Pompey, Theophanes and the Contest for Empire

I The campaign of Pompey to Transcaucasia

In the year 66 BCE, when the last threat to Roman power in the East, Mithridates VI of Pontus, fled from Roman armies to the Crimean Bosporus, Pompey was close to accomplishing the mission with which the Senate had entrusted him.^[20] Earlier in that year, the Lex Manilia had bestowed upon him imperium extraordinarium to fight Mithridates and his Armenian ally, king Tigranes II.^[21] After the hasty departure of Mithridates, Pompey considered the time to be ripe for launching a campaign against Armenia. At this time, the kingdom of Tigranes had already developed into a contested borderland between the Romans on the one side and the Parthian Empire on the other.^[22] Thus, it seems likely that Pompey wanted to conduct a rapid advance to prevent a preemptive attack by the Parthians since they had previously made attempts to invade Armenia.^[23] At this stage, the son of Tigranes II, Tigranes the Younger, revolted against his father and invited the Romans to take control of the kingdom. Unsurprisingly, Tigranes II was temporarily in extremis and thus he readily accepted Roman hegemony. Although the younger Tigranes retained control of his realm, things turned out rather differently under the Romans than he had expected when issuing his invitation. While the prince may have counted on the support of some local elites to become a Roman client ruler, Pompey ultimately decided otherwise, with the result that his decisions were not accepted by all Armenian nobles.^[24]

Transcaucasia, located on the northern frontier of Armenia, remained politically unstable and posed a threat to the Romans. It encompasses the land on the isthmus between the Pontic and Hyrcanian Seas, which roughly corresponds to modern-day Georgia and Azerbaijan. This region was divided by two autonomous kingdoms, with the Iberians in the western half and the Albanians in the eastern half (Strabo 11.3–4). Despite the support of Tigranes II, Roman hegemony over Armenia proved to be ephemeral for two reasons. Firstly, the fall of the kingdom of Armenia transformed its former space of influence into a contested area to which the Romans and Parthians held a claim.^[25] In other words, Armenia, and particularly its Transcaucasian frontiers, remained contested borderlands in subsequent years.^[26] These frontiers were crucial for the mobility of people between the northern steppes and the heartland of the Near East.^[27] Therefore, control of this borderland was important to any political power that aimed to rule Armenia. Secondly, the local elites in Pontus and Armenia were diverse rather than unified, representing different groups of people living in the area. They shared a common, albeit heterogeneous, culture. A major goal for both Mithridates and Pompey had been to win over their favour and so entrench their own power there.^[28] As far as can be determined, these local nobles had strong ties to both Iranian and Macedonian-Hellenistic cultures.^[29] Iranian groups were settled in the regions of Pontus, Armenia, and Transcaucasia since the period of Achaemenid domination and had left a considerable imprint on the indigenous peoples.^[30] The ethnic and cultural diversity of the nobles was further enhanced during the long period of domination by Hellenistic rulers over this region. This diversity suggests that ancient Near Eastern and Macedonian concepts of monarchies shaped the idea of legitimate rulership among local elites.

Moving the discussion back to Roman military movement in the 60 s BCE, the main problem for the modern understanding of the Transcaucasian campaign is the focus of the literary sources on Pompey, as a result of which the contexts of his decision-making are only poorly understood. Despite various possible explanations, it is conceivable that Pompey had heard that this region remained unstable and that its inhabitants had been allies of Mithridates and Tigranes.^[31] Even though Pompey’s decision-making remains unclear, the sources clearly indicate that the Transcaucasian campaign was divided into three phases.

In the beginning, Pompey had his first encounter with the Albanians at the turn of the year 66. The Albanians allowed the Romans to march through until the weather conditions shifted in their favor. Subsequently, they crossed the river Araxes with an army but suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of Pompey and his troops, forcing them to negotiate a treaty (Cass. Dio 36.54.4–5; Plut. Pomp. 34.1–4). Having achieved this victory, Pompey focused on the neighbouring Iberians and this movement can be considered as comprising the second phase of the campaign (Cass. Dio 37.1–2; Plut. Pomp. 34). At this point, Plutarch makes a striking statement about the Roman expedition:

For the Iberians had not been subject either to the Medes or the Persians, and they escaped the Macedonian dominion also, since Alexander departed from Hyrcania in haste. Notwithstanding, Pompey routed this people also in a great battle, in which nine thousand of them were slain and more than ten thousand taken prisoners; then he invaded Colchis, where, at the river Phasis, Servilius met him, at the head of the fleet with which he was guarding the Euxine.^[32]

Proving the superiority of the Roman arms in battle allowed Pompey to campaign beyond the frontiers of the Achaemenid and Macedonian empires. Remarkably enough, without the note that a Roman fleet was awaiting Pompey, the reader of Plutarch’s account would assume that the general rather aimed at surpassing Alexander’s deeds rather than continuing his pursuit of Mithridates.^[33] However, at that time, Pompey did not have the opportunity to celebrate his success as word reached him that the Albanians had broken the treaty (Cass. Dio 37.3.3; Plut. Pomp. 35.1). As a consequence, he again turned eastwards.

