Vulnerabilities in Kantian Constructivism: Why they Matter for Objective Normativity
-
Susana Cadilha
and
Francisco Lisboa
Abstract
In section 1 we present moral constructivism as a metaphysical project which grounds moral norms in the attitude of valuing by rational agents. In section 2 we establish that Kantian Constructivism – opposed to Humean Constructivism – seeks objective and universal moral norms through a process of rational construction and ratification of norms that does not draw on any kind of subjective attitude of valuing. In section 3 we explore whether Kant is a moral constructivist or moral realist, arguing that he might be read as a proto-moral constructivist whose formulas impose standards of correctness upon our moral judgments, from which we formulate moral norms as necessary facts of reason. In section 4 we argue that: 1) vulnerabilities have moral relevance which adds merit to the project of finding objective moral norms, and 2) the inclusion of vulnerabilities as empirical contingencies is compatible with Kantian Constructivism. We do so by considering vulnerabilities a constitutive aspect of finite rational agents which must, therefore, be implied and considered in the process of moral construction.
Acknowledgments:
This research work is supported by national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., in the context of the celebration of the program contract foreseen in the numbers 4, 5 and 6 of article 23.º of D.L. no. 57/2016 of 29 August, as amended by Law no. 57/2017 of 19 July.
References
All translations are quoted from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (1996) and the quotation rules followed are those established by the Akademie Ausgabe. Kant, Immanuel (1900 ff): Gesammelte Schriften. Hrsg.: Bd. 1 – 22 Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, ab Bd. 24 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin.
Ameriks, Karl (2003): On Two Non-Realist Interpretations of Kant’s Ethics, in: K. Ameriks: Interpreting Kant’s Critiques, Oxford, pp. 263 – 282.10.1093/0199247315.003.0012Search in Google Scholar
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958): Modern Moral Philosophy, in: Philosophy 33(124), pp. 1 – 19.10.1017/S0031819100037943Search in Google Scholar
Bagnoli, C. (2016): Kantian Constructivism and the Moral Problem, in: Philosophia 44, pp. 1229 – 1246.10.1007/s11406-016-9745-4Search in Google Scholar
Bagnoli, Carla (2017): Kant in Metaethics: The Paradox of Moral Autonomy, Solved by Publicity, in: M. Altman (ed.): Kant Handbook, London, pp. 355 – 377.10.1057/978-1-137-54656-2_16Search in Google Scholar
Enoch, David (2009): Can There Be a Global, Interesting, Coherent Constructivism about Practical Reason?, in: Philosophical Explorations 12(3), pp. 319 – 339.10.1080/13869790903067683Search in Google Scholar
Formosa, Paul (2013): Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist?, in: European Journal of Philosophy 21(2), pp. 170 – 196.10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00438.xSearch in Google Scholar
Formosa, Paul (2014): The role of vulnerability in Kantian ethics, in: C. Mackenzie, W. Rogers, S. Dodds (eds.): Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy, New York, pp. 88 – 109.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199316649.003.0004Search in Google Scholar
Guyer, Paul (2006): Kant, London and New York.10.4324/9780203966624Search in Google Scholar
Hussain, Nadeem & Shah, Nishi (2006): Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaard’s Rejection of Realism, in: R. Shafer-Landau (ed.): Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1, Oxford, pp. 265 – 294.10.1093/oso/9780199291885.003.0011Search in Google Scholar
Kleingeld, Pauline (2010): Moral Consciousness and the ‘Fact of Reason’, in: A. Reath, J. Timmermann (eds.): Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, A Critical Guide, Cambridge, pp. 55 – 72.10.1017/CBO9780511770869.005Search in Google Scholar
Korsgaard, Christine (1996): The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge.10.1017/CBO9780511554476Search in Google Scholar
Korsgaard, Christine (1998): Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self: A Reply to Ginsborg, Guyer, and Schneewind, in Ethics 109(1), pp. 49 – 66.10.1086/233873Search in Google Scholar
Korsgaard, Christine (2010): Reflections on The Evolution of Morality, in: The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 5, pp. 1 – 29. https://www.amherstlecture.org/korsgaard2010/korsgaard2010_ALP.pdfSearch in Google Scholar
Langton, Rae (2007): Objective and Unconditioned Value, in: Philosophical Review, 116(2), pp. 157 – 185.10.1215/00318108-2006-034Search in Google Scholar
O’Neill, Onora (1996): Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructivist Account of Practical Reasoning, Cambridge.10.1017/CBO9780511621239Search in Google Scholar
Rawls, John (1980/1999): Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, in: S. Freeman (ed.): Collected Papers, Cambridge, MA, pp. 303 – 358.Search in Google Scholar
Scanlon, T.M. (2014): Being Realistic About Reasons, Oxford.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678488.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Shafer-Landau, Russ (2003): Moral Realism: A Defence, Oxford.10.1093/0199259755.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Street, Sharon (2008): Constructivism about reasons, in: Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3, pp. 207 – 245.Search in Google Scholar
Street, Sharon (2010): What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?, in: Philosophy Compass 5(5), pp. 363 – 384.10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00280.xSearch in Google Scholar
Street, Sharon (2012): Coming to terms with contingency: Humean constructivism about practical reason, in J. Lenman, Y. Shemmer (eds.): Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, Oxford, pp. 40 – 59.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609833.003.0003Search in Google Scholar
Williams, Bernard (1979): Internal and External Reasons, in: R. Harrison (ed.): Rational Action, Cambridge, pp. 101 – 113.Search in Google Scholar
Wood, A. (2008): Kantian Ethics, Cambridge.10.1017/CBO9780511809651Search in Google Scholar
© 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Title pages
- Table of Contents
- Articles
- Vulnerabilities in Kantian Constructivism: Why they Matter for Objective Normativity
- Three Rival Versions of Kantian Constructivism
- Kantian Constructivism and Kantian Constitutivism: Some Reflections
- Re-constructing Kant: Kant’s Teleological Moral Realism
- Kantian Constructivism and the Sources of Normativity
- Topics of the Kant Yearbook 2023, 2024 and 2025
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Title pages
- Table of Contents
- Articles
- Vulnerabilities in Kantian Constructivism: Why they Matter for Objective Normativity
- Three Rival Versions of Kantian Constructivism
- Kantian Constructivism and Kantian Constitutivism: Some Reflections
- Re-constructing Kant: Kant’s Teleological Moral Realism
- Kantian Constructivism and the Sources of Normativity
- Topics of the Kant Yearbook 2023, 2024 and 2025
