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Kantian Constructivism and the Sources of Normativity

  • Janis David Schaab EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 28. September 2022
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Abstract

While it is uncontroversial that Kantian constructivism has implications for normative ethics, its status as a metaethical view has been contested. In this article, I provide a characterisation of metaethical Kantian constructivism that withstands these criticisms. I start by offering a partial defence of Sharon Street’s practical standpoint characterisation. However, I argue that this characterisation, as presented by Street, is ultimately incomplete because it fails to demonstrate that the claims of Kantian constructivism constitute a distinctive contribution to metaethics. I then try to complete the practical standpoint characterisation by elaborating on Christine Korsgaard’s suggestion that metaethical Kantian constructivism takes up a position on the source of morality’s normativity.

Since this paper is partly based on my doctoral research, it would not have materialised without the feedback and support of many people over several years. Perhaps chief among them are Sarah Broadie, Ruth Chang, Rowan Cruft, Stephen Darwall, Olof Leffler, Theron Pummer, Tobias Rosefeldt, Ben Sachs, Thomas Schmidt and Jens Timmermann. For more recent feedback, I would like to thank Michael Gregory, Pauline Kleingeld, Olof Leffler and an anonymous reviewer. In addition, I am grateful to participants of the Colloquium for Practical Philosophy/Ethics at HU Berlin, the conference The Future of Normativity at the University of Kent, and the Graduate Research Seminar at the University of St Andrews. This research was partly funded by grant VC.GW17.059 from the Dutch Research Council (NWO).

References

All translations are quoted from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (1996) and the quotation rules followed are those established by the Akademie Ausgabe. Kant, Immanuel (1900 ff): Gesammelte Schriften. Hrsg.: Bd. 1 – 22 Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, ab Bd. 24 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin.

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Published Online: 2022-09-28

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