The final phase of the campaign complicates our interpretation of Pompey’s intentions. Modern commentators argue that Pompey had no reason to campaign against the Albanians because his way to Mithridates through Colchis was free and considerable Roman forces remained in Armenia.^[34] The sources do not allow the modern historian to draw a conclusion concerning the strategic situation, as different emphases are placed on various details pertaining to it. Intending to highlight the qualities of Pompey as a leader, Cassius Dio (37.3.3–4.4) and Appian (Mithr. 15.103) recount the route that the Roman army took through the mountains in detail. With regard to the battle, Plutarch once again provides his readers with a colourful account, which is worthy of being quoted in full:

Turning back against these [sc. Albanians] in resentment and wrath, [Pompey] crossed the Cyrnus again with great difficulty and hazard, since the Barbarians had fenced off its banks with long stretches of palisades; then, since he must make a long march through a waterless and difficult country, he ordered ten thousand skins to be filled with water, and with this provision advanced upon the enemy. He found them drawn up on the river Abas, sixty thousand foot and twelve thousand horse, but wretchedly armed, and clad for the most part in the skins of wild beasts. They were led by a brother of the king, named Cosis, who, as soon as the fighting was at close quarters, rushed upon Pompey himself and smote him with a javelin on the fold of his breastplate; but Pompey ran him through the body and killed him. In this battle it is said that there were also Amazons fighting on the side of the Barbarians, and that they came down from the mountains about the river Thermodon. For when the Romans were despoiling the Barbarians after the battle, they came upon Amazonian shields and buskins; but no body of a woman was seen. The Amazons inhabit the parts of the Caucasus mountains that reach down to the Hyrcanian Sea, and they do not border on the Albani, but Gelae and Leges dwell between. With these peoples, who meet them by the river Thermodon, they consort for two months every year; then they go away and live by themselves. After the battle, Pompey set out to march to the Hyrcanian and Caspian Sea, but was turned back by a multitude of deadly reptiles when he was only three days march distant, and withdrew into Lesser Armenia.^[35]

Apart from some striking—and fanciful—details in the description of the battle by Plutarch, the geographical setting of the campaign invites discussion. Plutarch states that the Amazons joined the battle on the side of the Albanians. In terms of mental geography, his statement indicates that the Romans were fighting a battle against inhabitants of the land of myth, which was supposed to lie somewhere between the Caucasus and the Hyrcanian Sea.^[36] Although Pompey failed to reach the shore of the Hyrcanian Sea, Plutarch penned this passage with the tacit understanding that Pompey was again contesting Alexander’s achievements.^[37] But his statement needs to be examined in light of the fact that Alexander never gained possession of Armenia. This fact is an aspect submerged in the historiography related to his conquest, as only Strabo explicitly states that Macedonian soldiers failed to conquer this region.^[38] The details of Plutarch’s account indicate that he relied on a source which suggested that Pompey extended his conquests to regions untouched by Alexander. This raises the question of Plutarch’s source(s).

II The reception of Theophanes’ Pompey in Plutarch

Modern historians largely agree that the narrative provided by Theophanes of Mytilene most likely represents the common tradition found in the writings of Appian, Cassius Dio, Plutarch, and Strabo on Pompey’s expedition to Transcaucasia.^[39] While these authors share certain details, they place emphasis on different things in their accounts. Consequently, it is not as apparent how their writings correlate with the fragments attributed to Theophanes. This applies in particular to Plutarch, who provides the most detailed account of the battle fought between Pompey and the Albanians. It is important to emphasise that our understanding of Theophanes’ lost account heavily depends on Strabo’s Geography, and thus the details provided by him can help us to understand the relationship between Plutarch and Theophanes.^[40] A comparison between the accounts of Plutarch and Strabo is warranted due to the numerous references made by Plutarch to Theophanes and his historiographical account in various instances throughout his own works.^[41] Despite the absence of any mention of the battle by Strabo, Plutarch’s battle description contains certain elements that correspond to Strabo’s geographical description of Armenia and the Caucasus. It is important to note that when describing these regions, Strabo specifically cites Theophanes as his source. Three parallels between the historiographical account of Plutarch and the geographical description of Strabo can be drawn.

