Phenomenology in Central Europe: Philosophy from the margins

Introduction

The genealogy of phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe has become of increasing interest to philosophers in recent years. It has been explored from various angles at conferences and seminars in for example Budapest, Gdansk, Warsaw, Riga, Kaunas and Bucharest and in a number of journals (such as Horizon in 2016 and Studies in East European Thought in 2017). This research trend may seem surprising since phenomenology is liberated from theoretical presuppositions and oriented towards things themselves, the givenness of phenomena rather than historical discourse. The aim of the present article is to demonstrate why and how this area of genealogical investigation is both illuminating and beneficial to phenomenology.

The motivation for this study is natural since it fills a gap in the knowledge of the history of the discipline (the story of how phenomenology evolved in the Slovak Republic must still be regarded as work in progress). Moreover, this kind of study may provide interesting contextualizations and thematic resources. The present study poses a challenge in terms of how phenomenologists should approach the field. The investigation is primarily historiographical with biographical elements and covers the convoluted historical and political circumstances in Central and Eastern Europe in the 20th century. It shows how philosophical anthropology, a closely related philosophical field, can complement phenomenology as it focuses on the human perspective and the historical situation of one’s being. Following Wilhelm Dilthey’s philosophy of life, Helmuth Plessner points out that we can be guided by the observations of “a historian who follows the events, of a narrator, of someone who understands, of a person who keeps up with the expressions of life of people, both large and small...in order to remain at this level, where everything happens for us, the level of surprise and memory” (Plessner, 2003, p. 215).

In this study we distinguish between the leading figures in phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe—such as Jan Patočka, Roman Ingarden and Gustav Speth—and minor figures, whose relevance is naturally often overlooked. To counter the marginalization of these figures, we will focus specifically on them in this study. The main element in our reconstruction is the concept of philosophy “in margine”: in other words, the marginal philosophy Jan Patočka (1907–1977) discussed in his essay on Masaryk. The second concept is “state of emergency” (in Czech, vyjímečný stav), which the Czechoslovak philosopher Milan Šimečka (1930–1990) described in his letters from prison. In connection with that we will discuss the “form” or “structure” of a phenomenological account and some “essential factors that characterize the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe” (Plotka, 2016, pp. 10–15).

There were several researchers working in the background whose impact was less direct but who nonetheless constituted a second stream that ultimately disappears into oblivion. They include Marie Bayerová (1922–1997) and Josef Cibulka (1926–1998). Using examples of their philosophical work, we reconstruct the complicated but creative destiny of Husserl’s phenomenology in Central Europe during this period. There are, of course, many other figures, mainly in Czech philosophy (for a more complete view see Blecha, 2003; Moural, 1997; Bakoš, 2010). As will be shown, Bayerová and Cibulka represent philosophers who expended a great deal of energy on phenomenology, with varying degrees of success. This had consequences for both their work and personal life. But that was the reality of life as an intellectual in Czechoslovakia in the second half of the 20th century. The paper examines important tendencies in the phenomenological movement in this milieu and in the nature of philosophizing itself.

From historiographical record to historicity

Bayerová and Cibulka were contemporaries who studied under Patočka at Charles University in Prague. Later, at different times, they worked at the Institute of Philosophy at the Academy of Sciences in Prague and Bratislava. They continued to engage with Patočka as Bayerová worked with him when translating Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations. Both Bayerová and Cibulka were at the Institute of Philosophy in Prague at the same time as Patočka. Cibulka corresponded with Patočka after he had moved away from Prague. With the onset of normalization, working in philosophy became very difficult and the political circumstances affected both the personal and professional lives of this generation of academics. The Czech and Slovak intellectual milieu intermingled, with some of the Czech generation moving to the Slovak half of the republic. Cibulka, for example, moved to Bratislava, as did “M. Šimečka, R. Matuštík, B. Truhlář, V. Brožík” (Matejov, 1998, p. 264). This was nothing new: Czech intellectuals had moved to Slovakia in previous eras—in the 19th century and after 1918 (when the common Czechoslovak state was formed). Conversely, after 1993 there was an uptick in the brain-drain from Slovakia to the Czech Republic (following the division of Czechoslovakia). There were two historical periods which encouraged philosophical writing in phenomenology—a short period in the 1960s and the era after the revolution in 1989. These periods provided both Bayerová and Cibulka with opportunities for free and creative activity (even in old age).

