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Measuring Benchmark Damages in Antitrust Litigation: Extensions and Practical Implications

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Published/Copyright: October 23, 2019
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Abstract

This paper compares the “forecasting approach” and the “fully interacted approach” to estimation of cartel damages. We investigate the impact of relaxing the assumptions of exogeneity and stationarity, both theoretically and in Monte Carlo simulations. The results suggest that the advantages of the fully interacted approach are less clear and that the forecasting approach may be more robust to the relaxations of some of these maintained assumptions.

JEL Classification: C1

Acknowledgment

The author thanks Professor Doug Bernheim for helpful comments on an ealier version of the paper. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of NERA or its clients, Johns Hopkins University or its affiliates. All errors are mine.

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Supplementary Material

The online version of this article offers supplementary material (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/jem-2019-0010).


Published Online: 2019-10-23

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