Firstly, the Amazons are mentioned in the accounts of Plutarch, Appian, and Strabo. While Appian (Mithr. 15.103) briefly mentions that women were among the captives taken by the Romans after the battle, who had wounds no less severe than the men, Strabo explicitly refers to Theophanes when describing the Amazons. Since Strabo refers to Theophanes as his source, his description is qualified as a fragment of the latter’s now lost account (BNJ 188 F4) and is thus worth quoting in full:

The Amazons, also, are said to live in the mountains above Albania. Now Theophanes, who made the expedition with Pompey and was in the country of the Albanians, says that the Gelae and the Legae, Scythian people, live between the Amazons and the Albanians, and that the Mermadalis River flows there, midway between these people and the Amazons.^[42]

Strabo gives us insight into what Theophanes originally wrote about the Amazons. He located the Amazons in the mountains above Albania, which is information that he most likely gave in the context of his account of Pompey’s expedition to Transcaucasia. When speculating about the placement of this fragment within Theophanes’ mostly lost account, it is important to consider that Strabo, unlike Plutarch, does not provide an account of the battle. Strabo may have used Theophanes’ work to enhance his geographical description by incorporating additional details that could have possibly been extracted from a battle account.^[43]

Moreover, Theophanes is suggested as the common source of Strabo and Plutarch due to the mention of Gelae and Legae, which do not appear in any other source except in their writings.^[44] Since Strabo mentions these peoples in a passage where he refers to Theophanes as his source, it is probable that this specific piece of information originated in the work of Theophanes. Thus, it is fair to say that Plutarch’s battle description and Strabo’s geographical digression were most likely drawn from Theophanes’ historiographical account. The precise manner in which Theophanes described the battle, however, can only be speculated upon. The evidence supporting Theophanes’ mention of a battle involving living Amazons is derived from Plutarch’s statement that no female bodies were found on the battlefield. Only their shields (πέλταις Ἀμαζονικαῖς) were found. Interestingly, this statement could be connected to Pompey’s visual representation in Rome. The depiction of πέλται as weaponry used by enemies became increasingly popular in Roman art due to Pompey’s military achievements.^[45] The importance of Amazons for Pompey’s representation suggests that Theophanes mentioned their presence in the battle, where they were believed to live, as a way to further promote and enhance his portrayal of Pompey as an outstanding general. It is worth noting that Lucullus, Pompey’s predecessor in the Mithridatic War, claimed to have sacked the city of Themiskyra, which was considered the mythical residence of the Amazons.^[46] Accordingly, Theophanes’ Amazonian shields could have been used to help promote Pompey as worthy rival to Lucullus.

Secondly, in addition to Plutarch, Strabo (11.4.1–5) also offers a description of the Albani who fought against Pompey. While Strabo does not explicitly mention Theophanes’ work as his source, the context and content of this passage strongly suggest that it served as such. Strabo describes the Albanians as skilled warriors armed with javelins and bows, and wearing helmets made from the skins of wild animals. However, although these same details can also be found in Plutarch’s account of the Albanian troops, one particular detail in his account is not reported by any other author, including Strabo. This detail is the duel between Pompey and the Albanian general Kosis. The only achievement similar to this noted by Plutarch is that of Marcus Claudius Marcellus in 222 BCE, where he earned the spolia opima by defeating the Gaulish general Viridomarus in a duel. Plutarch’s description of Kosis’ demise does share some similarities with Marcellus’ well-known story, such as the spearing through of the enemy’s body (Livy, Epit. 20; Verg. Aen. 6.859; Prop. 4.10.39–41; Plut. Marc. 6–8). It is possible that this was a purposeful form of flattery on Theophanes’ part. By suggesting that Pompey deserved the spolia opima for killing the Albanian king’s brother, Theophanes found the closest historical event chronologically speaking to make his case.

Thirdly, Strabo mentions that the region beyond Albania, called Cambysene, is a rugged and waterless land.^[47] It is possible that he derived this geographical information from Theophanes’ account of Armenia and Albania, as it is Theophanes to whom he attributes such a description (BNJ 188 F6 = Strabo 11.14.11). Cassius Dio (37.3.5) and Plutarch (Pomp. 35.2) also mention the challenges faced by the Roman army when traversing this region.

Considering these parallels, it appears that Plutarch likely drew upon Theophanes’ account when writing about the battle between Pompey and the Albani. His choice might have been intentional, as other sources on Pompey’s expedition were available to him in his time.^[48] Although a certain answer cannot be given as to why he did so, it seems at least probable that Plutarch chose Theophanes’ account as universalism was important to his literary production. I have elsewhere discussed, for example, that universalism is also an essential theme in Plutarch’s Life of Alexander.^[49] Universalism was also a crucial concept for imperial representation in the days of Pompey and Plutarch.^[50] Interestingly, there are only a few similarities between Strabo’s account and those of Appian and Cassius Dio. Those could be attributed to the fact that these authors devoted less attention to the battle, as Plutarch’s account represents the most comprehensive source on it. Now two aspects still require explanation: why Theophanes would possibly have had living Amazons fighting in the battle and why he was interested in describing this region close to the Hyrcanian Sea.