The aim of this paper is not to overstate the philosophical efforts and originality of Bayerová and Cibulka. The account given here is intended as one of phenomenological historiography. By obtaining retrospective insights into their work we can explore how the questions and topics they tackled evolved, how these thinkers shifted in step with the different political circumstances, and how, or if they concluded their thinking. We will also explore the legacy of the “destiny” of the phenomenological movement in this milieu. We will begin by presenting some of the main phenomenological research conducted by Marie Bayerová and Josef Cibulka, and at the end of this section we will briefly consider their legacy.

If we trace Bayerová’s work back to its origins, we see that her initial interest was primarily in the phenomenological method of epoché and reduction. In her interpretation of the method, she follows certain “nodal points” and collects, or brings together, the membra disiecta (scattered fragments)—identifying Husserl’s method and the contexts within which the individual steps are taken. She thus arrives at a kind of methodical and propaedeutic description (Bayerová, 1968; Vydrová, 2015). We can consider her approach unique as, although just a summary, no other such studies had been conducted at that time. She also explored Czechoslovak philosophy, looking for themes to extend phenomenology and introduce it into Czech philosophy. She was particularly interested in topics that were important in phenomenology, such as evidence, the status of objects and gnoseology. She tried to untangle the Bolzano–Brentano–Husserlian knot and find common and divergent tendencies within it, which was important for the genealogy of philosophical thinking and for understanding the emergence of the philosophical and cultural traditions in the Czech environment. Bayerová discovered that these common links were part of a broader tendency in Central European thinking. For example in her study of Bolzano she makes reference to representatives of Hungarian and Polish thinking, such as Palágyi, Leśniewski, Adjukiewicz, Kotrabiński, Twardowski and Tarski (see Bayerová, 1994, p. 13, p. 16, p. 18).

When researching Husserl, Bayerová drew an arc beginning from his Logical Investigations passing through Crisis and ending at Experience and Judgment. Its trajectory is unsurprising, revealing the shift from pure logic to the new approach to psychology and theory of knowledge as a ground of phenomenology. She writes, “conceptually Husserl goes beyond Bolzano”, “his thinking extends ‘logically’ to intentional analysis. Here intentionality becomes an explanatory or interpretational element that Husserl introduces in its fullest and broadest sense into the concept of the knowledge of being” (Bayerová, 1994, p. 195). When we look at the trajectory of his thinking, the relation between logic and phenomenology arises out of, or is based on, formalization and pure logic which turns into or transforms into the material eidetic. Two sets of questions then emerge: 1. What makes knowledge possible and what do knowledge and experience mean in reality? 2. Which approach is best suited to the status of the object and its multifacetedness? This was the phenomenological pointer that ultimately led Bayerová to another interesting topic in the 1990s. It can be seen as the culmination of her thinking—in the sense that it gave her original insights and international recognition but also went beyond the classic interpretation of work on phenomenology. Together with the art theorist Tomáš Vlček, Bayerová fruitfully linked Husserl’s phenomenology with Cubism (Vydrová, 2016).

Bayerová sought to identify the different forms and givenness of objects—the residuum of phenomenological reduction—as pure essences and works of art. The leap from logic to fine art is not as great as might be supposed. Iteratively understanding the status of objects also means explaining experience; in other words, it leads us to the phenomenology of perception. The starting points of phenomenology change—from formalization, from logical to material resources of phenomenology.

Looking at Josef Cibulka’s work with the same intention, we can see how his thinking is deeply rooted in Hegelian and Marxist philosophy. He translated Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy and included phenomenological topics in his discussions of historicism, positivism and scientism. His arc was wider, stretching from modern philosophy to modernity (Matejov, 1998, p. 247), which led him to the key problem of sense and facticity. These two concepts featured in the title of his long and dense book, and are indicated in the subtitle, Polarity and Intertwining of Transcendental and Hermeneutic Philosophy. Cibulka confronts the work of Husserl with both that of his predecessors and his contemporary critics to produce a genealogy of his thinking. He was constantly moving on to more fruitful themes, such as the passivity and corporeity of the subject, and abandoning less challenging topics. But as he points out it is not just the new topics found in the later Husserl that are important, those relating to time and temporality are also crucial (Cibulka, 1996, p. 83).

