Olimpia G. Loddo: Intersemiotic Legal Translation

1 Structure of the book

The book comprises seven chapters covering pp. 1–105, while the cover page, Preface, Acknowledgement and Contents cover pp. i–xiv. As the author explains in her Preface (pp. vii–viii), what motivated her into investigating intersemiotic legal translation (hereiafter: ILT) was a 2017 research project she was involved in about The Ontology of Normative Pictures implemented by the Department of Law of the University of Cagliari under the supervision of Prof. Giuseppe Lorini (whom she justifiably calls a pioneer in the study of non-verbal normativity), as well as her position as a research fellow at the Centre for Advanced Studies – South Eastern Europe (CAS SEE), where she collaborated with numerous academics with relevant activity. In her Preface she also mentions her previous works that have partly contributed to the book under review and makes clear that “this book is a distinct and autonomous work and is different from the aforementioned essays. Its purpose is to provide a more extensive and encompassing examination of the subject matter with the aim of presenting a broader perspective.” (p. viii). Chapters 1–2 are introductory to the concepts and basic legal translation categories and ILT definitions. Chapters 3–6 address, respectively, the four ILT dimensions, the three ILT types in the legal field, the ILT process, and the ILT digital aspect. Chapter 7 contains the author’s general conclusions.

2 Discussing legal translation and legal intersemiosis

Chapter 1 (“Introduction”, pp. 1–3), explores the LT concept and its relationship with the general theory of translation and the general theory of law. The author also gives a brief historical account of the intersemiotic translation concept, which was first “proposed by another distinguished scholar, the Russian-American linguist Roman Jakobson who, while stating that the interpretation of a sign belonging to one language using a sign belonging to another language was a translation in the ‘proper sense,’ coined the term ‘intersemiotic translation’ to describe all those forms of translation that are an interpretation of a sign using another sign that belongs to a different semiotic system.” (pp. 1–2) –a feature that Rowley-Jolivet (2002: 22) calls “multi-semiotic”. Admittedly, many scholars (e.g. Cheng et al. 2017: 143; Chromá 2012: 117) use similar terminology (also) within the realm of verbal LT in order to emphasise that it (usually) involves interpretation of the sign for the transition from a legal system into a different legal system – what Loddo, following Cao (2007: 23), calls an “interlegal translation”, which is the same as “intersystemic translation” (Prieto Ramos 2021: 175–176; Valeontīs and Krimpas 2014: 248). But in Loddo’s work the term “intersemiotic translation” retains its original meaning, denoting some transition from one form of semiotic system into a different form of semiotic system (e.g. verbal into visual, visual into acoustic and so on).

Chapter 2 (“What Is Intersemiotic Legal Translation?”, pp. 5–28) offers an introduction to the ILT concept on the basis of previous LT-related studies, on the one hand, and intersemiotic translation, on the other hand. Drawing on extensive relevant literature on semiotics and LT, as well as on their connection (e.g. Cheng et al. 2014a; Wagner 2006), the author begins with a brief overview of LT and its subject, focussing on peculiarities originating in the nature of normative language and legal terminology. This is, more or less, what I have called “language-based peculiarities” of legal language as against “legal-system-based peculiarities” of legal language (Valeontīs and Krimpas 2014: 31–32, 242). Depending on the effect of the texts involved, she further distinguishes between isofunctional (i.e. same ST and TT effect) and heterofunctional (i.e. different ST/TT effect) LT, while, depending on the type of the translated communicative act she distinguishes between isomorphic (i.e. same type of communicative act in ST and TT) and heteromorphic (i.e. different type of communicative act in ST and TT) LT, with combinations of all four categories being possible (pp. 12–17). The distinctions in question are not presented in the book under review for the first time, since one can find exactly the same categorisation in a previous work of the author’s (Loddo 2022). Although she makes a general mention of that work in her Preface, I feel that it would probably not have been purposeless if she had explicitly cited it in connection with the distinction in question. Then the author progresses into a brief account of the evolution of the concept of intersemiotic translation, starting from the abovementioned Jakobson’s tripartite distinction up to modern times and focussing on intersemiotic translation’s eventual relevance for the contemporary jurist. Loddo then explores the combined concept of ILT, which she ranks as a specific case of the generic LT concept. Besides, the author addresses the hot debate about the possibility of using plain language in matters legal (cf. Asprey 2003: 78; Williams 2004), which she clearly denies (pp. 7–8) following Scarpelli (1995: 6; cf. also Ainsworth 2014), while underlining the important implications this issue has for ILT, “which requires a thorough understanding of the semantic dimensions and peculiarities of legal language.” (p. 9). Inspired by Jakobson’s (1959) model, who recognised three types of translation depending on source-sign and target-sign correlation (namely intralingual translation, interlingual translation, and intersemiotic translation), the author distinguishes among interlegal translation (i.e. one between different legal systems), intralegal translation (i.e. one within the same legal system), and supralegal translation, i.e. one produced in the framework of supranational entities, such as the EU (cf. Prieto Ramos 2021: 175–176; Valeontīs and Krimpas 2014: 247–248). Unlike other LT-relevant works, Loddo’s book does not ignore a special case of interlegal translation, which arises when same-language states have different legal systems and often leads to a lack of terminological synonymy within the same natural language (pp. 11–12). By the way, when I wrote on “intralinguistic legal translation” it was exactly this state-of-affairs I had in mind (Valeontīs and Krimpas 2014: 248). In any event, the crucial point in LT, in her words, is “to identify the common denominators that unify the names of diverse legal institutions across different legal systems to promote the viability of legal translation” and “to delineate the factors that differentiate these terms, thus rendering interlingual translation a challenging task and intersemiotic translation an even more arduous undertaking.” (p. 8; cf. Prieto Ramos and Cerutti 2021). I absolutely subscribe to this view, no matter how plain or technical a legal language is or how much conceptual and institutional divergence exists between one and another legal system. She concludes the chapter by claiming for ILT a place within a more general typology of legal translation based on the legal system to which the source and the target refer; in this connection she distinguishes among intralegal intersemiotic translation, interlegal intersemiotic translation, and supranational intersemiotic translation.

