Article
Licensed
Unlicensed Requires Authentication

Lying vs. misleading: The adverbial account

  • Manuel García-Carpintero got his PhD at the University of Barcelona, where he has taught ever since. He works on issues in the philosophy of language and mind, and related epistemological and metaphysical problems. Currently he is weaving together ideas he has been publishing in papers over the years into three independent books, one on assertion and speech acts entitled Tell Me What You Know (under contract with OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS), another on indexicals and reference, Indexicals and Reflexivity (Springer) and another on consciousness and the self, Representing Oneself (Oxford University Press).

    EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: June 24, 2021
Become an author with De Gruyter Brill

Abstract

We intuitively make a distinction between lying and misleading. As several philosophers have pointed out, on the account of this distinction favored here – the adverbial account, as I’ll call it – it provides evidence on the theoretical notion of what is said and the related theoretical distinction between semantics and pragmatics. For, on that account, the distinction tracks whether or not the content and the assertoric force with which it is presented are semantically conveyed. On an alternative (assertoric) commitment account, the difference between lying and misleading is predicated instead on the strength of assertoric commitment. One lies when one presents with full assertoric commitment what one believes to be false; one merely misleads when one presents it with short-of-full assertoric commitment, by merely hinting or otherwise implying it. Here I’ll present the debate confronting the two accounts, and I’ll provide support for the adverbial account and its methodological application.


Corresponding author: Manuel García-Carpintero, Department of Philosophy, University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain, E-mail:

Funding source: DGI

Award Identifier / Grant number: FFI2016-80588-R and FFI2016-81858-REDC

About the author

Manuel García-Carpintero

Manuel García-Carpintero got his PhD at the University of Barcelona, where he has taught ever since. He works on issues in the philosophy of language and mind, and related epistemological and metaphysical problems. Currently he is weaving together ideas he has been publishing in papers over the years into three independent books, one on assertion and speech acts entitled Tell Me What You Know (under contract with OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS), another on indexicals and reference, Indexicals and Reflexivity (Springer) and another on consciousness and the self, Representing Oneself (Oxford University Press).

Acknowledgement

Financial support was provided by the DGI, Spanish Government, research projects FFI2016-80588-R and FFI2016-81858-REDC, and the award ICREA Academia for excellence in research, 2018, funded by the Generalitat de Catalunya. This work received helpful comments from audiences at the LOGOS Seminar, and from Filippo Contesi, Mark Jary, Neri Marsili and Emanuel Viebahn. Thanks to Michael Maudsley for the grammatical revision.

References

Bach, Kent. 1994. Conversational implicitures. Mind & Language 9. 124–162. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1994.tb00220.x.Search in Google Scholar

Bach, Kent & RM Harnish. 1979. Linguistic communication and speech acts. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.Search in Google Scholar

Benton, Matthew & Peter van Elswyk. 2020. Hedged assertion. In S. Goldberg (ed.), Oxford handbook of assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.11Search in Google Scholar

Bianchi, Claudia. 2013. Implicating. In Marina Sbisà & Ken Turner (eds.), Pragmatics of speech actions, HoP, vol. 2, 83–118. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.Search in Google Scholar

Bird, Alexander & Emma Tobin. 2018. Natural Kinds. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/natural-kinds/.Search in Google Scholar

Bonalumi, Francesca, Thom Scott-Phillips, Julius Tacha & Christophe Heintz. 2020. Commitment and communication: Are we committed to what we mean, or what we say? Language and Cognition 12. 360–384. https://doi.org/10.1017/langcog.2020.2.Search in Google Scholar

Borg, Emma. 2019. Explanatory role for minimal content. Noûs 53(3). 513–539. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12217.Search in Google Scholar

Brandom, Robert. 1983. Asserting. Noûs 17. 637–650. https://doi.org/10.2307/2215086.Search in Google Scholar

Camp, Elizabeth. 2018. Insinuation, common ground, and the conversational record. In Daniel Fogal, Daniel Harris & Matt Moss (eds.), New work in speech acts, 40–66. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/oso/9780198738831.003.0002Search in Google Scholar

Carson, Thomas L. 2006. The definition of lying. Noüs 40(2). 284–306. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00610.x.Search in Google Scholar

Davis, Wayne A. 2019. Implicature. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, (Fall 2019 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/implicature/.Search in Google Scholar

Del Pinal, Guillermo. 2018. Meaning, modulation, and context: A multidimensional semantics for truth-conditional pragmatics. Linguistics and Philosophy 41. 165–207. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-017-9221-z.Search in Google Scholar

