in structural terms, are often seen by type-1 theorists as buttressing their case for the Necessity Claim. The first one, frequently pointed out in the syntactic or quotation literature, is
the fact that ‘wh-extraction/wh-movement’ out of a recruited quotation is blocked (Hollebrandse 2007; Köder and Maier 2016; Schlenker 2017; Weissenborn et al. 1991), see Example (41).
The other two have been brought up in conversation by linguists or philosophers who were skeptical that the Depiction theory had any way of explaining them other than by recognizing the agency of marks of quotation. They are:
a recruited quotation in subject position in a finite clause forces singular agreement on the verb (42);
the suspension of elision (deletion of a vocalic sound (V) at the end of a word before the V that starts the next word) or of liaison (the sounding of a normally silent consonant at the end of a word, because the next word begins with a V) in French (see Abouda et al. 2020). Elision is exemplified in (43a/b), liaison in (44a/b).
Original: You guys have to tidy up your room. |
Direct Report in the form of an open question: *What did mom say, “You guys have to” ? (from Köder and Maier 2016: 845) |
these cars is a plural expression. (Radford 2009: 473) |
L’animal a été vendu par des braconniers. (invented) |
‘The animal was sold by poachers’ |
Le animal à la troisième ligne a été remplacé par bête. (invented) |
‘The animal on line three has been replaced by bête’ |
Ses animaux [sezanimo] sont bruyants. (invented) |
‘Her/his animals are noisy’ |
Ses “ animal” [seanimal] sont prononcés avec un accent du nord. (invented)[24] |
‘Her/his animals are pronounced with a northern accent. |
(41) and (42) speak for themselves. In (43a) and (43b), the French definite article, which is elided when followed by an ordinary noun, remains pronounced when it precedes a recruited quotation starting with a vowel (Abouda et al. 2020; Rey-Debove 1978: 65–66). In (44a) and (44b), we see that a plural determinative before a noun with initial vowel normally provokes the phonetic realization of the phonological dental fricative /z/. But, Abouda et al. (2020) argue, liaison does not occur before a recruited quotation.
I need to point out that the data for wh-extraction and elision/liaison are messier than the above presentation implies. Weissenborn et al. (1991) and Hollebrandse (2007) show that children aged 3–6 extract out of quotations (in the form of DD). It could be argued that children perform wh-extraction at a non-mature stage of their grammatical development before they have actually acquired quotation. But Hollebrandse (2007) shows that children aged 5–6 extract out of sentences/clauses which they do recognize as quotations. In their grammar at least, there appears to be no barrier to extraction in quotations.
As regards phonological processes in French, Rey-Debove (1978: 66) provides numerous attested examples of elision (and one of liaison) before a PQ. A striking example has a writer who in a single sentence elides an article in front of a quotation and then does not in front of the next.
In spite of these qualifications, the above data have to be accounted for. Key in the Depiction theory’s response is the assumption that the object that is linguistically recruited is not a string of words but a communicative act (Section 2). This act (in this case an iconic one) is of a very different nature than the conventional linguistic environment in which it gets embedded. This is somewhat concealed by the fact that it is typically given concrete form as a linguistic string. But consider that non-linguistic demonstrations can be recruited too, as in our early example (3) or in (45). And that is true of other acts as well, such as the act of ‘placing’ (Clark 2003) in (46). This lends strong support to the claim that it is the act, not the word string, that is recruited.
He gave a [ demonstration of raspberry sound ] to every policeman he saw. |
(Clark and Gerrig 1990: 782) |
Give me some [ places a match on the counter ]. [25] |
(invented) |
I consider (45) and (46) to be English sentences in which a recruited non-linguistic act occupies a syntactic slot.[26] I take it that the choice for a instead of an in (45) is a default choice in favor of the base form of the indefinite article. In (46), I assume that the placing of the match carries neither a number feature nor a countability feature; hence it can be coerced by the syntactic environment to function as a plural nominal, and not as an ungrammatical singular count, as would be expected if the match placed on the counter functioned like the noun match.