Drawing largely on previous works by Jakobson (1959, 1960, 1971, Eco (2000, 2001, 2003a, 2003b), Peirce (1931–1935), Plaza (1981, 1987 and others, in chapter 3 (“Intersemiotic Legal Translation: Four Dimensions”, pp. 29–46) the author discusses four dimensions or levels of analysis of ILT depending on the relationship between the source and the target product: the intersemiotic dimension, the interpretative dimension, the creative dimension, and the multimodal dimension. In her analysis she explains how some conceptual tools developed within philosophy of language and philosophy of law could be applied as well to ILT, given that pansemiotic features are common to all semiotic systems. But Loddo is careful enough to emphasise also that, in order for an intersemiotic translation to be possible, a relationship is required between the source text and the target product on at least one of three levels: semantic, pragmatic, and/or syntactic. She recalls relevant works on road signs (Krampen 1983; Studnicki 1970) in order to introduce the reader to the very ILT concept, i.e. the fact that the supralinguistic traffic sign system has been created to communicate normative information about a road’s conditions to people, no matter what (verbal) language they understand (pp. 43–44). In this connection, she also points to the fact that both verbal and visual systems can virtually combine articulated signs to transmit information, as well as that intersemiotic translation presupposes the possibility of at least partial reproduction of the logical relationships outlined in the source text (p. 44).

Chapter 4 (“Intersemiotic Legal Translation as Target Representamen: Three Types of Intersemiotic Translation in the Legal Field”, pp. 47–74) starts from Peirce’s (1931) version of Ogden and Richards’ (1923) semiotic triangle and the respective relationship(s) among object, representamen, and interpretant (p. 48). Loddo then proceeds into recalling Plaza’s (1987) tripartite typology of intersemiotic translation, which is based on the relationship between the target representamen and its object, namely iconic intersemiotic translation, indical (<index) intersemiotic translation, and symbolic intersemiotic translation. On this occasion, by citing relevant previous literature (e.g. Eco 2001; Queiroz and Aguiar 2015) she points to the intrinsic relationship among Peirce’s (1931), Plaza’s (1987) and Jakobson’s (1959) views in this respect. Moreover, Loddo addresses the issue of the medium selected by the translator for the creation of the target representamen and, in this connection, focuses on four possibilities, namely estures, two-dimensional representations (e.g. drawings or pictures), material artifacts (e.g. physical objects), and digital artifacts (pp. 62–69). She points out that any translation requires implicit assumptions about what information is important enough (and which is the optimal way for it) to be transferred (cf. Wagner et al. 2020). She concludes the chapter by stressing that, in order “[t]o translate a rule accurately, the translator must consider how and where the hypothetical recipient will perceive the normative message and what the rule aims to regulate” (p. 72). This, of course, calls inter alia for an adequate cultural awareness of the legal translator (cf. Soriano Barabino 2020). At least at this point she seems to draw on a combination of de Beaugrand and Dressler’s (1974) acceptability and Reiss and Vermeer’s (1984) functional Skopostheorie. A clearly functional stance she takes on arguing that the platform design may be ineffective, whenever it does not serve the purpose of the translation (p. 98). In any event, Loddo is, again, careful enough to explicitly state that the above tripartite classification is a simplification, given that an ILT usually combines icons, indices, and symbols; more importantly, she warns the reader that such strategies mostly lend themselves for translation of rules that govern acts consisting of specific brute facts that existed prior to the rule and can be represented via an icon (p. 71). Most importantly, the author attempts to sensitise legal designers in such a way as to consider the typology of the rule they intend to represent in graphic form, since their choices are essential both from a practical and epistemological standpoint (p. 72).