In light of all the information presented, it is important to emphasise that there are some striking parallels between Pompey, as originally portrayed by Theophanes, and Alexander, as he is represented in the fragments aligned with the works of the first Greek authors who joined him on his expedition.^[51] This especially applies to the similarities between the campaign to Transcaucasia and Alexander’s movements to the Northern Ocean, the river Tanaïs, and the Hindu-Kush. These parallels merit a serious examination, not only since they have not been addressed in previous scholarship on Pompey’s imitation of Alexander but also because they can assist in revealing why he employed Alexander as a device for his representation.

The number of fragments of Aristobulos and Onesicritus about Alexander testify to the fact that these authors were widely known among Roman intellectuals in the late Republic. Even though they only provide a few insights, it is still possible to understand Alexander’s intended representation and get a sense of his imperial aspirations.^[52] In this context, Armenia presents an interesting case, since it remains the only region of the Achaemenid Empire that escaped Alexander’s conquest, which required the self-appointed ‘King of Asia’ to acknowledge the fact that he failed to gain possession of the Caucasus region.^[53] With the help of geographical fiction, Aristobulos and others crafted the idea that Alexander had indeed crossed the Caucasus, which was considered to be a continuous mountain range from Asia Minor to India. Considering the Hindu-Kush to be part of the Caucasus, they supported Alexander’s overstated claim of having conquered all the lands of the Great King.^[54] Finally, as we learn from Herodotus, the Caucasus was known to the Greeks as the northern administrative border of the Achaemenid Empire (3.97.4). Aristobulos exaggerated the deeds of Alexander by changing the original name of the river from Iaxartes to Tanaïs.^[55] According to Strabo (11.7.4), the river Tanaïs had a great symbolic meaning to the Greeks, Macedonians, and the great number of Asians among Alexander’s entourage,^[56] as it represented the northern edge of the Achaemenid Empire. Following Aristobulos and Ptolemy, the Tanaïs also marks the limits of the imperial ambitions of Cyrus and Darius, where they failed to defeat the nomads (the so-called Sacae) dwelling there.^[57] Interestingly, Herodotus and Strabo mention that Darius reached this river during his campaign against the European Scythians. They describe the land as a waterless desert, which is similar to how the authors who wrote about Alexander describe the land beyond the Iaxartes.^[58] Thus, it is hardly surprising that Theophanes also gave this river the name Tanaïs. He also described the natural environment of the land into which Pompey penetrated as having striking similarities to what was described by the first Greek authors concerning the land beyond the Tanaïs during the time of Alexander’s conquests, in that both regions were said to be deserts (BNJ 188 F3 = Strabo 11.2.2; Arr. Anab. 4.3.4; Curt. 7.8.23).

Moreover, judging from what has remained of the first accounts of Alexander, it can fairly be said that carrying conquest to the edges of the known world was considered the most distinguishing feature of the Macedonian conqueror to Roman authors. These edges were represented by the shores of the Ocean. Understandably, it was important for Alexander to claim to have reached the Hyrcanian Sea, which was considered a bay of the Northern Ocean.^[59] There, at the northernmost fringes of the world, Alexander, and later Pompey, are said to have defeated the local inhabitants (Aristobulos or Onesicritus: Arr. Anab. 3.24.1–3; Curt. 6.5.11). Furthermore, geographical fiction again proved to be a helpful tool for the first Greek authors to create the idea of Alexander having pushed to the limits of the world. A fragment of Onesicritus’ account that has survived in Plutarch’s Life of Alexander provides evidence that this writer introduced to the tradition an alleged encounter between the Macedonian conqueror and the Amazons somewhere in northern Hyrcania.^[60] Strabo provides evidence that this parallel incident was not a product of Plutarch but rather a statement he found in Theophanes’ account.^[61] Apart from Pompey’s claim of surpassing the achievements of Lucullus, it seems that he also aimed to assert his own superiority over Alexander’s deeds. Since Alexander is said to have engaged in intimate relations with the queen of the Amazons, the statement that Pompey defeated these mythical female warriors in battle and displayed their weaponry is seemingly intended to exaggerate his deeds with respect to those of Alexander.

Concerning the Albanians, the ideological value of defeating them for Pompey may be explained by the fact that they fought on the side of the Great King against Alexander in the Battle of Gaugamela. Aristobulos included them in his list of nations fighting alongside Darius III (BNJ 139 F17 = Arr. Anab. 3.11.3–7). Seen in light of all the similarities examined here, it is not surprising that the diplomatic encounters between Pompey and the Parthians in the aftermath of the campaign come across as reminiscent of those between Alexander and Darius III.^[62] The culmination of the parallels between the first Greek accounts concerning Alexander and the fragments aligned with Theophanes in the battle against the Albanians qualifies this episode as a key event in this latter author’s account.