I hold that it is the markedly different nature of the recruited act that suspends normal grammatical processes that would be in effect if the syntactic slot were filled by a conventional linguistic string. And this is every bit as true of recruited quotations as of the more outlandish cases in (45) and (46). The communicative acts recruited syntactically carry none of the features (e.g., grammatical, like number, countability, gender; phonological, like starting with a vowel) that the corresponding linguistic constituents normally carry. As a result, they tend to combine with default forms in their syntactic environment: a singular verb when occurring in subject position;[27] and, in French, the full form of the article or determiner without additional consonant (because that is the default form).
Blocking of wh-extraction calls for an explanation in terms of the segregation of the internal syntactic structure of a recruited quotation from the syntax of the host sentence. Postulating an operator that ensures segregation is one way to go. But, again, a pragmatic explanation is available: as it is an act that is recruited, the string of words that gives it its concrete shape is not directly available for syntactic operations.
It remains for me to say a word about the messiness of the data for wh-extraction and elision pointed out earlier. Here, the Depiction theory is not in a more awkward position than a structural account that posits an element of syntax that constitutes a barrier … that is sometimes crossed. My suggestion is that, although it is not a string of words that is recruited, that string remains visible/audible to the speaker-writer: after all it is displayed for depictive purposes. As a result, the speaker-writer may sometimes treat the recruited act as if it was a string of words.
I concede that the above suggestions are far from absolutely conclusive. But what matters is to show that the Depiction theory is not resourceless when it comes to providing plausible and consistent explanations of the deviant grammatical behavior of sentences that contain recruited quotations.
Nor is it resourceless when it comes to accounting for the absence of effects on grammar in hybrid cases: a hybridly quoted subject does not force singular agreement (47), wh-extraction is licensed (48) (Gregoromichelaki 2017: 217; Maier 2014a: 7:13), and, I assume, both elision and liaison would be licensed too, though I can only advance this tentatively as I’m not aware of any study having investigated this.
‘Them’ , as you say, are my two best officers. |
(Hill, Sawmill Springs) |
Who did Mary say that she would “never misunderestimate ever again” ? |
Maier (2014a) |
I have assumed that hybrid quotation is just quotation on top of a linguistic structure that is complete in itself. As such, a sentence that hosts a hybrid quotation is not predicted to display grammatical behavior that deviates from ordinary quotation-free sentences.
7 Conclusion
This article has shown that, contrary to a widespread core assumption of type-1 theories of quotation, quotation can occur unmarked. It has also found that there is currently no work in syntax that supports more nuanced formulations of the Necessity Claim according to which marks of quotation are the typographic (or phonetic) reflex of an underlying syntactic operator which may remain unrealized. The view “that Q-marks do not articulate some unpronounced linguistic element” (Johnson 2017: 288–289) had been asserted before. Here, I have endeavored to build a careful case for it.
In parallel, I have shown that type-2 theories, which endorse the existence of unmarked quotations, are a viable option. One embodiment in particular of type-2 theories, the Depiction theory, has demonstrated its ability to account for the grammatical facts adduced by the type-1 theorist, while simultaneously doing justice to the nature of quotations as demonstrations, i.e., as iconic communicative acts.