The author focuses on the process of ILT in Chapter 5 (“Intersemiotic Legal Translation as a Process”, pp. 75–90). She explains that the term “intersemiotic translation” is currently used in a broader sense in comparison to Jakobson’s original use. Citing Queiroz and Aguiar (2015: 201), she makes clear that intersemiotic translation goes well beyond the interpretation of verbal signs (p. 75). In this connection she attempts a brief historical overview of the semioticians and translatologists’ debate about the concept of intersemiotic translation, selecting a minimum of four different conceptions of intersemiotic translation that are worth mentioning, namely intersemiotic translation as an adaptation, an illustration, a resemiotisation, and a transactional process (pp. 76–86). For example, the case of affirmative action translated into legal discourse (Frade 2020) is a clear case of resemiotisation, as it interprets a societal context into positive law. Loddo makes clear that no inherent incompatibility exists among such conceptions, as they focus on different instances and/or aspects of the phenomenon. Later in the chapter, the author gives a list of examples of non-verbal legal communication such as tactile signals for the deaf, acoustic signals for the blind, road signs, icons, images, drawings, diagrams, or cartoons and underlines their suitability for transferring information no matter what language(s) the receiver speaks (p. 88). In this way, legal communication is enriched with new tools through the use of multiple semiotic channels: such a communication enables e.g. foreigners to know their rights and obligations, whether they are immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees, stateless people etc., thus facilitating their integration into a given legal and cultural context (p. 88). Admittedly, as the author explains, the use of ILT does not inherently promote integration, since the discriminatory nature of a rule, even in form of e.g. comics, remains such (pp. 88–89). The chapter concludes by noting that such a form of communication may contribute to legal innovation and reform, since even a merely descriptive graphic representation of norms can highlight the emerging problems and issues (p. 90).

Technological innovations could not have been ignored in such a insightful study; they are addressed in Chapter 6 (“Intersemiotic Digital Legal Translation”, pp. 91–104). The author explains that internet allows us to perform digital speech acts that can be legally relevant (digital legal acts), as people enter contracts and make digital payments through their personal computers and mobile phones (p. 92). And such contracts and payments are, of course, legally binding acts. Loddo further explains that “the performance of a legal act in a digital environment develops in a complex chain of events that includes the identification of a set of possible legal acts made available to the user by the platform manager, the creation of an interface based on the platform manager’s choices, the user’s choice based on the options proposed in the interface, and the input sent to the machine and its translation into a machine code/structured format” (p. 92). I absolutely agree with her concluding remarks that “intersemiotic legal translation in the digital environment can increase the effectiveness of the legal act and make it more dynamic”, as I also subscribe to her view about this phenomenon’s being a form of resemiotisation, which could sometimes be problematic (p. 102). And she is again absolutely right in underlining that the user’s active role in intersemiotic digital translation influences the development of interface design of online platforms, as this should be designed in such a way as to enable users operate on a given platform, being involved even in actions that are clearly legal acts (p. 98). Drawing on previous work by Amare and Manning (2013: 2), the author notes that choosing one semiotic tool instead of another can have ethical relevance, and hence translators can choose a sign that reconciles their communication needs with the recipient’s needs and interests. In this connection, intersemiotic translation can make legal content more accessible, even to non-specialised users, as Loddo explains; she adds, however, that from a legal standpoint resemiotisation could be a problematic aspect of ILT, as it often leads to a target text essentially different in nature from the source text, and hence to a state of affairs that may contradict the user’s original legal intent (p. 102). She further analyses this view as follows: “While the intent connected to the use of intersemiotic translation techniques in contract drafting and digital contract drafting, supported by legal design theorists, is explicitly aimed at facilitating the understanding of the contractual content, some techniques could be a source of misunderstanding on the part of the signatory contractor who has not drawn up the contract, which could lead to unforeseen and disadvantageous consequences” (pp. 102–103). The chapter concludes by emphasizing that, one the one hand, use of inadequate semiotic tools in contract drafting could be interpreted as a form of abuse of contractual freedom, while, on the other hand, free choice of semiotic tools is a right of the drafting contractor (unless law provides for otherwise); but in cases when this could bring objective trouble to the other contracting party as to their access to clear, complete, truthful, faithful, unambiguous, and not deceptive information about the agreement’s exact content, then the exercise of contractual freedom and freedom of form are abusive (p. 103).