Donnellan, Keith. 1966. Reference and definite descriptions. Philosophical Review 75. 281–304, Included in Essays on Reference, Language, and Mind, J. Almog & P. Leonardi. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183143.Search in Google Scholar

Ereshefsky, Marc. 2017. Species In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Fall 2017 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/species/.Search in Google Scholar

Fallis, Don. 2009. What is lying? Journal of Philosophy 106. 29–56. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil200910612.Search in Google Scholar

Franklin-Hall, Laura. 2021. The animal sexes as explanatory kinds. In Shamik Dasgupta, Ravit Dotan & Brad Weslake (eds.), Current controversies in philosophy of science. London: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar

Fricker, Elizabeth. 2012. Stating and insinuating. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society lxxxvi. 61–94. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2012.00208.x.Search in Google Scholar

García-Carpintero, Manuel. 2018. Sneaky assertions. Philosophical Perspectives 32. 188–218.10.1111/phpe.12116Search in Google Scholar

García-Carpintero, Manuel. 2020. On the nature of presupposition: A normative speech act account. Erkenntnis 85(2). 269–293. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0027-3.Search in Google Scholar

García-Carpintero, Manuel. 2021a. Metasemantics: A normative perspective (and the case of mood). In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), The Cambridge handbook of the philosophy of language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/9781108698283.023Search in Google Scholar

García-Carpintero, Manuel. 2021b. Reference-fixing and presuppositions. In Stephen Biggs & Heimir Geirsson (eds.), Routledge handbook of linguistic reference, 179–198. London: Routledge.10.4324/9781003111894-19Search in Google Scholar

García-Carpintero, Manuel. forthcoming. How to understand rule-constituted kinds. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.10.1007/s13164-021-00576-zSearch in Google Scholar

Geurts, Bart. 2019. Communication as commitment sharing: Speech acts, implicatures, common ground. Theoretical Linguistics 45(1–2). 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1515/tl-2019-0001.Search in Google Scholar

Glanzberg, Michael. 2018. Lexical meaning, concepts, and the metasemantics of predicates. In Brian Rabern & Derek Ball (eds.), The science of meaning, 197–225. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/oso/9780198739548.003.0007Search in Google Scholar

Green, Mitchell. 2017. Conversation and common ground. Philosophical Studies 174. 1587–1604. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0779-z.Search in Google Scholar

Grice, Herbert P. 1975. Logic and conversation. In Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and semantics, vol. 3, 41–58. New York: Academic Press, Included in Grice (1989), 22–40, from which I quote.10.1163/9789004368811_003Search in Google Scholar

Grice, Herbert P. 1989. Studies in the ways of words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Harris, Daniel W. 2020. Semantics without Semantic Content. Mind & Language. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12290.Search in Google Scholar

Hawthorne, John. 2012. Some comments on Fricker’s ‘stating and insinuating’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society lxxxvi. 95–108. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2012.00209.x.Search in Google Scholar

Hinchman, Edward. 2020. Assertion and testimony. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Oxford handbook of assertion, 555–580. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.23Search in Google Scholar

Kennedy, Christopher. 2007. Vagueness and grammar: The semantics of relative and absolute gradable predicates. Linguistic and Philosophy 30(1). 1–45. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-006-9008-0.Search in Google Scholar

Khalidi, Muhammad Ali. 2021. Are sexes natural kinds? In Shamik Dasgupta, Ravit Dotan & Brad Weslake (eds.), Current controversies in philosophy of science, 163–176. London: Routledge.10.4324/9781315713151-23Search in Google Scholar

König, Ekkehard & Peter Siemund. 2007. Speech act distinctions in grammar. In Timothy Shopen (ed.), Language typology and semantic description, 276–324. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511619427.005Search in Google Scholar

Ludlow, Peter. 2014. Living words. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712053.001.0001.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712053.001.0001Search in Google Scholar

Maitra, Ishani. 2007. How and why to be a moderate contextualist. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-sensitivity and semantic minimalism, 112–32. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/oso/9780199213320.003.0005Search in Google Scholar

Mazzarella, Diana, Robert Reinecke, Ira Noveck & Hugo Mercier. 2018. Saying, presupposing and implicating: How pragmatics modulates commitment. Journal of Pragmatics 133. 15–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2018.05.009.Search in Google Scholar

Meibauer, Jörg. 2009. Implicature. In J. Mey (ed.), Concise encyclopedia of pragmatics, 365–378. Amsterdam: Elsevier.10.1016/B0-08-044854-2/00307-2Search in Google Scholar

Meibauer, Jörg. 2014. A truth that’s told with bad intent. Lying and implicit content. Belgian Journal of Linguistics 28. 97–118. https://doi.org/10.1075/bjl.28.05mei.Search in Google Scholar

