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Debt Limits and the Structure of Public Debt

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Published/Copyright: May 31, 2018

Abstract

This paper provides a tractable framework to assess how the structure of debt instruments – specifically by currency denomination and indexation to GDP – can raise the debt limit of a sovereign. By calibrating the model to different country fundamentals, it is clear that there is no 'one-size-fits-all' approach to optimal instrument design. For instance, low income countries may find benefit in issuing local currency debt; while in advanced economies, debt tolerance can be substantially enhanced through issuing GDP-linked bonds. By looking at the marginal impact of these instruments, the paper also provides insight into the optimal portfolio composition.

JEL Classification: H63; F34

Acknowledgments

With special thanks to S. Ali Abbas for his guidance and comments on this paper. Thanks also to Sam LaRussa for his research assistance support.

Appendix

Table 6:

Shock Correlations.

Real GDP (percent change); primary balance (change, percent of GDP)Real GDP (percent change); real exchange rate (percent change)Primary balance (change, percent of GDP); real exchange rate (percent change)
All countries0.12−0.020.01
Advanced economies0.33−0.07−0.05
Emerging markets0.070.170.10
Low income countries0.050.070.10
Figure 1: ACs Growth Shock.
Figure 1:

ACs Growth Shock.

Figure 2: ACs Primary Balance Shock.
Figure 2:

ACs Primary Balance Shock.

Figure 3: ACs Exchange Rate Shock.
Figure 3:

ACs Exchange Rate Shock.

Figure 4: AEs Growth Shock.
Figure 4:

AEs Growth Shock.

Figure 5: AEs Primary Balance Shock.
Figure 5:

AEs Primary Balance Shock.

Figure 6: AEs Exchange Rate Shock.
Figure 6:

AEs Exchange Rate Shock.

Figure 7: EMs Growth Shock.
Figure 7:

EMs Growth Shock.

Figure 8: EMs Primary Balance Shock.
Figure 8:

EMs Primary Balance Shock.

Figure 9: EMs Exchange Rate Shock.
Figure 9:

EMs Exchange Rate Shock.

Figure 10: LICs Growth Shock.
Figure 10:

LICs Growth Shock.

Figure 11: LICs Primary Balance Shock.
Figure 11:

LICs Primary Balance Shock.

Figure 12: LICs Exchange Rate Shock.
Figure 12:

LICs Exchange Rate Shock.

Figure 13: ACs Debt Level.
Figure 13:

ACs Debt Level.

Figure 14: AEs Debt Level.
Figure 14:

AEs Debt Level.

Figure 15: EMs Debt Level.
Figure 15:

EMs Debt Level.

Figure 16: LICs Debt Level.
Figure 16:

LICs Debt Level.

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Published Online: 2018-5-31

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