Cibulka’s scope ranged widely: in the main part of his book he discusses Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, transcendental pragmatics, Habermas, Derrida and Foucault. He juxtaposes the work of Husserl with that of his predecessors and interpreters and then, having analysed and critiqued them, turns to the fruitful overlap between phenomenology and hermeneutics. He uses it to show the interplay and tension between reflecting, in the sense of grasping the structure of meaning, and a hermeneutic account that retains the unpredictability of meaning (Matejov, 1998, p. 248). He takes into account various aspects of the expression and achievements of the subject, such as wishes, interests, and agency. He tries to show how different hermeneutical accounts complement one another and cannot be reduced to the other or to a single ground. He thereby shows that meaning is decentralized. Fedor Matejov points out that, after his “publication eruption” in 1989, Cibulka conducted research into contemporary philosophical questions and the human situation (Matejov, 1998, p. 246). Unlike Bayerová’s strategy, which was both subtle and convergent, Cibulka’s account was extensive and diverged thematically. But we should note that Cibulka’s papers, notes and reviews have not been published and are still awaiting scholarly assessment. They are held in the archives of the Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences.

To draw this section to an end, it is worth considering the backdrop to Cibulka and Bayerová’s thinking and their interests: 1. the wish to extend the roots of the German and Austrian philosophical tradition; 2. both researchers were closely involved in their own regional histories and in translating texts, and these should not necessarily be seen merely as means of escaping the restrictions on philosophizing but as indicating their sensitivity to their own intellectual background (mainly in Bayerová’s case); and 3. the question of how phenomenology would continue to develop and the opportunities it presented, but seeking to retain its original meaning at the same time. The first aim in exploring such minor and unknown figures in phenomenology is historiographic and can be described as a kind of “record-keeping” of the phenomenological movement in Central Europe. But it also leads us to consider the issue of historicity. As stated at the beginning of this section—historicity is key to ascertaining the mode of phenomenology found in these forgotten stories about intellectuals in Central and Eastern Europe. In other words, historicity tells us about how the thinking developed and the historicity of humankind, our personal history and existence in the circumstances of the era. It is both historiographical and anthropological, and relevant to philosophical anthropology, the study of humans in situations and intersubjective relations as situated in history.

Marginal philosophy

Patočka’s second essay on Masaryk (Patočka, 2006, pp. 341-365) is useful to understanding the liminal situation. In what sense? If we want to employ the concept of “marginal philosophy”, or “philosophy in margine”, then we have to join Patočka and look at the possibilities for philosophy that emerged along with the new Czechoslovak state (1918). Patočka thought the situation was special because of the interlinking of politics. Masaryk’s rise to power was unusual in that, “Philosophers constructed the state in ideal terms, through real political action—only one thinker in history had this opportunity: Masaryk” (Patočka, 2006, p. 343). Patočka was nonetheless aware that Masaryk’s philosophical aim was not entirely free of bias and borrowed uncritically from other philosophies. Of course the situation in the second half of the century differed in many respects, but the process of marginalization became even more marked, and the “stage”, so to speak, remained the same. But what do we mean by “in margine”?

The term “marginal” describes an approach that follows preordained patterns and is not as open, free or courageous as original philosophy, which is about developing one’s own particular philosophy (Patočka, 2006, p. 342). Not all societies are prepared or equipped to develop this kind of thinking which is of a wide intellectual scope and includes issues relating to literature, theology, poetry, popular works and so on, but also requires the philosopher to have a personal, political attitude and to live in freedom. Patočka thought ancient Greek philosophy met these conditions. It also applies to attentive thinkers in the modern era who strive for a deep intellectual and cultural grounding, develop the ability to think contextually but who are also critical and consistent in their thinking. This kind of thinking and attitude brings a historical dimension to the individual’s life. As Patočka stated,

… the ‘marginal philosophy’ of the Slavonic nations attempts to show, even through their secondary and interpretative philosophical thinking, in explaining the history of life in these societies, that these social unities are already becoming free in the political sense and are joining or even re-joining history. (2006, p. 344)