The ultimate conclusions of the whole book are summarised (and/or repeated) in its final page, which hosts Chapter 7 (“Conclusions”, p. 105). Loddo once more underscores the fact that the use of non-linguistic semiotic systems in legal communication is increasing, which involves the use of icons, diagrams, and even comic strips and illustrations in legal documents (e.g. contracts or privacy policies), i.e. non-verbal (or mixed) means used in order to communicate legislative innovations and/or indicate key features of current legislation. As a law graduate herself, she is aware of the fact that lawyers have so far lingered on the linguistic dimension of legal communication, thus ignoring its intersemiotic dimension; she reasonably attributes this fact to a logocentric (i.e. discourse-oriented) prejudice that affects lawyers and courts due to current law education and practice (p. 105). In other words, no tradition exists in jurisprudence that trains lawyers and judges in the interpretation of other semiotic tools. As she states, her intention is to show that modern jurists avail of various such tools, and she expects that the advancement of information technology and digital law will provide intersemiotic translations with ever-increasing importance in law practice (p. 105). In writing this book, her aim has not been to idealise the current state-of-affairs, but rather to provide an even partial overview of current applications of ILT without overlooking their eventual limitations or risks; accordingly, she ends her book by warning the target audience against eventual ideological exploitation of ILT, e.g. promotion of unjust legislation, deception of a contracting party, exploitation of the recepient’s cognitive biases, and the like; at the same time, she reminds that lawyers and legal scholars should no longer ignore the positive aspects of ILT (p. 105).

3 Concluding remarks

Some inconsistencies do exist in the book, e.g. the author states that “[t]ranslation theorists did not initially consider the peculiarities of legal language, and naively assimilated legal language into other specialized languages (language for special purposes)” (p. 7), but just below, in the same page she argues that “a legal translation is a translation for special purposes. In other words, it is a translation that makes extensive use of technical language; in this case, legal language. As a technical language, legal language must be kept distinct from ordinary language; […]”. Of course there is a difference between legal translation and e.g. scientific translation – Bocquet (2000: 16ff.), for example, thinks the two lie at the extreme opposites of specialised languages – but how huge this difference is depends mainly on the various ontological classifications of law as a single or multiple domain (Valeontīs and Krimpas 2014: 25–30; cf. also Harvey 2002: 180). There are also some reference inconsistencies, e.g. in “Jakobson 1960” reference entry one finds “New York-London” as the publishing place of “The M.I.T. Press” instead of “Cambridge, MA”; in “Plaza 1981” reference entry one finds the journal name “Dispostio” instead of “Dispositio” and page numbers 65–91 instead of 45–91; in pp. 92–94, footnotes 5, 14, 19 and within the body text the author cites “Addis and Loddo (2022)”, while in p. 104 she refers to the same (?) work as “Loddo OG, Addis A, Lorini G (2022)”. But such minor errors are not unheard of in most scholarly works.

As a final evaluation of this book, I would say that, notwithstanding some inconsistencies, it does cover an important gap in legilinguistics (on this term see Galdia 2021: 29) and it is a useful tool not only to jurists, but to linguists (especially jurilinguists and even psycholinguists) and (legal) translators as well. In my opinion, the book can open new horizons of thought and refresh or rearrange already known information. The mere fact that Olimpia G. Loddo has a firm background in jurisprudence, combined with a fairly good mastery of fundamental aspects of semiotics and translatology testifies to the interdisciplinary background of this work; and interdisciplinarity is by itself an advantage.