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Partial Adherence to Voluntary Quality Standards for Experience Goods

  • Jason Winfree EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 29. Januar 2015

Abstract

Since many types of food are experience goods and have a collective reputation, the food industry has various minimum quality standards. However, in the food industry, sometimes not all firms adhere to the standard, and consumers do not always distinguish between compliant and non-compliant firms. This paper finds that when there is only partial compliance, having a food quality standard or increasing compliance for the standard does not always increase profits for the firms adhering to the standard, even though average industry quality increases. Potential solutions to the free riding problem are analyzed.

JEL: Q18; D43

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Published Online: 2015-1-29
Published in Print: 2016-1-1

©2016 by De Gruyter

Heruntergeladen am 2.10.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/jafio-2014-0013/html?lang=de
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