Abstract
We study attitudes to legality and the rule of law in Russia through analysis of interviews with legal and business professionals conducted in 2013–14, the high point of the stabilisation of the Russian economy and polity following the transition of the 1990s. The annexation of Crimea occurred during the course of our fieldwork but the effects of the cooling of relations with the west and the introduction of sanctions were yet to be felt. We observed a perception that the administration of civil justice was not uniformly corrupt, but that in ‘political’ cases, that is, those involving state officials or powerful private interests, judicial decisions could in effect be bought and sold. This commodification of civil justice was the result of an empowered but predatory state. While the state was strong enough to engage in predation, however, it was seen as lacking the capacity to manage the economy in an effective way or to deliver essential public goods. We consider the implications of our findings for a conception of the rule of law as an emergent social norm. We conclude that the 1990s policy of weakening the state through privatisation and the removal of regulatory controls, a policy designed to ensure that the command economy did not return, has left Russia with a dysfunctional public order, under which the ‘normality’ envisaged by the reforms of the 1990s is a distant prospect.
Funding source: Economic and Social Research Council
Award Identifier / Grant number: ES/J012491/1
Funding source: NORFACE Network
Award Identifier / Grant number: 462-19-080
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Research funding: This work was funded by the ESRC via its Rising Powers programme (grant (ES/J012491/1) and New Opportunities for Research Funding Agency Cooperation in Europe programme (NORFACE 462-19-082).
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© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Articles
- The Rule of Law as an Emergent Social Norm: Evidence from Qualitative Research in Russia
- Negotiating the Intellectual Property Protocol under the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area: Priorities and Opportunities for Nigeria
- The Rise of Germany in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries and Sustaining Democracy
- The Good Governance Quandary: The Elusive Search for Role Models
- Reviewing the Indonesian Anticorruption Court: A Cost-Effective Analysis
- The Constitutionality of Compulsory Land Acquisition in Vietnam: Issues and Recommendations
- Extractive Constitutions: Constitutional Change and Development Paths in Latin America
- Notes
- On Ramseyer’s Response to the Critics of “Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War”
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Articles
- The Rule of Law as an Emergent Social Norm: Evidence from Qualitative Research in Russia
- Negotiating the Intellectual Property Protocol under the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area: Priorities and Opportunities for Nigeria
- The Rise of Germany in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries and Sustaining Democracy
- The Good Governance Quandary: The Elusive Search for Role Models
- Reviewing the Indonesian Anticorruption Court: A Cost-Effective Analysis
- The Constitutionality of Compulsory Land Acquisition in Vietnam: Issues and Recommendations
- Extractive Constitutions: Constitutional Change and Development Paths in Latin America
- Notes
- On Ramseyer’s Response to the Critics of “Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War”