While it cannot be conclusively proven that Plutarch’s description of the battle is entirely attributed to Theophanes, it is evident that the details in his account align with Theophanes’ intentions in how and why he represented Pompey’s deeds as he did. Given those parallels, it is safe to say that Theophanes originally portrayed Pompey as a conqueror with a strong Alexandrian image which seems to have been the image that the Roman general promoted of himself. Since the evidence examined above rather suggests that Theophanes’ Pompey outperformed the deeds of Alexander more than by simply imitating him, however, this invites further discussion.

III Universalism in Rome and the Hellenistic East

If Theophanes’ account corresponds with the image that Pompey promoted of himself, his representation might have originally aimed at two distinct audiences: the elites of Rome and those of the Hellenistic East. Beginning with the Roman elites, the geographical argument in Theophanes’ account is crucial for evaluating the Roman perspective of Pompey’s campaign. In Augustan literature, the river Tanaïs was viewed as a significant boundary.^[63] This is why it is emphasised in Augustus’ claim to power in the Res Gestae. Although the Tanaïs is presented as the most far-flung boundary of the Roman Empire in the East, Augustus’ proclamation does not fail to highlight that the empire wielded influence even beyond its administrative frontiers. In the same paragraph of the Res Gestae that mentions the Tanaïs, it is said that Transcaucasia is a borderland with inhabitants seeking Roman friendship.^[64] From a Roman perspective, this means that Pompey’s campaign extended conquest to the empire’s utmost limits. At this point, it is important to emphasise that the Res Gestae were most likely influenced by Pompey’s self-representation, Pompey having effectively established himself as a world conqueror in the eyes of the Roman audience.^[65]

Besides the Armenians, the Iberians and Albanians make a notable appearance in Pompey’s third triumph in Rome. The theme of the triumph was that of world conquest, as can be seen from Cicero, Diodorus, and Plutarch (Cic. Sest. 129; Diod. Sic. 40.4; Plut. Pomp. 45.4–5). With just a slight stretch of imagination, this can be seen as an argument by Pompey that he surpassed the renowned achievements of Alexander. Since the Romans considered Alexander to be the embodiment of the rule of Asia, Pompey used this narrative to complete his public image as a world conqueror, which he had begun to create in the preceding years. At earlier points in his career, he already claimed to have carried conquest to the fringes of the world as he did in the case of his campaigns to Africa, Spain, and finally in Transcaucasia. Note that all of these lands were associated with the Ocean, which was regarded as the body of water encircling the world (Plut. Pomp. 38.2–3). This also perfectly corresponds with Pompey’s dedicatory inscription to Minerva, as mentioned by Pliny, which referred to the territorial gains from his campaign in Asia. In this inscription, it is stated that the general had ‘conquered the lands between the Maeotian Lake and the Red Sea’ (Plin. HN 7.98: terris a Maeotis ad Rubrum mare subactis). The statement created the impression of Roman rule extending from one side of the Ocean to the other, highlighting his achievement of universalism.^[66] Diodorus makes Pompey’s claim in this inscription even more explicit by stating that ‘he extended the borders of the empire up to the borders of the world’ (Diod. Sic. 40.4.1: καὶ τὰ ὅρια τῆς ἡγεμονίας τοῖς ὅροις τῆς γῆς προσβιβάσας). Even though by stating that conquest had been carried to the world’s edges, this perception was less a reflection of the actual than of the theoretical claim to rule the world.^[67] Additionally, the Romans were aware that prior to Pompey’s war against Mithridates, Lucullus had not succeeded in subduing the Iberians and Albanians.^[68] Thus, Pompey found a suitable example in the Caucasus to illustrate his unparalleled military triumph in the East in a way that was easily understood by all Romans. On the one hand, the masses who witnessed the triumph could see Pompey as a world conqueror extending his victories to the most distant corners of the world.^[69] On the other hand, Pompey’s military accomplishments could also serve as a forceful counterargument to senatorial opposition.

Furthermore, at the close of the Republican period, powerful generals like Pompey not only changed the political atmosphere in Rome but also the idea of empire. Although the idea of empire was still associated with the res publica as a collective, the room for staging individual success was no longer limited as it had been traditionally.^[70] Hence, it appears that Pompey left a considerable imprint on Roman nobles. This has often been assumed to be due to the fact that shortly after the conquest of the Near East, Caesar highlighted his military success by claiming to have reached the fringes of the world in Europe.^[71] Apparently, the context of Pompey’s and Caesar’s self-representations and, later on Augustus’, was doubtlessly that of universalism. Nevertheless, it is important to note that at the time of the late Republic, universalism was already well known and the main ideological argument in the strategies of legitimation that Alexander and his successors used and had already been developed earlier in the Near East.^[72] In this context, it is important to emphasise that the claim of expanding conquest to Transcaucasia, or, more broadly, to the northern reaches of the world, had already been a significant aspect of the universalism proclaimed by the ancient Near Eastern empires. In addition, the elites of the Hellenistic East regarded the claim of having conquered this region as a vital criterion for legitimate rulership, as evident from the enduring presence of this idea throughout the entire first millennium BCE.