A possible criticism of the present study is that it rests on a misunderstanding: perhaps the quotation phenomena that type-1 and type-2 theories investigate are simply not the same. This suggestion – touched upon in Section 4.3 – needs to be taken seriously. Cappelen and Lepore, in their inimitable style, write: “The theory of quotation doesn’t explain all sorts of things. In addition to not explaining quotational usage without quotation marks, it also doesn’t explain why penguins can’t fly or why naked mole rats are blind. It’s not meant to explain this other stuff. It’s a theory about sentences with expressions surrounded by quotation marks. That’s what we have opted to call ‘quotation’, but we’re not wedded to the expression” (2007: 38). Or consider this statement by García-Carpintero: “Like most other philosophers, in spite of having written so much about it, I do not care much about quotation itself. It just happens that it constitutes a sufficiently isolated environment to test general issues of truly fundamental philosophical significance” (2017: 175). Statements like these hint at a reduced interest in the complete set of empirical facts that concern quotation. Quotation, it appears, first has to be defined – i.e., its scope has to be narrowed – and only then can it be investigated. This is a valid attitude towards an object of study, one that may be particularly suitable to philosophy.[28]
Yet, however much one may enjoy Cappelen and Lepore’s zest and should commend García-Carpintero for his blunt honesty, it is a fact that most type-1 theorists have devoted a lot of energy to engaging with (and sometimes thrashing, in Cappelen and Lepore’s case) more empirical approaches like Saka’s or Recanati’s. This must mean that they thought they were in the same business as type-2 theorists. Cappelen and Lepore certainly did. In what may not be the greatest display of internal consistency ever, they stated in the preface to their 2007 book: “Most of all we find the data fascinating and think of this book as an introduction to the subject matter for the uninitiated. It is important to array the data without the ‘noise’ of theory”. You could hardly be more empirically oriented than that.[29] I do not, therefore, think it was unreasonable to assume that the positions of type-1 and type-2 theorists were comparable.
With some gratification, I see some convergence between my work and that of a few formal linguists. This is a welcome development because formal linguists are often unsympathetic to the ‘loose’ analyses of pragmaticists that are unfit for strong predictions. I am thinking especially of the work of Mark de Vries and Kathryn Davidson. De Vries underlines the compatibility between formal syntax and – loose depiction-type! – pragmatics, stating that “a special ‘semantics of the quotation mark’ is no longer necessary. Importantly, the syntactic approach does not exclude a special pragmatics of direct speech” (2008: 46). Davidson, for her part, writes that unlike in proposals that take role-shift to be underlain by a semantic operator “the current analysis purposely offloads much of the iconic work (done through the notion of a demonstration [à la Clark]) to the pragmatic component of the grammar, and by doing so is able to provide a unified treatment of both sign language and spoken language data” (2015: 513). It is probably no accident that these are two researchers who have pointed out the hazards of relying exclusively on written data – which is precisely what most proponents of the Necessity Claim do.
Whatever its merits, I hope the present article will at least have succeeded in making type-1 theorists more aware of the work that needs to be done if they want to articulate a coherent Necessity Claim, and maybe also in giving them a glimpse of the robustness of the motivations that ground type-2 theories.
Funding source: F.R.S.-FNRS
Award Identifier / Grant number: Research Project T.0184.16, 2016-2021
Acknowledgments
I thank the participants of the workshop Expressing the use-mention distinction: An empirical perspective at the 2020 meeting of the DGfS in Hamburg (March 2020), and especially its organizers, Holden Härtl and Marcel Schlechtweg. Two anonymous reviewers are to be commended for their detailed constructive comments. Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the F.R.S.-FNRS research project T.0184.16, 2016–2021, (https://doi.org/10.13039/501100002661).
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Quotation as an interface phenomenon
- Quotation does not need marks of quotation
- Quotational nicknames in German at the interface between syntax, punctuation, and pragmatics
- Quotation marks and the processing of irony in English: evidence from a reading time study
- Angry lions and scared neighbors: Complex demonstrations in sign language role shift at the sign-gesture interface
- Scare quotes as deontic modals
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Quotation as an interface phenomenon
- Quotation does not need marks of quotation
- Quotational nicknames in German at the interface between syntax, punctuation, and pragmatics
- Quotation marks and the processing of irony in English: evidence from a reading time study
- Angry lions and scared neighbors: Complex demonstrations in sign language role shift at the sign-gesture interface
- Scare quotes as deontic modals