Meibauer, Jörg. 2018. The linguistics of lying. Annual Review of Linguistics 4. 357–377. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-linguistics-011817-045634.Search in Google Scholar

Michaelson, Eliot. 2016. The lying test. Mind & Language 31(4). 470–499. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12115.Search in Google Scholar

Morgan, Jerry L. 1978. Two types of convention in indirect speech acts. In Peter Cole (ed.), Syntax and semantics, vol. 9, 261–280. New York: Academic Press.10.1163/9789004368873_010Search in Google Scholar

Neale, Stephen. 2016. Silent reference. In Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meaning and other things, 229–342. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684939.003.0013.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684939.003.0013Search in Google Scholar

Pepp, Jessica. 2020. Assertion, lying, and untruthfully implicating. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Oxford handbook of assertion, 829–850. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.40Search in Google Scholar

Putnam, Hillary. 1975. The meaning of ‘meaning’. In Philosophical papers vol. 2, 215–71. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511625251.014Search in Google Scholar

Recanati, François. 2013. Content, mood, and force. Philosophy Compass 8/7. 622–632. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12045.Search in Google Scholar

Reins, Lousia M. & Alex Wiegmann. 2021. Is lying bound to commitment? Empirically investigating deceptive presuppositions, implicatures, and actions. Cognitive Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12936 published online.Search in Google Scholar

Saul, Jennifer. 2012. Lying, misleading, and what is said. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603688.001.0001.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603688.001.0001Search in Google Scholar

Searle, John R. 1979. Expression and meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511609213.Search in Google Scholar

Stainton, Robert. 2016. Full-on stating. Mind & Language 31(4). 395–413. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12112.Search in Google Scholar

Stokke, Andreas. 2016. Lying and misleading in discourse. Philosophical Review 125. 83–134. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-3321731.Search in Google Scholar

Stokke, Andreas. 2017. Conventional implicature, presupposition, and lying. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91. 127–147. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akx004.Search in Google Scholar

Stokke, Andreas. 2018. Lying and insincerity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198825968.001.0001.Search in Google Scholar

Sullivan, Arthur. 2017. Evaluating the cancellability test. Journal of Pragmatics 121. 162–174. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2017.09.009.Search in Google Scholar

Taylor, David E. 2020. Deflationism, creeping minimalism, and explanations of content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101(1). 101–129. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214477.Search in Google Scholar

Tobia, Kevin P., George E. Newman & Joshua Knobe. 2020. Water is and is not H2O. Mind & Language 35, 183–208. https://doi.org/10.1287/837f37e8-d655-468b-b87f-09c0503ba2a9.Search in Google Scholar

Vanderveken, Daniel. 1991. Non-literal speech acts and conversational maxims. In Ernie LePore & Robert van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and his critics. Oxford: Blackwell.Search in Google Scholar

van Elswyk, Peter. 2020. Deceiving without answering. Philosophical Studies 177(5). 1157–1173. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01239-7.Search in Google Scholar

Viebahn, Emanuel. 2017. Non-literal lies. Erkenntnis 82. 1367–1380. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9880-8.Search in Google Scholar

Viebahn, Emanuel. 2019a. Lying with presuppositions. Noûs 54(3). 731–751. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12282.Search in Google Scholar

Viebahn, Emanuel. 2019b. Lying with pictures. British Journal of Aesthetics 59(3). 243–257, https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayz008.Search in Google Scholar

Viebahn, Emanuel. forthcoming. The lying-misleading distinction: A commitment-based approach. The Journal of Philosophy.10.5840/jphil2021118621Search in Google Scholar

Weiner, Matthew. 2006. Are all conversational implicatures cancellable? Analysis 66(2). 127–30. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/66.2.127.Search in Google Scholar

Weissman, B. & M. Terkourafi. 2019. Are false implicatures lies? An empirical investigation. Mind & Language 34(2). 221–246. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12212.Search in Google Scholar

Williams, Bernard. 2002. Truth and truthfulness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Williamson, Tim. 1996. Knowing and asserting. Philosophical Review 105. 489–523. Included with some revisions as chapter 11 of his Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000. https://doi.org/10.2307/2998423.Search in Google Scholar

Yalcin, Seth. 2014. Semantics and metasemantics in the context of generative grammar. In A. Burgess & B. Sherman (eds.), Metasemantics: New essays on the foundations of meaning, 17–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669592.003.0002.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669592.003.0002Search in Google Scholar

Published Online: 2021-06-24
Published in Print: 2021-06-25

© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Downloaded on 2.4.2026 from https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/ip-2021-2011/html
Scroll to top button