The two most significant characteristics of imperial ideology in all ancient Near Eastern empires were, firstly, the assertion of possession of the extreme edges of the world and, secondly, the competitive ideal of surpassing the accomplishments of former kings.^[73] These two ideas formed the core of the discourse on empire, which emerged as early as the start of the first millennium BCE among the rulers of the Neo-Assyrian Empire, the first paradigmatic imperial formation in the ancient Near East. The succeeding empires of the Babylonians, Persians, and finally Hellenistic rulers perpetuated the Assyrian claim to universalism, but they also transformed it.^[74]

To satisfactorily prove that universalism was achieved, the Neo-Assyrian kings used a particular mental map in their royal inscriptions, assuming the edges of the world to be the shores of the so-called ‘Upper and the Lower Sea’ which correspond to the present-day Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf.^[75] Due to competitive ideals inherent in Assyrian royal ideology, the claim was consistently extended to encompass territories in the middle of the sea. These ideals compelled future rulers to devise new tropes to assert their imperial achievements.^[76] As a result, a discursive framework for assessing successful rulership was introduced that continued to be important in the Neo-Babylonian and Persian periods until the rise of Achaemenid Persia as an empire under Cyrus II.^[77] His son and successor, Cambyses II, proceeded with both the ancient Near Eastern tropes and the narrative of imperial extension in his representation.^[78] In a similar vein, albeit under different circumstances, Darius I devised his own notions of universalism that were unparalleled in the history of ancient Near Eastern empires. He promoted the belief that the Ocean encircling the world served as the outermost boundaries of his dominions. Significantly, his claim even extended to the lands that potentially existed beyond the Ocean. For this purpose, the Achaemenids adopted the mental geographical framework of Babylonian scholars, who conceived of the Ocean as a canal-like body of water encircling the world. This Ocean served as the boundary that separated the inhabited world from a vaguely known space in which mythical creatures were believed to live.^[79] In this way, the Ocean became the reference point for claiming universalism that continued to be important, not only for Alexander and his successors but also for Roman generals and emperors.^[80]

While the Roman emperors considered the Hellenistic representation suitable for their purposes, Alexander and his successors had different intentions. An argument can be made that Alexander and the Diadochi employed existing models of rulership to gain support from Asian aristocrats. This, in turn, led to the transformation of Mediterranean and ancient Near Eastern monarchical concepts, resulting in a range of reactions from the elites, both acceptance and resistance.^[81] In light of this discourse on empire, it is possible to offer an alternative explanation for Alexander’s ambition to reach the northern, eastern, and southern shores of the Ocean, rather than attributing it to irrational decision-making as some previous scholars have argued.^[82] This is particularly true because reaching the shores of the Northern Ocean held significant importance as an argument for asserting universalism and royal accomplishment during the Achaemenid and Hellenistic periods.^[83] This brings us to Pompey, who asserted his conquests extended to the Northern Ocean.

It is therefore plausible to suggest that an educated Roman of Pompey’s era could have readily recognised the parallels between the general’s claim of universalism and an episode described in the Histories of Herodotus. In that account, the Great King Cyrus is reported to have campaigned in the lands beyond the River Araxes, near the Northern Ocean, where he met the Scythian Massagetae.^[84] The expedition resulted in the death of Cyrus and a total defeat of the Persian troops. This story in Herodotus is important for understanding Pompey’s campaign, as it corresponds with ancient Near Eastern sources. Although the overweening ambition of Cyrus and the fatalism of imperialism are the predominant elements in his narrative, it seems that Herodotus’ account also serves as a creative response to Achaemenid historiography. The only ancient Near Eastern record of Cyrus’ defeat is found in the famous Bisitun Inscription, where Darius I proudly proclaims his subjugation of the ‘point-headed Sacae.’^[85] To emphasise his remarkable accomplishment, Darius mentions that he crossed a body of water resembling an ocean. It can be supposed that the immense body of water Darius refers to is the river Araxes, as mentioned in Herodotus’ account. Herodotus creates the perception of a mighty river that resembles an ocean, with islands as large as Lesbos scattered within it (1.202.1). Therefore, Darius’ statement highlights that he outperformed the deeds of Cyrus by defeating the Scythians who live beyond the northern edges of the world. Furthermore, the claim of ruling the Sacae can be found in all the Achaemenid royal inscriptions until the time of Alexander.^[86] The region surrounding the Hyrcanian Sea remained a focal point within the empire during the late Achaemenid period. The Great Kings Darius II, Artaxerxes II, and Artaxerxes III conducted military campaigns against the Cadusii, a people dwelling along the shores of the Hyrcanian Sea.^[87] These campaigns presented the Achaemenids with an opportunity to assert universalism, as they reached the waters that they perceived as representing the Ocean in their mental map.

