Pre-Disaster Established Trust and Relationships: Two Major Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Implementing the ICS
-
Ray Chang
and
Joseph Trainor
Abstract
Since the establishment of the Incident Command System (ICS), many discussions have centered on its design, using the failure or success of disaster response to evaluate the effectiveness of this system. However, even prior to implementation, there are certain pre-conditions that must be first satisfied by responders. Two major factors underlying these pre-conditions, that strongly influence the eventual design and consequent functioning of the ICS, are pre-disaster established trust and relationships. This research utilizes qualitative methods to explore the importance of pre-disaster established trust and relationships in the implementation of the ICS. Twenty-eight in-depth qualitative interviews were completed and analyzed. From looking at how ICS users make a variety of different decisions regarding the establishment of the incident command, the setting up of overall response goals and objectives, the implementation of the Incident Action Plan, the selection of new ICS leaders, and the working arrangements made with volunteers, it can be observed that relationship and trust are two very important factors that dictate the successful implementation of the ICS. Based on this analysis, three conclusions could be drawn in this research: (1) any thorough evaluation of the ICS should also include an analysis of any existing pre-conditions, (2) future ICS training should cover strategies to build relationships and trust between response organizations, and (3) additional research should be conducted to understand other factors that influence the implementation of the ICS at scene of disaster.
Appendix A
Qualitative Interview Questions
(This question is only for the interviewees who served as IC on the selected disaster) to get started I want to ask you about XYZ event. I want to know during that event were you the sole Incident Commander (IC) or were you part of a Unified Command (UC) team? How that decision was made? (this interview question is to understand how people determine using a single IC or UC, which is the first decision point)
What were the driving factors that led to this? Did you ever consider doing the alternative set up? Why or why not?
Same or different from other events
What were the processes for making that decision at the scene?
Would you please give me an example showing how you make decisions under the UC structure? (this question is aimed to understand how people cooperate in the UC, which is the second decision point)
How do you decide when to or not to activate branch, division, team, group, and etc. What are your criteria for deciding you actually need to use these structures? (this question is aimed to understand how do people create new ICS branches, which is the third decision point)
The ICS mentions if personnel or resources exceed a manageable span of control, ICS leaders have to create new branches. What is a manageable span of control? How can you determine it? (this question is aimed to understand how do ICS leaders determine ICS span of control, which is the eighth decision point)
Once you establish a new ICS branch, how do you decide who should lead it?
Do you consider people out of your organization?
What skills do you look for serving as a leader in that new ICS branch?
What are most important traits to select new ICS leaders?
From you experience, this leader is selected from the original ICS hierarchy (promoted people from lower ICS positions) or outside communities (hired people from other groups that were not within the ICS structure)?
Can you explain to me how Incident Action Plan (IAP) works (this question is aimed to understand do ICS leaders change the IAP during disasters, which is the fifth decision point)
Based on your experience, do you change the IAP?
If you do, can you explain the reasons of changing the IAP?
If you do not, how do you deal with those situations that are not expected before disasters? (this question is aimed to understand how do ICS leaders allocate responsibility to resolve unexpected problems, which is the fourth decision point)
Based on your experience, do you think ICS users improvise at the scene? (this question is aimed to understand do ICS users in response to disastrous situations, which is the seventh decision point)
If they do, can you give me an example of improvisation?
If they do not, how do they deal with those situations that are not expected before disasters?
On the selected disaster, did you work with people from different organizations or backgrounds, such as the deputies or technicians? (this question is aimed to understand how do ICS leaders work with people from different organizations and backgrounds, which is the sixth decision point)
If you did, did you give instructions to them or work with them on making decisions?
Would you please give me an example of the above situation (instruct them or make decisions with them)?
Appendix B
List of Twenty-Eight Interviews
| ICS Role | Representing Group | Disaster Name/Type | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | General and Command Staff | Emergency Management Office | 2013 CO Flood/ Type 3 |
| 2 | ICS user | NYPD/Incident Management Team | Hurricane Sandy/Type 3 |
| 3 | Operation Division Chief | Volunteer and later become a federal contractor | Waynesville, Missouri flooding/Type 3 |
| 4 | Operation Division Chief | FEMA | Hurricane Irene/ Type 2 |
| 5 | Incident Command/Operation Division Chief | Emergency Management Office | Imperial sugar refinery explosion 2008 (Georgia)/Type 3 |
| 6 | Command Staff/Liaison Officer | Southwest Incident Management Team | 2013 CO Flood/ Type 3 |
| 7 | Safety Officer | FEMA | 9/11 Ground Zero US&R Operation |
| 8 | Planning Section Chief | Emergency Medical Technician | 2012 Ohio Tornadoes/ Type 3 |
| 9 | Federal Coordination Officer | FEMA | 2014 Mississippi Tornados/ Type 2 |
| 10 | UC member (the Federal Coordination officer) | FEMA | Tornados and floods/ Type 2 |
| 11 | Incident Commander | Southwest Incident Management Team | 2013 CO Flood/ Type 3 |
| 12 | EMS Branch Leader | Contra Costa County | 2013 Asiana Air Crash |
| 13 | Incident Commander | Director of Butler County | Hurricane Sandy |
| Emergency Management Agency | |||
| 14 | IC for EOC Operation Support Chief | San Francisco EOC | 2013 Asiana Airplane crash |
| 15 | Incident Commander | Forest Service- Fire & Aviation management | No Specific disastrous case |
| 16 | Incident Commander | Incident Command Team | No Specific disastrous case |
| 17 | Incident Commander | Public Works | 1996 Floods in Portland |
| 18 | Incident Commander | Park Services | No Specific disastrous case |
| 19 | Incident Commander | Salvation Army | No Specific disastrous case |
| 20 | Incident Commander | Fire Department | Train Crush in Washington State |
| 21 | Operation Division Chief | FDNY | Hurricane Katrina |
| 22 | Incident Commander | Washington State Forest Service | Many Type 2 and Type 3 Wildfires |
| 23 | Operation Section Chief | National Park Service | Hurricane Irene |
| 24 | Incident Commander | Department of Nature Resource | Type 2 and type 3 disasters; no specific one |
| 25 | Incident Commander | LA County Fire Department | Type 3 |
| 26 | Deputy Planning Section Chief | LA Department of Forestry Safety | Wild land Fires in California |
| 27 | Incident Commander | A city fire department in SF bay area | Wild land fires in California |
| 28 | Incident Commander | Orange County Fire Department | Type 2 and Type 3 wild land fires |
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©2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Research Articles
- Pre-Disaster Established Trust and Relationships: Two Major Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Implementing the ICS
- Household Disaster Preparedness in New York City before Superstorm Sandy: Findings and Recommendations
- C2 Agility for Emergency Management: Examining the Katrina and Sandy Responses
- An Analysis of the Emergency Fire Response to the Colorado 2012 Waldo Canyon and 2013 Black Forest Fires
- Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Full-Scale Exercise of Epidemiologic Capacity for Bioterrorism Response
Articles in the same Issue
- Research Articles
- Pre-Disaster Established Trust and Relationships: Two Major Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Implementing the ICS
- Household Disaster Preparedness in New York City before Superstorm Sandy: Findings and Recommendations
- C2 Agility for Emergency Management: Examining the Katrina and Sandy Responses
- An Analysis of the Emergency Fire Response to the Colorado 2012 Waldo Canyon and 2013 Black Forest Fires
- Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Full-Scale Exercise of Epidemiologic Capacity for Bioterrorism Response