In some respects we can detect similar tendencies in Bayerová’s thinking about the historical situation of Czech philosophy and in Cibulka’s reaction to the problems facing contemporary philosophy. Gradually they both tried to reconcile these issues with their own philosophical position. In the complicated political situation philosophers found themselves in under communism, this movement tended to be very subtle and indirect and was not publicly visible. Phenomenology often appears in unexpected forms. Phenomenological thinking was often undertaken in other disciplines such as in art and theories of art and some of the human and social sciences (e.g. in sociology). It was also found underground, in the parallel and unofficial structures, existing in the private sphere, and in prison, in the work of Šimečka for instance. Šimečka was a philosopher, writer and dissident who was arrested in 1981 and imprisoned for 13 months. His correspondence with his family was published in samizdat form, clandestinely, and was disseminated even after the revolution. He saw it as a means of escaping from the negative conditions and persecution: “Sadness and misfortune uncover man… This uncovering, tearing off of the protecting coat, help our eyes to look around better, help the soul to measure depth and help to put reason into motion” (Šimečka, 2018, p. 98). Šimečka confesses in one of his letters: “I perceive my fate as a philosophical task which was assigned to me.”

Nonetheless not all those involved were explicitly politically active against the regime. Although the work they were able to do was often uninspiring and restricted (unqualified jobs, such as providing technical support in libraries or working as sales assistants or even labourers). Several intellectuals were active members of the Communist Party who later left or were kicked out. Some even collaborated with the state security forces. Not all those who were politically persecuted became successful after the revolution, having gained their political freedom. Neither Bayerová nor Cibulka were central figures in politics, but neither did they give up on philosophy and remain passive; that is not to suggest that this is all that is required to do philosophy. To borrow the words of Josef Zumr from an interview with Jan Patočka, “how a person becomes a philosopher and how philosophy becomes the destiny of a person” was both convoluted and challenging in the 20th century in the communist countries of central Europe (see Várossová, 1969, pp. 3–14 and Mervart, 2013).

Marginal philosophy has been variously defined. As we have seen, the most important aspect is the relationship philosophers have with their own historical lives, their self-explanations, self-interpretations and their critical attitudes to their own philosophy and history, but they also need to be able to maintain a distance from given justifications (reflecting on the circumstances and conditions under which they are interpreted; Patočka, 2006, p. 354, p. 356). Cibulka noted that “only a consciousness that is familiar with its own variability and that can exploit that variability can form an attitude towards the past” (Cibulka, 1996, p. 15). In other words what is required is a trained and critical consciousness that can examine its own possibilities. A positive intentional variability of understanding, as opposed to a rapid straightforward solution, brings with it a kind of ambiguity between the old and the new, between acceptance and rejection, either explicit or implicit, official or unofficial in the framework of historical schema. However, this is not the same as indifference, as Plessner points out: “…there is no indifferent thinking about the essence of humans” (Plessner, 2003, p. 221). This ambiguity cannot lead to stagnation or even cessation because “history is the task of constant reinterpretation”; “the relation to history... is ambivalent in that sense, it is accepting as well as denying, following as well as distancing. It is not possible to build an identity on the pure negation of one’s history; an absolutely positive relation by contrast puts society to sleep and deprives it of self-criticism” (Novosád, 2016, p. 82). How we relate to our history can sustain us in the constant shifts in thought.

On the one hand, philosophy in the strong sense means looking for impetus in openness and freedom of thinking and agency, while on the other it is a kind of anthropological ambition to become aware and to understand human beings in their crises (Patočka, 2006, p. 356), to find solutions to the problems of humankind and the epoch in which humans live. This indicates a shift from the marginal, peripheral areas to the central core consideration. In this process, a national philosophy can emerge and simultaneously overlap with global questions and thereby transcend the national framework. To enter philosophy and thus history also means to re-enter them, and this can be interpreted as a continuous effort, as constantly dealing with marginality and repeatedly calling things into question.

Being in marginal, peripheral situations and crises are a part of philosophizing, just as understanding and overcoming them are. This iteration can be interpreted with the help of Šimečka’s concept of the “state of emergency”, of being in permanent tension with “bad coincidences”, boredom, degradation and devaluation. This reverse side, the decay of human action, not only follows on from political persecution but is connected to the states of acedia, passivity, and mediocrity. In fact, what we lose through acedia is not just a kind of praxis, but also a proper relation to ourselves, things and the world in which we live. In contrast to this fossilized state Šimečka calls for a kind of “exceptional” state, not a state of permanent danger, and not the pursuit of safety (Šimečka, 2018, p. 53; see Zvarík, 2017, p. 9). Because of the certainty and stability of philosophy, its unproblematic emergence can lead to stagnation. Philosophy thus appears to be “seemingly as unreal marginalia” (Patočka, 2006, p. 341) and has to struggle through the layers of unproblematic givenness and thereby obtain freedom (on Patočka’s conception of “shaken” see Zvarík, 2017).

