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Zur Rolle der Freiheit in Kants (Moral-)Philosophie

  • Georg Geismann EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: September 3, 2020
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Abstract

The focus of this paper is on the concepts of practical and transcendental freedom, their relation to each other, and their role in Kant’s (moral) philosophy. It is argued that there is in this regard neither an inconsistency or contradiction between the Dialectic and the Canon of the first Critique nor a break between the first and the second Critique. The Canon’s claim that we cognize practical freedom through experience must by no means be understood as implying that Kant held a “naturalized” concept of freedom. The paper also reveals the preparatory role of the first Critique with respect to the moral philosophy that Kant, beginning in the Groundwork, presented in the following years.

Published Online: 2020-09-03
Published in Print: 2020-09-01

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