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A Relational Account of Moral Normativity: The Neo-Kantian Notion of We-Subject

  • Roberto Redaelli ORCID logo EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 9. August 2021

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to provide a relational explanation of the sources of moral normativity, within a Neo-Kantian framework. To this purpose, the key notions employed are those of we-society and stance-taking, developed by Neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert. Specifically, by resorting to such notions, the paper attempts to overcome two limits ascribed to the theory of moral normativity of Ch. Korsgaard: namely W. Smith’s objection of solipsism and S. Crowell’s problem of non-deliberate action, whereby Ch. Korsgaard’s identification of the source of normativity in reflection would lead her theory to a form of solipsism and to failing to explain actions based on so-called ‘mindless coping’. In tackling these objections, the paper outlines a Rickertian inspired theory, according to which the sources of moral normativity can be explained on the basis of the heterological I-You relationship, which is the foundation of the we-society intended as a set of values, patterns of expectations, tacit consents, and procedural knowledge.


Corresponding author: Roberto Redaelli, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Schillerstraße 1, 91054 Erlangen, Germany, E-mail:

Acknowledgment

I am grateful to Steven Crowell for his fruitful contributions on the issues herein discussed and to Christian Krijnen for his precious advice on Rickertian philosophy. Finally my gratitude goes to Erasmus Mayr for his meticulous guidance on constructivism.

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Published Online: 2021-08-09
Published in Print: 2021-10-26

© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Heruntergeladen am 1.12.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/jtph-2021-0014/html?lang=de
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