The idea of universalism expressed through the claim of having crossed the northern boundaries of the former Achaemenid Empire did not die with the Achaemenids. Alexander asserted that he had reached the Northern Ocean, which he identified as the Hyrcanian Sea, and claimed victory over its inhabitants.^[88] Additionally, as previously mentioned, his successful crossing of the river Tanaïs and subjugation of the unconquered Scythians furthered projected his superiority over the Achaemenids in the eyes of his Asian subjects.^[89] By using ancient Near Eastern concepts of imperial success, Alexander created a royal persona that served as a role model to his successors. Thus, it is not surprising that in the years following his death, his heirs focused on the northern fringes of the world to express their imperial ambitions. It was Seleucus I’s general Demodamas who claimed to have surpassed the deeds of Alexander when crossing the Tanaïs (Plin. HN 6.49). Similarly, Seleucus sent out admiral Patrocles to explore the nature of the Caspian Sea and find a passage from the Northern to the Eastern Ocean (BNJ 712 T3a-b; F7; also Strabo 11.11.6). In the years to come, later Hellenistic rulers maintained the claims of their ancestors, and therefore, universalism continued to be the defining feature of their self-representation.^[90] The persistence of ancient Near Eastern geographical concepts after Alexander’s reign suggests that Hellenism was not the end of imperial traditions but a phase of transformative ideation. Now the role played by Pompey in this context needs to be elucidated.

Whereas the intention and purpose behind Pompey’s imitation of Alexander are unknown, the information provided by Plutarch can contribute much to our understanding of his representation in the Hellenistic East. As previously discussed, it is highly probable that Plutarch relied on Theophanes’ account, which not only depicted Pompey in a manner similar to Alexander but also presented him as superior to the Macedonian conqueror. If this aspect is considered evidence of his representation instead of mere rhetorical ornamentation, it has the potential to stimulate further discussion about a dialogue between Pompey and the Near Eastern elites.^[91] Seen in the context of the aforementioned imperial traditions, Theophanes’ portrayal of Pompey in his account aligns seamlessly with the expectations of Eastern nobles, who were well-acquainted with Hellenistic concepts of legitimacy. It should be emphasised that Pompey likely acquired knowledge of this tradition through his interactions with various nobles, particularly in regions such as Asia Minor, Pontus, and Armenia.^[92]

Remarkably, during Pompey’s expedition to the Caucasus, local rulers established their strategies of legitimacy with a clear inspiration from Alexander and the Achaemenids. It is evident that the adoption of Achaemenid titles such as ‘Great King’ or ‘Kings of Kings’, as well as the association of their lineage with prominent figures like Cyrus, Darius, Alexander, and Seleucus.^[93] The phenomenon of adopting these titles among Near Eastern rulers has been interpreted as universalism, serving the purpose of engaging the diverse elites within their realms.^[94] However, empires and local rulers responded in various ways to Near Eastern imperial traditions. The following three examples exemplify how the Achaemenids and Alexander were used as a common ground to address the aristocrats. They also serve as testimonies to the vibrancy of the Near Eastern imperial tradition in the time of Pompey’s conquest.

Firstly, Mithridates VI was able to resist Roman imperialism for over thirty years, in part because his rule was widely accepted among the diverse group of elites in his empire. He was the first Iranian ruler who made the emulation of the Achaemenids and Alexander the dominating feature of his political program. According to Justin’s epitomes of Trogus’ Philippic History, Mithridates’ strategy of legitimation was to highlight that his ancestors were Cyrus and Darius on his father’s side and Alexander and Seleucus on his mother’s side.^[95] Inventing ancestry, however, was nothing new in the world of the Hellenistic East. Mithridates VI was the scion of the line of Mithridates I, who was the first Iranian ruler to use elements of the Bisitun narrative of Darius to legitimise his rulership.^[96] Therefore, genealogical fiction was less spontaneous but rather an inherent element in the dynastic representation of Mithridates’ house. His successors ultimately continued to claim their ancestry from the Achaemenids, at least until the reign of the emperor Claudius (Tac. Ann. 12.18.4).