Phenomenology’s position in the communist era shows us that being an outsider paradoxically helped create a space for philosophizing. In this sense, there are two possible forms of phenomenology: one that is officially marginalized but philosophically and politically central (in the sense of freedom of thinking), such as that of Patočka; then there is Bayerová and Cibulka’s phenomenology, which remained on the margins philosophically but in practice maintained its phenomenological theme, which was not trivial, philosophically or existentially (but seemingly marginal). It is from the margins that thinking can potentially take the form of an “exceptional” attitude. It can be linked with the modest but distinct appeal—“Be able not to forget”—mentioned twice by Patočka. Together, but in different forms, they attempted to locate basic but valuable praxis, which leads us not only to Patočka’s famous “care of the soul” but also to Šimečka’s concept of “care of” one’s reality or meaningful activity (Šimečka, 2018, pp. 80–81).

Bayerová and Cibulka’s efforts were never completed, neither were they original or entirely forgotten. We should not stop critically assessing their conclusions and considering their philosophical relevance to further research. This certainly applies to Bayerová’s work on the intertwining of phenomenology and visual art, especially cubism, which paved the way to new thinking about the relationship between phenomenology and the avant-garde. She initiated a new wave of investigation that is still topical. Cibulka’s hermeneutic account and problematization of sense and facticity, which built on living subjectivity in the world, was picked up by those working on Slovak literary theory and on theoretical thinking about art. But his style of writing did not appeal to younger scholars who might have drawn on his studies. The other reason these researchers are forgotten (despite their work being continued) is that they remained isolated, with no community to refer to them. As research accelerated in the 1990s their work was glossed over in the preference for research from abroad, the emergence of free access to resources and the open borders, which had been sorely missed in Central and Eastern Europe. With the arrival of freedom, philosophy seized the opportunity but perhaps, in some ways at least, lost sight of “apparent marginalia”, forgetting what had gone before.

From reconstruction to self-understanding

The mode of phenomenology that developed in this region through specific achievements points to the significance of having a historical perspective in phenomenology. The present situation of humankind draws on its historicity in the sense that former generations, like historical forces, maintain the continuity in thinking between what went before and what is in the here and now. “‘This’ man is a being who neither in the case of all nations, nor in any period understands himself in the same way, and thus in his original everyday understanding is historically bound” (Plessner, 1970, p. 25). Historical questioning is forever re-creating and open-ended.

Patočka’s concept of the marginalia helps us to see a phenomenological task in the genealogy of phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe, a kind of philosophy of history concerned with the relation between philosophers and self-consideration, a critical attitude to their own philosophy and history, and reflection upon the crises of human beings. It is an effort to understand and trace some of the roots of phenomenological thinking in central Europe—phenomenologists’ attempts at using the phenomenological method and exploring the topics to understand the role of philosophy in human lives, to varying degree of success. The anthropological task is particularly evident in certain philosophical efforts, in the tiniest creative endeavours and decisions made in situations, not just in key or dominant shifts, factors or causes. Here the mode of phenomenology is the centre point that was enabled and supported by work on the margins. Alongside the main figures, such as Patočka, who remained at the centre of philosophical thinking, were the minor figures of the phenomenological movement, such as Bayerová and Cibulka, who helped to preserve a version of phenomenological research, its potentialities. They were “able not to forget,” and to resist the pressure to leave philosophy or engage in the ideological critique of phenomenology.

This was not a monolithic epoch, and it cannot be reconstructed to the extent it provides a full picture of that trajectory in history because it was not “built from one piece” but created “a limited balance between forces with different orientations” (Novosád, 2016, p. 49). The Slovak philosopher, Elena Várossová, who was alert to the phenomenological account of history, pointed out: “The truth of history is not a passive reconstruction of pure historical objectivity; and in this resides its difficulty as well as the possibility of a different reading” (Várossová, 1969, p. 7). Beyond these readings such as Várossová’s or Novosád’s historical forces, there is no hidden mind making all the decisions behind the big story of history, as the cases of these phenomenologists show, instead we find the “lived situation of historical man”, as Patočka put it (2006, p. 365). This involves connecting meaning, the endeavours of intellectuals who live within their own environment and in society, with their own interests, needs and possibilities, and these shape their attitudes and then they choose whether to act.