Secondly, the official language of Mithridates was not developed independently but rather fulfilled the expectations of the heterogeneous nobles in the Hellenistic East. Good examples of the prevailing models of monarchical rulership come from the Ariarathids of Cappadocia, the Orontids of Armenia, and finally Antiochos of Commagene. The strategies of legitimisation used by these dynasts blended together Near Eastern and Macedonian elements of monarchical rulership by claiming lineage from both the Achaemenids and Alexander.^[97] These rulers, however, went even further than simply claiming the heritage of the two dynasties. They ultimately found themselves in competition by using Iranian elements to surpass the visual vocabulary of their rivals, which naturally presupposes a positively connoted memory of the Achaemenid past.^[98] Such a connotation is suggested by Tacitus, who states that the cities of Asia Minor pointed out the privileges granted to them during the Achaemenid period, in order to negotiate their status with emperor Tiberius.^[99]

The final example comes from the Parthian Empire. During the period of the growing threat of the Romans along their western border, the representation of the Arsacid dynasty saw a revival of Achaemenid concepts and models. Scholars have assumed that the Parthian kings intended to win over the elites in the contested borderland in the west by making references to the Achaemenids.^[100] Beginning with the reign of Mithridates II, certain elements of the Achaemenid royal representation were introduced into the representation and genealogy of the Arsacids.^[101] Remarkably, in the context of Armenia being a disputed borderland with Rome, the Parthians’ claim to power incorporated references to Alexander alongside Achaemenid influence. Tacitus provides evidence for their claim when he mentions that the Parthian ruler Artabanus II justified his claim over Armenia by associating himself with Alexander and Cyrus.^[102] This claim of the Parthian kings provides the backdrop against which a plausible contextualisation of the diplomatic encounter between Pompey and Phraates III after the Transcaucasian campaign (Cass. Dio 37.5.2–3). Pompey felt confident enough to respond to Phraates without addressing him by his obligatory title of ‘King of Kings’ (Cass. Dio 37.6.2; Plut. Pomp. 38.2). This episode bears some resemblance to the ‘Marathus Letters’, which describe Alexander’s diplomatic encounters with Darius III after the battle of Issus in 333 BCE. In these Darius III provoked Alexander by omitting to address him as ‘king’, while Alexander introduced himself as ‘King of Asia’ in his written response. Similarly, Pompey angered Phraates III by only addressing him as ‘king’ and not by his obligatory title of ‘King of Kings’ (Arr. Anab. 2.14.9; Curt. 4.1.8). Despite the potential influence of Graeco-Roman authors on their source material, contesting the legitimacy of the opponent may be the essence of these episodes.^[103]

Based on this, it appears probable that Pompey projected an image of himself as the representative of Roman rule in the East, using it as a tool for ideological conquest. Interestingly, despite the turbulent years of the civil wars, Roman dominance over Armenia faced challenges but ultimately remained intact until the region became a province.^[104] Speculatively, it can be suggested that the local elites offered their support to Roman rule. It further seems that Pompey utilised Alexander as a means to demonstrate universalism to the nobles of the Hellenistic East. By surpassing Alexander’s achievements, Pompey put himself in a dominant place in the prevailing discourse on empire, which was influenced by the involvement of the Parthians. Nevertheless, while the available sources do not extensively explore the reactions of local elites, there is epigraphical evidence that suggests Pompey was acknowledged as an authority by the eastern aristocrats. Inscriptions discovered in western Asia Minor, for instance, honour Pompey as the ‘Lord of the Land and the Sea’ (ἐπόπτης γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης).^[105] By employing this particular phraseology, the residents of these cities did not bestow a novel title upon Pompey. Instead, they adopted a formula that carried a historical significance. It is worth noting that it was Alexander himself who sought to be recognised as the ‘Lord over Land and Sea’ (Arr. Anab. 7.15.5: γῆς τε ἁπάσης καὶ θαλάσσης κύριον). This suggests that the cities, in their reverence for Pompey, adhered to a Hellenistic paradigm in which the concept of universalism held significant importance. Modifications were required, however, as the cities acknowledged the distinction between honouring a Republican general rather than a monarch. Consequently, the inscriptions referred to Pompey using the neutral term ἐπόπτης.^[106] Thus, the title signifies that during the Mithridatic Wars, the idea of universalism played a significant role in communicating legitimate rulership within the Hellenistic East.

In conclusion, it can be argued that Pompey constructed a persona influenced by prevailing imperial models, which had served as the framework for legitimate rulership in the Hellenistic East. This is evident from his assertion of surpassing Alexander’s achievements in the Transcaucasian campaign. While the campaign may have also had strategic motives, the primary purpose was to shape Pompey’s desired image, an image that Theophanes supported through his writings, to meet political requirements. Ultimately, this image fulfilled the expectations of the eastern elites without challenging the Roman concept of military leadership. Embracing the legacy of Alexander and associating himself with the concept of Near Eastern rulership proved to be an effective strategy for Pompey to gain support in the borderland with the Parthian Empire. By fulfilling the elites’ expectations, the Roman general inadvertently tapped into an ancient tradition of claiming imperial success deeply rooted in the history of the Near East. The transmission of these Near Eastern ideas, spanning from the Achaemenid period to the emergence of succeeding empires, was facilitated by the diverse nobles of the Hellenistic East. Their expectations created an environment where invoking the spirit of Alexander became more than a mere literary device or personal motivation. It became a political myth resulting from ideation.